The blinkers are still in place
By K.S. Bajwa

THE India Armed Forces fought their most decisive war against Pakistan in December 71. It was the first occasion after Independence when Indian armed power was closely integrated into the formulation of national policy and it’s promotion after all the other means had failed to achieve the desired results. Even then, while the soldiers won the war, the political leadership failed to extract a durable peace.

In early 1971, after a very repressive military crack-down in the erstwhile East Pakistan, over 10 million refugees had fled into the adjoining Assam and West Bengal, causing security risks and economic burden. All peaceful means to persuade Islamabad to create the necessary political conditions for the return of these refugees failed.

By the end of March 1971 it was evident that a recourse to a military option was inevitable. Indian political leadership was keen for an immediate military intervention but the three chiefs, led by General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw (later Field Marshal), Chief of the Army Staff, were able to persuade the political executive to settle upon the period from October to November, for the contemplated operation.

Our national aims envisaged a military option to set up a government in empathy with the population, which would create conditions in the erstwhile East Pakistan for the return of the refugees. Our military intervention had to be, therefore, closely allied to the Bangla freedom struggle.

It was also calculated that a friendly Bangla government would also reduce the two-pronged threat from West Pakistan. Security of the rest of the country was to be ensured by carrying the fight into West Pakistan. As has been shown by subsequent events, it is doubtful whether our political executive looked too far beyond these immediate national aims to a durable peace with Pakistan.

After the liberation of Bangladesh, only significantly damaging military gains in West Pakistan would have given us a superior bargaining position in the negotiations for peace that followed the termination of hostilities.

Evidently there was a lack of a sound focus and clarity in the long-term political aims vis a vis national security in relation to Pakistan. Undoubtedly, this resulted in the selection of military objectives that did not really hurt West Pakistan.

We had, perforce, to plan to fight on two fronts. The core of the strategic concept evolved was for a major military intervention into the erstwhile East Pakistan while ensuring effective security of the rest of the country. In the Eastern Sector, operational design was to envelop the country from all sides — thereby enforcing a dispersion of Pak forces and denying them the advantage of exploiting interior lines.

The controversy that Dacca was not designated as a vital objective was laid to rest by a dynamic envelopment by 4 Corps, from the East and the Northern thrust from Meghalaya. Surrender of the Pak forces in a 14-day operation in this riverine terrain which favoured the defenders was a remarkable achievement. While Bangla Desh was liberated, there are positive as well as negative aspects to long-term gains to our security. On the plus side are the return of the bulk of the refugees; elimination of the Eastern prong of the threat from Pakistan and the prospect of developing friendly relations with Bangla Desh, which having a fairly well-rooted identity in Bangla sub-nationalism, does not have to fall back upon hostility with India to hold the nation together as is the case with Pakistan.

On the negative side, elimination of East Pakistan has helped to consolidate Pakistan both politically and militarily. Its security problems have been rendered more easily manageable. While there has been some scaling down in dissidents and militants operating from the territory of Bangla Desh, Pak’s intelligence outfit, ISI still manages to conduct operations against India. There is also a potential danger that in the long run West Bengal and Assam may be vulnerable to the penetration of Bangla nationalism as well as Eastern region solidarity.

In the Western, the situation was more complex. The strategic option open to us was an offensive-defence carrying the fighting into Pak territory. At the same time it would have to be directed to secure such objectives as would place us in a advantageously. Out of our long border with West Pakistan, the stretch from South of Fazilka in Punjab to the Arabian Sea was devoid of any obstacles and vulnerable to an armoured incursion.

From Fazilka to Madhopur we were poised on river or well developed ditch-cum-bund obstacle systems. From Madhopur, the vital road link to Jammu running close to the border was vulnerable. In Jammu and Kashmir, defences on both sides of the then Cease Fire line were well developed.

Neither side could muster the military resources to mount any significant operations. While we could recapture Pt 13620 overlooking Kargil, we did not have the troops to retake the Haji Pir pass. Our biggest failure was to ensure adequate defence of area Chhamb, despite our experience in 1965.

We failed to properly assess the Pak capability to mount a quick offensive operation in this area in view of its proximity to Pak bases in area Gujrat-Kharian-Jhelum. For some peculiar reason troops deployed in this area were given the dual role of mounting an offensive operation and (in case this could not be undertaken) to adopt a defensive. As it happened our troops were caught in between the two roles and could perform neither fully successfully.

The main strength of the Pak Armed Forces including the bulk of the armour, the fire power, the Air Force and the Navy were located in the then West Pakistan. We had an edge in the air and on the sea but a virtual numerical parity in the ground forces. However, the diversion of two additional infantry divisions to East Pakistan and disruption/dilution consequent to elimination/unreliability of key Bengali personnel in communication and technical slots, Pakistan field formations especially the armoured reserves, lacked integrated operational balance in their combat development.

In the assessment of enemy capabilities we seemed to have lost sight of this vital consideration. As a consequence, sizable armoured forces were kept tied down in the middle sector where our defences were based on a strong obstacle system and we failed to exploit their mobility. Assigning Pakistan a capability to mount a counter stroke any where along our border from Rajasthan to Jammu, we seem to have fallen for a deployment to be strong everywhere — thereby neglecting the principles of economy of force and concentration. Catering for the holding of defences and a strong armoured reserve poised to intervene in the Rajasthan as well as the Punjab sectors we could muster a strike corps of about three infantry divisions and a couple of independent armoured brigades.

This force was not enough for any deep penetration into West Pakistan and secure such objectives as would hurt Pakistan and provide us with significant bargaining options. We chose the Shakargarh Salient for our offensive, which ensured security of communications into Jammu and Kashmir but did not hold out an easily achievable access to any vital objective.

Added to this infirmity was the cautious and slow pace of our operations into Pakistan. In the end we had achieved nothing vital to enable us to bargain from an undeniable position of strength. Even what we had in the form of some 93000 prisoners of war captured in Bangla Desh and a few hundred square kilometers of landscape secured in the Shakargarh Salient, was given away without advancing our quest for peace in Jammu and Kashmir. And we had lost most of the strategic area of Chhamb. The strategic blinkers were still in place.

This feature was published on February 28, 1999