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E D I T O R I A L P A G E |
![]() Friday, November 5, 1999 |
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Militants strike again An encouraging trend
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Why was China neutral during
Kargil action? Chance acquaintance
Correcting and contradicting |
Americas carrot & stick policy by R.A. Singh MUCH was made here of the fact that President Clinton wasted no time in waiving sanctions against India after signing into law the Defence Appropriations Bill giving him extensive waiver authority. |
Americas
carrot & stick policy MUCH was made here of the fact that President Clinton wasted no time in waiving sanctions against India after signing into law the Defence Appropriations Bill giving him extensive waiver authority. But when one reads the fine print, it becomes immediately clear that Mr Clintons actions do not in any way amount to a special dispensation for India although the USA has once again proved its democratic credentials. For India, the President waived sanctions applying to the U.S. Export Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and sanctions under the International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET). Also cleared were loans to the Government of India by any US bank and US Department of Agriculture credit guarantees or other financial assistance to support the purchase of agricultural commodities, of course, from US farmers. It is worth noting that part of the benefit in all these exemptions, which were already there under an earlier one-year waiver, will accrue to the USA. What still remains on the banned list is significant: World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank loans; sale of defence articles, services, design and construction services; and the export of dual-use goods and technology. In deference to Congressional ire over the military coup in Pakistan, Islamabad has been banned from Ex-Im Bank, OPIC and IMET programmes. But it is still eligible to get US Agriculture Department credits and credit guarantees for the purchase of US agricultural commodities as well as to US bank loans to the Pakistani government. A White House spokesperson went on record to indicate that more waivers were possible for India. The carrot was there, but the stick was not far behind. A number of senior administration officials, including Energy Secretary Bill Richardson (on the eve of a trip to India), and Assistant Secretary Karl Inderfurth in Congressional testimony and in speeches, made it abundantly clear that the tone and tenor of future US relations with India (which had great potential for greatness) would depend on Indias cooperation in the security and nonproliferation fields. In other words, India had better sign the CTBT as the first course in a geopolitical dinner that would include on the menu other benchmarks mandated by the USA: adherence to the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT), nuclear and missile restraint, including non-development and non-deployment, and so on. The Clinton Administrations enhanced and apparently positive preoccupation with India in recent days has a logic of its own behind it. First, it tells the world and the US Congress that America looks with more benign fondness at a democratic India, whereas it tends to frown at the military junta that has taken over in Pakistan by overturning a duly elected government. Secondly, if India falls in line, it would then be far easier to put pressure on Pakistan to behave. After all, havent successive Pakistani regimes said Islamabad would go along with the NPT and the CTBT if India does so first? The Clinton Administration has been mentioning in laudatory terms a commitment India has made to build a national consensus on adhering to the CTBT. But given the cavalier manner in which the US senate gave the boot to CTBT ratification, despite Herculean efforts by President Clinton and pressure from his European allies, it is more than clear that Americas nonproliferation leadership is dead on the vine. In any case, the rest of the world had the sneaking suspicion that by trying to prevent others from developing nuclear weapons, the US was merely attempting to safeguard its own current superiority. It is also true that if the next incumbent of the White House is a Republican (a not unlikely possibility), his administration will give short shrift to the CTBT. The US Senate rejection of CTBT ratification is certain to cool Russian and Chinese ardour for the treaty. With an autocratic China on one side and a military regime with no accountability on the other, it would be unwise of India to foreclose its nuclear options merely to appease America. India cannot lose sight of the fact that when it comes to making dual technology available to India or in sponsoring India for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, the USA has always retreated into a bureaucratic mode of mouthing meaningless platitudes. America never seems to think in terms of Indias needs, interests or security. It seems to care more for the benefits to be derived from Indias vast and growing consumer market. Incidentally, a Rupublican administration in Washington will only make things tougher for India, for the GOP has always had a soft corner for military regimes in Pakistan. Under the circumstances, India under Mr Vajpayees stewardship must not think in terms of a year or two from now. The need of the hour is a long-term nuclear policy that takes care of the nations security and is not swayed by the ebbs and tides of near-term politics. Unless America provides ample proof of its amicable long-term intentions, India must be prudent in proffering its hand of friendship. Yet another reason for such caution is the fact that President Clinton, not unlike his predecessors, has displayed a soft corner for China. There has been a spate of US intelligence reports over the years quoting chapter and verse about Chinas unabashed practice of exporting nuclear and missile technology and material. The beneficiaries have included North Korea and Iran, two nations the USA describes as rogues, as well as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. But Mr Clinton has gone out of his way to turn a blind eye to the transgressions because here again he is concerned more with the massive Chinese market. It is also true that Mr
Clinton is more than eager to be known by posterity for
his foreign policy achievements. He is obviously quite
taken up with Nixons opening to China and the
historical Shanghai Communique more than two decades ago.
Mr Clinton wants to be known as the President who brought
one-fifth of the world population into the global
mainstream. In the process, democratic India, which is
not really a problem, gets scant attention. Perhaps it is
time India did what the Chinese have been doing: eat the
carrot and reject the stick. |
Why was
China neutral during Kargil action? THROUGHOUT the Kargil war, Indias gaze was turned away from China. Why? Because it was not Indias intention to rub China the wrong way. It will be recalled that in both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, Chinas intervention on behalf of Pakistan was blatant. It threatened India, although it never carried out the threats. Against such a background, Chinas neutrality in the Kargil conflict was a big puzzle. How is one to explain this? This is because China changed its course, albeit partly. With the end of the cold war, the USA has become the sole super power. China is not reconciled to this: it wants a multi-polar world in which it can have a say. But it also wants to promote good relations with the USA for trade and technology. Today, the USA is not only Chinas first trading partner, but also a major investor in the Chinese economy. And the USA has been willing to share its high technologies with China. So, its relation with the super power has become complex. The USA, on its part, is not ready to offend China openly as its main interest in that country is economic. Though it will keep a sharp eye on Chinas global ambitions and try to block its way, Washington is unlikely to disturb the present economic relations. China knows this. China does not look at India and Pakistan today the same way as it did during the cold war years. Then China was an adversary of the USSR, and India was one of Moscows closest friends, while Pakistan was a friend of both the USA and China. Today, Moscow is a strategic partner of both China and India. This has naturally brought about a change in Chinas attitude to Pakistan and India. At one time, China wanted to win over the Muslim world, and thought that Pakistan and Iran could be useful. But events have shown that Pakistan is a liability in Central Asia. And in Xinjiang, a province of China with a Muslim majority, Pakistan has been of no help in containing Muslim militancy. There is clear evidence that the militants of Xinjiang have linked up with the Islamic militants of the world, more so with the Taliban, which is under Pakistans patronage. Militants of the PoK are also said to be in contact with Xinjiang. Today, Pakistan is a nuclear and missile power, thanks to China. Why did China take this great risk? One view is: It wanted to turn the Islamic world against Washington. It was a grand strategy. It was not mainly designed to create a nuclear parity in South Asia, as is often believed. China saw the Pakistan bomb as an Islamic bomb. But it least suspected that Islamic fundamentalism could pose a major threat to its own interests. Throughout South-East Asia, there are prosperous Chinese communities. Today, they are under the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. And there is the threat to Xinjiang. China has also discovered that its close relations with Pakistan have turned India, potentially a great power, into an enemy with unpredictable consequences. It is, therefore, keen to neutralise this. It does not want India to have an alliance with the USA. This may have implications for Tibet and Xinjiang. Hence accommodating Indias anxiety has become an important calculation in Chinese policies. This is reflected in a major policy statement of the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji. India is an important neighbour of China and the development of good neighbourly and friendly cooperation with India is one of Chinas basic national policies, he had declared. This explains why China chose to remain neutral over Kargil. There are other factors. For instance, like the USA, China seeks peace in South Asia. It does not want to encourage adventurism in a region with nuclear armed nations. This became very evident when China turned down the arguments of Pak emissaries to Beijing one after another. First, it was General Musharraf, followed by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, and finally Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. They all wanted Chinas support for their adventurism. China refused to oblige. There was an immediate reason hostile world opinion against Pakistan. Naturally, there was a sense of despair and panic which explains why Nawaz Sharif readily accepted the deal offered by President Clinton. There was no other way to save face. In the event, Pakistan had to agree to withdraw its troops from Kargil and restore the sanctity of the LoC. Pakistan had hopes that China would help it to internationalise the Kashmir issue. For this, Pakistan first of all needed the blessings of Washington, which was wanting. What is more, the special relations which existed between the two was a thing of the past. The West is rather disillusioned with Pakistan. This has to do with the growing Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, and the role of terrorists like Osama bin Laden. To this is to be added Pakistans nuclear ambition and its readiness to use blackmail. And, of course, the Kargil adventure, which was the last straw. Intrusion of Pak soldiers into India and the plot to cut off Ladakh and the Kashmir valley from India were the worst forms of adventurism, especially when both India and Pakistan are nuclear armed. It was Pakistans calculation that it could get away with a fait accompli because India is already committed to not using the nuclear weapon first. Pakistans gamble created a global antipathy against it. It truly isolated Pakistan from the world community. This is one reason why neither Beijing nor Washington was willing to internationalise the Kashmir issue. Even the Organisation of Islamic Conference was not ready to support Pakistan in this adventure. In any case, China had made it clear to Sartaj Aziz that the Kashmir issue is a complicated affair with a long history and should be, and could only be, solved through peaceful means. According to him, India and Pakistan must find an effective approach to bring about a political solution to the Kashmir issue through negotiations. It must be a matter of concern to China that there are today four powers in Asia with nuclear weapons. This has unnerved the nations without nuclear arms in Asia. There is a demand for de-nuclearisation of Asia. This will be highly embarrassing to China, being a major nuclear power. The world knows that India took to nuclear arms largely because of the Chinese nuclear threat. Can India, therefore, take Chinas neutrality for real? One cannot be sure on this. But the logic is in favour of Chinas neutrality. China has realised that its Islamic enterprise has come a cropper. Besides, it was paying too high a price to Pakistan for keeping up tension on the sub-continent. There is change in Chinas thinking. China is unlikely to take sides on the Kashmir issue. This has been voiced in no uncertain terms by the Chinese Prime Minister who said that Kashmir is a historical issue, involving territorial, ethnic and religious elements. Surely, what he wanted
to convey was that China does not want to interfere.
There are two other factors the change of attitude
of Washington towards Pakistan and the Kashmir issue, and
the growing cordiality between India and the USA. |
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