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Human rights violations in Tibet
India shouldn’t keep quiet
by Kuldip Nayar
CAMP Hale at Colorado in the US is a long way from Tibet. But what joins them together is the training of some 2000 Tibetan warriors who have been taught the art of guerrilla warfare to fight the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China. The warriors have failed to deflect China from consolidating its position in the Buddhist kingdom which it annexed in 1947. Yet they have not given up fighting. They continue to put up resistance here and there and harass at times the Chinese soldiers even at Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. Beijing sees the hands of New Delhi in the independence war that the people in Tibet have waged against China. Beijing is more convinced about New Delhi’s hand after Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna told China the other day that Tibet was like Kashmir, “our core problem”. The two governments discussed last week the delineation of the border but Tibet appears to have been settled as far as New Delhi is concerned. But the Tibetans nourish a grievance against India, which accepted China’s suzerainty over Tibet after the British left India in 1947. Their complaint is that New Delhi declared China’s suzerainty over Tibet without consulting its people. This is also the complaint of the Dalia Lama, who took refuge in India in 1954 when he could not tolerate the Communist shoes trampling upon the spiritual and traditional ways of his people. He, too, believes that since India had no locus standi in Tibet, it had no right to accept China’s suzerainty over it. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, could see that the Dalai Lama was not safe in Tibet and, therefore, sent Indian officials to receive him on the border. This was a great gesture which was applauded throughout the world. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan leaders accompanying him, too, saw in India a country which gave shelter to the persecuted in the world. But it became apparent to them soon that for good relations with China they, particularly the Dalai Lama, would have to face a bad time. He was placed at Dharamsala, a tiny hill station in Himachal Pradesh, and told not to have any contact with the outside world without permission from New Delhi. A similar fiat was issued on his pronouncements. Understandably, Nehru was going through a bad patch with Chinese Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai, who talked of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai but forcibly built a road at Aksai-Chin, part of Ladakh, to connect Sin-Kaing with Tibet. It was Beijing’s betrayal which Nehru tried to cover up, lest the common man in India should get disillusioned with the build-up of friendly relationship with China that Nehru had done. But even during the 1962 war with China, initiated by Beijing, Nehru did not utter a word about Tibet. Nor did he draw the world’s attention to the ethnic cleansing going on in Tibet. And that has been the policy of all his successor governments. At times, the Dalai Lama has felt “suffocated” and has complained against it to New Delhi. But there has been no change in its policy even when Beijing is hauling thousands of Chinese to Tibet to settle them there to change the complexion and convictions of the population. A lonely Dalai Lama has pointed out that the centuries old Buddhist culture in Tibet was being destroyed with the influx of Chinese. But except for odd protests here and there, nothing concerted or concrete has come out. And the Chinese are squeezing out even the semblance of lofty religious practices that the Tibetans have defiantly followed. Washington is said to be willing to appeal to the conscience of the people in the world to save the centuries’ old culture in Tibet. But how far it is willing to go is not known. After all, President Obama kept the Dalai Lama waiting to placate Beijing. Even when he met him, he looked like going over an exercise. The strong Chinese economy gives more laughter to the US citizen than a few drops of tears that the irking of conscience might do. There are continuous reports of China nibbling at our territory. India is annoyingly quiet. But when Beijing puts its claim on Arunachal and when the visa for the people of Jammu and Kashmir is not stamped but given on a separate stapled paper, India should introspect why it accepted China’s suzerainty over Tibet without getting any assurance on the future. Today it is like an occupied territory, without the Tibetans having any say in governance. Unfortunately, the Dalai Lama is thinking of retiring at a time when he is needed the most to put pressure on China to honour at least the religious rights of the Tibetans. Essentially, it is India which has to come out of its make-belief world and realise that good relations with China do not depend upon the curbs on the Dalai Lama or the silence over what is happening in Tibet. Beijing would probably respect New Delhi more if it were to find later saying openly what it feels about Tibet. Beijing should also realise that 80 per cent of India’s population, the Hindu, has always considered Tibet as part of the Kailash, the mountains where Lord Shiva rests. The Hindus have religious ties with Budhhism and see in the Dalai Lama a religious head. No doubt, India accepted China’s suzerainty over Tibet in the wake of departure by the British because that was how they dealt with Lhasa. After more than five decades New Delhi cannot question the suzerainty but it can at least raise a voice against the atrocities committed in Tibet and the recurring violation of human rights. New Delhi should realise that a suzerain is a ruler or a government that exercises political control. But a suzerain cannot claim the hold over the way the Tibetans want to live and the religion they want to follow. When China is changing the very complexion of the population in Tibet and when the ethnic population is being annihilated, it is not suzerainty but an act of suppression by a dictatorial regime. Power can eliminate anything, more so tiny Tibetan protest, but it cannot silence the humanity over the extinction of people, however small in number. When India, with all its traditions of tolerance, buttressed by Mahatma Gandhi’s example of dignified defiance, fails to speak out, it only proves the dictum: the weakest is pushed to the wall. New Delhi can still protest against the misrule in
Tibet.
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Mind — your business
by Chetana Vaishnavi
In a premier institute the entrance to a large hallway has the sign “Mind Your Head”. Every time I read it I wonder what it really means. I do not believe it has been written to warn any unusually tall person that he would hit his head, because the ceiling is really not that low. If it means to say, “Your mind is your head!” then a punctuation mark would have been needed. Therefore, it can be construed as a request to control one’s arguing capability after one enters the hallway leading to lecture theatres where brainstorming sessions take place. In short, one should mind one’s head and not enter into any irrelevant debate, thereby implying that we have to mind our own business. We may or may not mind our own business. But come to think of it, our mind is our own business. We all speak of our mind, yet we do not know what the mind is. The 19th century satirist, Ambrose Bierce, defined mind as a curious form of matter secreted by the brain. The dictionary meaning of mind is human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thoughts, perception, emotion, will, memory and imagination. Thus a mind is an organ of intelligence, closely associated with the brain, though many people believe it is same as the brain. We know that without brain the mind cannot exist. Does it mean that mind is synonymous with the soul? We have oft and again been told to keep our mind open. However Rick Warren says: “Some people are so open minded, their brains fall out”. We know by now that minds are like parachutes which only function when open. But Terry Pratchett believes that the trouble with having an open mind is that people will insist on coming along and trying to put things in it. And once things are put into it, you will start hallucinating. Hallucinations are experiences that confuse reality and imaginations. All this results in abnormal emotions. We must remember that emotions are not made by the mind, but they can colour or cloud its operation. We do mindless things when we fail to apply our mind and people say we are out of our mind. But one can bear in mind that experience is the name we give to our mistakes. We must thank God for being kind enough to give us a mind. Mind is something that is exclusively ours and no one can fathom it. A psychologist may believe that he can read your mind. But very soon he will change his mind about this, because mind you, your mind belongs only to you. Oh yeah! Nobody can really read it till you speak it out! And I am sure you are no blonde. For a blonde becomes speechless after she speaks out her
mind!
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Today marks the ninth anniversary of the horrific attack on Parliament which sparked off India’s attempt at military coercion vis-a-vis Pakistan. But the lessons learnt seem to have been ignored. Lack of political will and
a coherent decision making process are still lacking, thereby undermining the nation’s credibility
LOST OPPORTUNITIES
Gurmeet Kanwal
India's first attempt at military coercion achieved only limited success. Operation Parakram, launched in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament, was the first full-scale mobilisation since the 1971 Indo-Pak war. It began on December 15, 2001 after the Cabinet Committee on Security’s (CCS) decision and was completed on January 3, 2002. It finally ended on October 16, 2002 when CCS belatedly recognised that the law of diminishing returns had been operative for many months already. In a face-saving move, CCS declared that troops were being "strategically relocated" and constant vigil would be maintained, especially in J&K. Though the 10-month deployment ended without a conflict, the two nations came close to war on at least two occasions. The first window of opportunity came in the first week of January 2002 soon after the Indian Army had completed its slow-paced mobilisation. In the snow-bound areas of J&K the army had relatively few options to launch offensive operations across the LoC, but in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal. The United States and other Western governments, however, stepped in with astute diplomatic manoeuvres resulting in General Musharraf's ashen-faced commitment in a nationally telecast speech on January 12, 2002, that Pakistan "will not permit any terrorist activity from its soil". India backed-off, but troops remained in place in their deployment areas on the international border (IB) and the three strike corps remained poised in their concentration areas. The second opportunity presented itself after a terrorist attack on the family quarters in the Indian army garrison at Kaluchak near Jammu on May 14, 2002. The summer weather was conducive for offensives across the LoC in Kashmir Valley as well as the Jammu division south of the Pir Panjal mountains. In Punjab and Rajasthan, though the 40-degree plus temperatures were hard on man and machine, the disadvantage was common to both the sides and major offensive action was possible. By this time the Pakistan army had also mobilised and was poised in defence. Despite high-pitched rhetoric and extensive saber-rattling, the government did not approve military strikes across the border.
Slow Pace of Strike Corps MobilisationWhile the formations responsible to defend the border - "holding" or "pivot" corps - were ready for battle within 72 to 96 hours of receiving orders, the three "strike corps" (1, 2 and 21 Corps) took almost three weeks to complete their mobilisation because their fighting echelons are based at long distances from the border. Hence, it was only in the first week of January 2002 that major offensive action could have been undertaken by the land forces. This time the mobilisation was total. All leave was cancelled and the soldiers re-called for active duty. Almost all training establishments were closed down. Extensive operational familiarisation exercises were conducted and operational plans war-gamed, updated and refined. Ammunition trains brought reserve stocks to forward ammunition points. In the first week of January 2002, expectation about the impending offensive action had reached fever pitch and morale was at an all time high. However, the troops had no way of knowing that the national aim was to practice coercive diplomacy. The army also addressed shortcomings in training that initial mobilisation had revealed. There were unacceptably large casualties and it was officially stated that till March 15, 2002, the army had lost 176 men in the operation due to mishaps in minefields, mishandling ammunition and explosives and traffic accidents. The defence minister reportedly stated in Parliament, that up to July 2003, the army suffered 798 casualties. It clearly emerged that the army's mine laying methodology and training and the system adopted for marking minefields to keep civilians and cattle away needed substantial improvement. The cost of sustaining Operation Parakram was reported to be have been pegged by India's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) at Rs 7 crore a day. This works out to approximately Rs 2,100 crore over 10 months and, presumably, does not include the cost of mobilisation and de-induction. The minister told Parliament in October 2002 that Operation Parakram had cost Rs 8,000 crore, excluding Rs 300 crore compensation paid to people in border states where troops were deployed.
Lessons Learned - and not LearnedPerhaps the most important lesson emerging from the standoff was the inordinately long time that strike corps needed to mobilise for war. By the time these elite formations were ready to deliver a massive punch, the international community had prevailed upon India to give General Musharraf an opportunity to prove his sincerity in curbing cross-border terrorism. These strike corps are designed to penetrate deep into Pakistan and run the risk of crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold early during an offensive campaign. The lack of coherent politico-military decision-making was clearly evident. It is not at all clear whether any military objectives were actually assigned by the political leadership. Asked whether the deployment was aimed at attacking Pakistan, the then army chief Gen S. Padmanabhan, said, "There were many aims, which were fulfilled." However, he also said, "Whenever there is a situation calling for the army's help, the latter's role should be well defined to avoid confusion." Gen V. P. Malik, General Padmanabhan's predecessor wrote in the Tribune: "Despite speeches and international commitments…. Musharraf's efforts to rein in Jihadi groups… remained cosmetic and tactical… Infiltration across the LoC and other ISI operations continue… There is no let up in terrorist acts…" When mobilisation began, Vijayanta tanks of 1970s vintage, artillery guns that were even older and many other obsolete equipment were in frontline service. Analysts pegged the overall Indo-Pak combat force ratio at approximately 1.15:1.0 in India's favour during the Operation. Speaking as an MP in the Rajya Sabha less than a week after mobilisation began, former army chief Gen Shankar Roychowdhury blamed the "recurrent political controversies on military procurement in the last 15 years" for having "crippled the army's modernisation programme." Sadly, not much has changed in the last decade despite well-intentioned reforms in defence procurement procedures. Inordinate delays in decision-making and bureaucratic red tape continue to mar acquisitions, a large chunk of the defence budget is still surrendered year after year, large equipment shortages continue to persist and a CDS is yet to be appointed. Strategic analysts in India were concerned at the adverse impact of the lack of resolute action on the credibility of India's deterrence. Former air chief A. Y. Tipnis said at that time: "We have shown enormous patience, now it is time to show we have resolve too. Inaction is damaging our credibility; people have begun to believe India incapable of taking any action." Brahma Chellaney wrote: "The harsh truth is that the government played a game of bluff not just with Pakistan but also with its own military… When a nation enjoys credibility, it can usually achieve its objectives with a mere threat to use force. However, when there are serious credibility problems, even modest objectives are difficult to accomplish. Vajpayee ended up practising coercive non-diplomacy." The aim of politico-military coercion is to induce a change in an adversary's policies and actions through a credible threat of devastating punitive action in case of non-compliance. While trans-LoC terrorism from Pakistan continued, there was a definite reduction in its intensity. On the other hand, Pakistan steadfastly refused to either terminate the activities of the LeT and the JeM, detain their leaders and block their funds or to hand over even one of the 20 terrorists India had demanded. Training camps and other facilities for terrorists also continued to operate in POK. Hence, the government's aim of launching Operation Parakram was only partially achieved and the credibility of India's coercive diplomacy and military superiority was seriously undermined. Also, the opportunity to strike at the roots of terrorism in POK was once again squandered. Lack of political will was again demonstrated after the terror strikes in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, despite credible evidence that these had been launched by the LeT at the behest of the Pakistani army and the ISI. As long as the Pakistani army continues to exercise a tight stranglehold over Pakistan's polity, unbridled control over its nuclear weapons, retains its unjustifiable size of 500,000 personnel in uniform and enjoys American patronage as a frontline state with MNNA (major non-NATO ally) status - which brings with it new military equipment, loan waivers and the rescheduling of loan payments on easier terms over longer periods - it will have no incentive to move towards genuine peace with India. The Kashmir issue is only the symptom of a much larger fundamental malaise. The Southern Asian region is likely to continue to witness periodic bouts of hostility between India and Pakistan, tempered by short interludes of tentative peace. The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi
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