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E D I T O R I A L P A G E |
Tuesday, August 3, 1999 |
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Mass
killing on rail track
THE
KARGIL INTRUSION Kashmir:
a saga of dithering |
Major
parties' frantic search for poll mantras
Are
you staple-happy?
Proposals
for fasting |
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Mass killing on rail track The railway accident that took place at Gaisal in the northern part of West Bengal yesterday is one of the worst tragedies of its kind in recent years. The casualty figures will continue to be juggled with or stated vaguely for quite a few days. But the death of a very large number of persons and the disability and injuries caused to hundreds of passengers will predictably cause much grief and horror in the public mind. Think of the circumstances. The Delhi-bound Brahmaputra Mail collides head-on with the Guwahati-bound Awadh-Assam Express at 1.55 a.m. Among many of those found dead immediately happen to be the four drivers of the two trains. As a message about the disaster reaches the possible rescue centres through the usually sluggish communication lines, activity begins. Within hours, more than 200 bodies are brought up by BSF men stationed at Panjipara. More rescuers come and the tragedy unfolds itself with heart-rending grimness. Wild stories are floated: there was a bomb blast before the collision of the two engines; there was a breakdown of the signal system; there was total lack of alertness on the part of the custodians of hundreds of lives on the two trains. But nothing is precisely known. A haphazard headcount begins. One finds that most of the victims in the Brahmaputra Mail are Army, BSF and CRPF personnel. Their destination was Delhi from where they might have gone to places like Kargil, Leh, and flood-affected areas in the plains. Guesswork follows guesswork. Most of the injured are shifted to hospitals in Kishanganj, Islampur, Raiganj and the accident-prone point called Siliguri! The bomb blast theory does not seem to be a product of a hypothesis in view of the massive number of security personnel among the passengers. However, human failure and mechanical errors cannot be ruled out as causative factors. Every time a major
railway accident takes places, statistics are dug out of
old files to show that nothing unusual or abnormal has
happened. The worst point repeatedly made is that the
number of accidents per million train kilometres is
steadily declining. Nobody in the establishment is
prepared to face the fact that the Railways do not spend
enough money to enhance safety prospects and to minimise
accidents. It is widely known that the scope for human
error has not been reduced by upgrading and maintaining
the tracks and the rolling stock consistently. Modern
technology has not been utilised imaginatively.
Signalling has remained a faulty factor. Communication
between drivers and railway stations has been full of
snags. The Railways continue to say that resource
constraints have impeded their schemes. But what about
the overstaffing of the system? Are the sanctioned funds
being properly utilised? Is there no scope for banning
the expenditure on wrong heads? Money starts flowing for
compensation after tragedies like those witnessed at
Khanna last year and at Gaisal yesterday. Inquires are
ordered. But the findings are seldom taken seriously. Mr
Nitish Kumar will return to Delhi on his onward journey
to Patna to play his old political games. The dead will
be forgotten by the government. Their number will go into
the dusty statistical files. We will wait yet again for
another Khanna or another Gaisal. The country will go to
the polls within a few months. Will any political party
make railway safety an important point of its manifesto?
It is time we thought of the loss of human lives in
railway mishaps. It is often stated by the Railways that
500 deaths out of a million passengers ferried in a year
constitute an "accepted average". If this kind
of attitude continues, the Railway Ministry should be
called the "Reckless Ministry". Bomb explosions
have taken place repeatedly on railway tracks. Can better
patrolling help? If Mr Nitish Kumar has a sense of shame,
he should resign here and now. He will not lose much.
Nobody knows what the next election has in store for him. |
Its cell phone election Kargil has faded from the front pages of newspapers and prime time television news programmes. Telecom has stormed to take its place. Thus what promised to be a one-issue election is now more open. There are at least three powerful but disparate forces turning the new policy on cellular and basic telephone operation into a major controversy and their aims are also different. Opposition parties are keen to rub off a part of the personal sheen of the Prime Minister, realising that he is the main vote-catcher for the ruling alliance. That he is holding the charge of telecommunications has come handy and the inept handling of the issue by some bigwigs in the PMO has been of great help. There is clearly an element of desperation in the opposition camp and that is evident in their attempt to target the Prime Minister himself for being responsible for the scam of the millennium, as the CPM describes it. Then there are powerful cellular operators who are keen to sabotage the changes either because the old system spells more profit to them or because they want to destroy competition. They are extremely busy, ferreting out old and new documents and planting them on friendly or rookie reporters. An internal memorandum written by former Communications Minister Jagmohan has found its way to the press as has a note Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha wrote for the Cabinet. Within hours of the governments claim that without the bailout package public sector financial institutions would lose over Rs 10,000 crore, there was a well-argued rejoinder. The loss, if any, would be a mere Rs 2500 crore and even this amount was covered by collaterals. Now comes the most
damaging bit of official evidence to punch several gaping
holes in the government case. It appears that the Bureau
of Industrial Costs and Prices (BICP), the high-powered
body to examine the whole pricing process, has voiced its
opposition as early as last November to the new changes
and has felt that with the increase in the number of
subscribers which is inevitable with the steady reduction
in the cost of the instrument, most operators will make
profit. Anyway part of the problem the licence-holders
face is caused by delay in clearing projects by the
Department of Telecommunications itself. The PMO has not
so far realised the huge mischief potential of some
private operators who have become the principal source of
information to the newspapers, which are taking unusually
partisan stands. One day the PMO tried to neutralise them
by itself leaking the news that the Prime Minister had
sent a detailed point-to-point rejoinder to the
objections raised by President Narayanan. But it
boomeranged when Rashtrapati Bhavan took umbrage at this
improper public relations job. Since then the government
(read the PMO) is relying on party workers like Mr
Rangarajan Kumaramangalam and Mrs Sushma Swaraj to
counter the sustained opposition charge without much
success.If the issue retains its momentum, it is sure to
become a major election issue and given the public mood,
voters are likely to believe in the worst, whether or not
the charge has any merit. This is the real danger and so
far the BJP election managers have not given any
attention to this. |
Unkind cuts Film-maker Shekhar Kapoor has done well to stand up to the censor board and refuse to release his multiple award winning "Elizabeth" in India if it insists on cutting three scenes from the film. This kind of scissors-happy attitude is totally out of sync with today's reality and a strange attempt to dictate terms of morality. Obviously, the board does not believe in seeing any film in totality and wants to excise everything that can be even mildly controversial. In "Elizabeth", it finds a severed head as too horrific. It also cannot stomach an archaic slang word. That is nothing unusual, considering that the board had tried to mutilate even Steven Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan. It had ordered as many as 14 cuts in Shekhar Kapoor's "Bandit Queen". In its attempt to live up to the image of being politically correct, the board is ever willing to reduce everything to the lowest common denominator. And while doing so, it does not distinguish between race-horses and asses. Trying to censor Oscar-winning films is in bad taste, to say the least, particularly when these are not exploitative or horrific at all. Ironically, while it is severe on quality films, the board lets ordinary films go scot-free. Gore, sex and violence that are a staple part of the average Indian film make one hang one's head in shame. But since these are portrayed in a roundabout way, they pass muster. Shekhar Kapoor has raised a valid point: if the man on the street is considered mature enough to have the power to vote his own government, he has to be also given the freedom to decide what he wants to see and what not to. But then, in India, it
is the government which has arrogated to itself the power
to decide what is good for the common man. This power is
exercised in a subjective and authoritative manner. So,
an attempt is made to gag every creative expression.
Readers will recall how a ruckus was created about the TV
serial Tamas. When it is not the government,
it is the private armies of regional leaders that are out
to enforce their writ. Not too long ago, it was the Shiv
Sainiks targeted theatres showing Fire. This
tendency has to be discouraged forcefully. Gagging is not
for the artistes alone. It is an attempt to deny the
common man the right to choose for himself. It is high
time the Censor Board and other such custodians of
morality stepped out of the Victorian era. |
There is a saying in French that the more things change, the more they are the same. In India it is the intelligence agencies which appear to have taken it upon themselves to establish its validity. In 1965, it was the shepherds who first informed the army of the presence of a large number of intruders along the Gulmarg heights and once more now in 1999, it was again a shepherd who first disclosed the presence of intruders in the Batalik sector. The Indian intelligence during this period of 34 years has seen much expansion and change, yet it is the same. In a TV programme the Indian Defence Minister asserted that there was no intelligence failure in the Kargil aggression. This assertion was based on, what to him appears to be a reasonable premise and a plausible excuse, that the Indian intelligence did not have access to the operations room of the Pakistan army. Is it the Defence Ministers case that intelligence agencies have no source other than access to enemys operations room which in the instant case was unfairly denied to them. The PM too has conveyed the impression that at the face of it, there has been no intelligence failure. How much this pre-judgement will influence the inquiry committee now ordered to go into the issue of intelligence and or other failures, only time will tell. On the other hand if it is not an intelligence failure then is it a failure at the national level and if so how will a member and a secretary of National Security Council (NSC) acting as chairman and secretary of the inquiry committee dig into the failings of the NSC! We hope the report of this inquiry committee, unlike the one conducted by Gen Henderson Brooks into the 1962 debacle, will be made public. At this point of time, a broad overview could be fruitful and help in dispelling the smog gathering around the issue. The stretch of the LoC from Turtuk to Mushkoh valley (160 km) is well delineated and is along the more difficult and forbidding terrain in J and K. Since 1972 the area has been generally peaceful; free from infiltration, insurgency and border clashes except for last years artillery duels. The locals are of the Shia sect and Buddhist faith with no involvement or sympathy for the insurgents and other terrorist organisations working from across the border. Therefore, the responsibility for the defence of this vast area continued to be restricted to one infantry brigade which maintained a degree of surveillance over this tract of high mountain ranges within the constraints of its limited resources. Sustained resource crunch further crippled its capacity for surveillance. Electronic surveillance equipment evaluated in the early eighties could not be made available to the army for reasons best known to the MoD. With the ever-increasing demand for troops in the valley, this sector saw further depletion of its resources. There are no resources with the army for trans-border intelligence gathering. Such tasks are not within its charter. Resources, and consequently responsibilities, are with RAW and some other intelligence agencies. In peace time military intelligence really comes into play when visual contact with the insurgents is established and at times when suitable local sources are available. It is only when information of movement of insurgents or infiltrators attempting to cross the border is received from intelligence sources that increased physical ground surveillance and/or re-deployment of troops to meet such a contingency is taken in hand. There are never enough resources to cater to all such situations at all times. At a brigade level and in an LoC setting, standing orders lay down the posts to be held and their strength, those to be held only in summer months with the dates specified in this area there is no such thing as early summer or late winter. From around middle of October to end April weather can deteriorate suddenly and result in heavy snowfall of 5 to 6 feet in a matter of a few hours. Some time ago a complete patrol of 17 men disappeared under a snow avalanche. There is very little flexibility possible at the brigade level. All these details are marked on the divisional and corps maps. No deviation from these instructions is acceptable. In case the armys own internal investigations reveal any infringement of orders or laxity, be certain that those responsible will be severely dealt with; not withstanding the findings of the inquiry committee. That is the ethos in the services, which is the reason for their continued efficiency and high standards unlike some other organisations where accountability is absent and consequently performance has become dismal. The scale and extent of the Kargil intrusion involved elaborate planning and preparations. New roads and tracks had to be made. Enrolling, training and equipping of a large number of insurgents from a motley crowd of terrorist organisations was undertaken. A large number of local porters and ponies for stocking of ammunition and stores were mustered. Number of new helipads in the area were prepared. Unusually large quantities of snow clothing and other winter warfare equipment from the world markets were procured. The RAW resources should have picked up information concerning these developments. The Urdu Press in Pakistan, during the month of March, 99, had much to say about the developments opposite Kargil. Nawaz Sharif, during his visit to Skardu in February, 99, in the course of a fiery speech, had talked of Kargil being part of Pakistan (PoK.) These were perhaps the leads which should have set the bells ringing in the RAW and the JIC. The ARC wing of the RAW, which is equipped with the most sophisticated and state of the art electronic surveillance equipment and carries out periodic flights along the border, too, appears to have slept through this period of preparations and intrusion. In December, 98, information obtained from an insurgent, Azhar Shafir Mir, during his interrogation by the BSF, pertaining to training of a large number of insurgents to cut off the Srinagar-Leh road, was reported to have been passed on to Delhi (why not the army in J and K?) There were some other bits and pieces of information concerning the developments opposite Kargil allegedly sent to Delhi by other intelligence agencies. This information from various intelligence agencies passed on to the Home Ministry and the JIC should have been collated, more information sought and the jigsaw puzzle assembled to form a meaningful picture. Since such information is routinely floated by our intelligence agencies to keep their backs constantly covered, those in Delhi appear to have ignored it or it was simply lost in the bureaucratic bumph. This large-scale ingress into our territory over a wide area has been the result of a colossal intelligence failure at the national level, notwithstanding what the PM and the Defence Minister have to say on the subject. Equally a failure of the National Security Council and the JIC to anticipate and appreciate such a possibility, more so after the manifestation of the nuclear dimension in the Indo-Pak setting, Indias exaggerated fears in this regard aired by the self appointed spokespersons in India and the ever debilitating operational status of our conventional military capability. A large number of intelligence agencies let loose in J and K have different and independent chain of command and control and consequently, different reporting channels. They work in a spirit of one-up-manship with very little cooperation and coordination amongst themselves and without any centralised control. At the lowest level where real time information is most essential, there is no lateral flow of time sensitive intelligence and these agencies often work off a common source and frequently at cross purposes. This sordid state of intelligence set-up in J and K has been repeatedly pointed out in these columns. In the present case it is the RAW which has much to explain. There is the need to take in the larger picture of our national security policy for J and K. The policy enjoined on maintaining a distinct edge over Pakistan in conventional military capability and that any aggression in J and K would be taken as an attack on India and the Indian response will be tailored accordingly and about which we left Pakistan in no doubt in 1965. It is this policy which has ensured the sanctity of the LoC rather than the Simla Agreement. Our deployments in J and K have been based within the frame of reference of this basic policy. The question we need to address ourselves is that how come Pakistan came to perceive that this policy could have undergone a change. Was it the ever depleting stocks of ammunition and other warlike stores and equipment due to the prolonged absence of adequate fiscal support (of which we gave ample proof by rushing around the world markets looking for ammunitions for our guns and small arms after a somewhat minor operation involving a few units in the Kargil sector and are now looking for surveillance and other essential equipment) poor state of our tank fleet etc resulting in the degradation of that edge? Was it the composition of the NSC, packed as it is with retired and tired old bureaucrats from the Delhi cocktail circuit or our over preoccupation with the nuclear dimension and the airing of ill founded fears and the weak signals being emitted from Delhi over the last few years! Or perhaps all! Finally, while the enquiry into the Kargil fiasco has been ordered, the move of the RAW chief as Governor of Arunachal Pradesh has for all practical purposes, exonerated that organisation, albeit before the trial. There are reports that he carried a dossier on the Kargil developments and perhaps it was convenient to get him out of the way. Be that as it may, there is a crying need to overhaul and reorganise the intelligence set-up in the country, particularly in J and K where all the intelligence agencies need to be brought under one authority and made fully accountable to it. At the Centre the JIC needs to be headed by a senior army General. Greater accountability of intelligence agencies is necessary to avoid another disaster which may perhaps have graver implications. The writer, a retired
Lieut-General, is a former Deputy Chief of the Army
Staff. |
Kashmir: a saga of dithering TWICE before we were surprised by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, yet we refused to learn any lesson. Kargil is the third naked reality of Pakistan having inflicted surprise on us. Why do we get caught in a cleft-stick every time? Before answering this question, we have to briefly dwell on the ugly events which overlook us each time. On September 1, 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam (armoured thrust into the Chhamb sector to isolate a part of J and K by capturing Akhnoor). Though we lost Chhamb, Akhnoor was saved because Pakistan failed to maintain the momentum of its offensive, thanks to our hurriedly launching operations in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors to draw Pakistani forces away from Chhamb. In the 1971 war, we again lost Chhamb to the enemy after suffering heavy casualties and proved the Greek proverb right that it is disgraceful to stumble twice over the same stone. This time the situation turned so bad that our divisional commander in the Chhamb sector started making plans to withdraw to Akhnoor. Disapproving his plans, the then Corps Commander, the late Lt-Gen Sartaj Singh, flew into the sector, took charge of the operations and ordered a counter-attack by reorganising the forces. Thus was saved the precarious situation. Ironically, what stood out like a sore thumb was that our intelligence agencies ditched us both the times so much so that in 1971, it was estimated that only one Pakistani brigade was earmarked for this sector. But during the operations, we discovered that five brigades under the Pak 23 Infantry Division operated against us in this sector. Incidentally, General Sartaj Singh, who retired as GOC-in-C, Southern Command, in 1974, was known to be one of the most determined field commanders of his time. He as a Corps Commander was the overall in charge of the entire J and K theatre during the 1971 war. It was only in July, 1972, that the Northern Command came into being with two corps under its command. General Sartaj Singhs style of functioning needs to be recalled (since it is often said that troops are always good but it is the commander who matters). Though his 15 Corps Headquarters was located at Udhampur, during the summer months he always moved his tactical headquarters to Srinagar to keep in a close touch with the valley and the Uri-Kargil-Leh sectors. Not only that, at least twice a week he used to fly to the forward areas to gauge the operational situation himself. And he knew each sub-sector like the back of his hand. Granted that mountains eat up troops and you can, therefore, hold only tactical features. But this does not mean that full surveillance should not be kept over the unheld features and ingress routes. The General always kept his commanders on their toes. A great emphasis was laid by him on patrolling the areas which were not held by our troops. The information given by the patrols was checked back with the air surveillance reports as the first thing every morning. This left little chance with the enemy to do a Kargil on us as he has done now. A question that stares us in the face is: How come we have been caught napping in Kargil this time? Who is answerable for this? Undoubtedly, the Indian soldier is still one of the best, if not the best, in the world. This can also be said about our middle ranking officers who have proved it once again by suffering a disproportionate number of casualties to save the honour of the country. But the same cannot be said about our higher command. Starting from the 1947 war, it is Pakistan that has acted every time in J and K and it is India that has reacted. Sadly, our rate of casualties is painfully high to be accepted. This is because we are fighting a war (what we call a war-like situation) of Pakistans choosing. Those who rejoiced over the creation of Bangladesh in 1972 would do well to know that Pakistan is better off now than what it was in 1971 because it is more compact and consolidated today. Besides, its Army has carved out a niche for itself in the decision-making forum and calls the shots as far as the defence policy is concerned. Now we can answer the question raised in the beginning of this article: Why do we get caught in a cleft-stick every time? It is because the Indian politician does not act when he should act and acts when he should not act. This trait is inherent in his nature. To quote only one example, there was no reason why we should have meddled in Sri Lanka with our forces which made us cut a sorry figure eventually. Yet again, there was no reason why the politician should have disregarded the advice of the military commanders in 1948. Had he not done so, there would not have been any Kashmir problem today. Another mystifying
reality is that the Indian Army, unlike the Pakistan
Army, does not have any say in decision-making or even in
the defence policy of the country. And all decisions
about the armed forces in India are taken by the
bureaucrats who have always ridden roughshod over the
recommendations of the Army. No wonder then, the defence
forces do not get even the essential operational
equipment like the Main Battle Tank (MBT), Advanced Jet
Trainer (AJT), Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and Aircraft
Carrier, etc, even after the successive Service Chiefs
have clamoured for these for years together. These are
only a few of the hundreds of such examples, not to speak
of the justified increase in pay and allowances and other
benefits which continue to be denied to the armed forces. |
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