, 53, Chairman and Managing Director of Air India, may well turn out to be the last Maharajah for the airline. The controversial merger of the country’s two national airlines, Indian Airlines and Air India, in 2007 led to even bigger losses that now total Rs 13,325 crore. Even as the government is working out a bailout plan, hard questions are being asked as to whether it’s worthwhile for public money to be squandered on the failing and flailing public sector airline. Jadhav spoke exclusively to Editor-in-Chief Raj Chengappa at his Delhi headquarters on how he sees the future of Air India and whether it has a future at all. Excerpts:
Indigo has now overtaken Air India in the domestic sector, pushing you to fourth in terms of market share with Jet Airways and Kingfisher occupying the top slot. What’s wrong with Air India?
The name of the game is basically whatever capacity you introduce in the market, you start earning money on that. Your ability to get more passengers depends on the amount of capacity you are going to put in the market. Our entire attention after the merger of Indian Airlines with Air India was not on introducing more capacity but trying to make better use of whatever capacities we have. Our revenue per available seat per kilometre has to be always higher than the cost of an available seat per kilometre. This can happen only in case the seat factor goes higher. Over the past year and a half that is what we have been attempting to do. We have tried to make sure that our seat factors creep up.
But what made them overtake you when at one point you were the lead carrier domestically?
If you look at the capacity made available by Jet Airways, Kingfisher, Indigo and Air India and Spicejet and others, you will find that they are ramping up their capacity yearly. We had earlier got permission to buy 43 aircraft. As long as these aircraft were coming in, we were also ramping our capacity. But our ramping up capacity was lesser than that of either Jet Airways or Kingfisher. For example, if we were adding five aircraft in a year, they were adding eight to nine aircraft in a year. Indigo has been the most aggressive. It has been adding 10 to 12 aircraft in a year and in the coming years Indigo is going to add more. I am not adding any aircraft. I have stopped since last September. Instead, we have removed 31 aircraft from service during the last one year either because they were old or we did not renew their lease. Rather than adding capacities, actually, we have cut down on capacity. With the existing reduced capacities, we have gone in for higher productivity. So, we maintained the same level of productivity as last year even though we were minus 31 aircraft. For a company like Air India which has to turn around, I have tried to make sure that our operations are lean, operational costs are low and then target for a higher seat factor. So, I am not at all in the game of market share in capacities. Right now the big question is how to stem the losses and make the airline profitable again.
Is the government working out a bailout plan?
The government has indicated that it will give Rs 5,000-crore equity, and for the balance figure, it will give some kind of sovereign guarantee apart from some deep discount bonds. I hope there will be a total assistance of Rs 18,000 crore in all. The final picture will be clear soon.
Instead of pumping in precious public funds, why shouldn’t the government disinvest in Air India and hive it off to the private sector?
Before taking up such a decision, the government needs to address seriously four issues: first, we have 40,000 employees and the government has to decide what has to be done for them; second, we have 132 aircraft and they need to be disposed of; third, there are various properties which need to be properly disposed of, including the brand name; and fourth, the big financial liabilities of the company also need to be addressed.
What is the true extent of financial liability that Air India faces?
We do have a white elephant on the table. Air India has a Rs 18,000 crore debt liability and a Rs 15,000 crore capital loan liability. Even if the government wants to privatise it and wants to give it to an individual, that person will have to take a heavy burden of financial liability and there is hardly anyone who would want to do that. Ultimately, this heavy liability may have to be written off. Secondly, we have taken a loan for our 68 aircraft from the Exim Bank, that is around Rs 18,000 crore. So, how can one think of giving Air India to a private person with such heavy liabilities? Another issue is of 40,000 employees. My teeth-to-tail ratio is 395 while the rest of the market is around 100. So in terms of manpower I am four times over.
How many employees do you really need?
When I made a presentation to the government last year, I told them that if you want this company to survive the downward market trend, then we should have only 90 aircraft as compared to the 132 we have. Also that the number of employees is much more than the required strength and we need a maximum of 18,000 employees, the remainder, which is around 22,000, need to be removed or retrenched, salaries have to be cut down; you have to do all this. The company may be closed down, or it may be given to a private party, or it may be allowed to run. But some hard steps need to be taken. After all, somebody has to bell the cat.
Was it a wise decision to merge Air India and Indian Airlines? Hasn’t it worsened the problem?
My view is: you cannot have two airlines running in a public sector and competing with each other at every level in an open sky format. One day you have to take a view as to which is the airline going to run. When the merger happened, the Asian market had already opened up and mergers were taking place. Everybody was ramping up. And here was Air India with 68-odd aircraft and Indian Airlines with 70-odd aircraft trying to replicate each other. The second issue is: Air India was a global airline with headquarters in India. But it had no depth even in India. The market all over the world had started changing. Global airlines without domestic depth have all died. Pan-Am, for instance, refused to go for domestic depth and they died. And they were replaced by airlines which had domestic depth which went international. Most of the national carriers took to merging with domestic partners in order to sustain themselves. Many who did not do that failed.
Were there any airlines which have survived without merging?
Among those that survived were Singapore Airlines and the Gulf carriers – both of them depended on India because of the huge market. Had it not developed within India, there was no other way to survive. Indian Airlines had a domestic depth and it had to ramp up its entire international operations on its own and then fight it with Kingfisher and Jet Airways. So for the government it makes sense that if you have two airlines in the same stable and if both of them have no space in the market, then they have to have one merged airline. Therefore, what the Government of India did at that point of time was to merge the two airlines in order to bring economy of scales, reach out to larger markets and procurement, and also to compete with Singapore and the Gulf carriers.
What were the big issues that the merger threw up?
The key issue is integration – be it IT network integration, engineering integration, commercial integration or ultimately product integration. But when the merger happened, the problems of an age-old public sector undertaking came upfront. Both the organisations have not yet solved all the HR issues – their pay scales, their compensation packages, their career progression, their agreements with the union etc all were legacies. Even if Indian Airlines and Air India were separate, their problems would have been upfront even now. So are you going to solve the merger problem or are you going to solve the age-old public sector undertaking problems? These are the issues on the table right now.
What have you done about network integration to make it easier for passengers?
We have already applied for a single code. So from March, there will be a single Air India code all over whether you go to Aiswal, Port Blair or Chicago. It could not happen earlier because our IT system was pre-historic. This has been a stumbling block for our entry into Star Alliance, our trying to get code share agreement negotiations, interline agreement and marketing arrangements.
What about the flight schedules?
We found that Air India schedules are not complimentary or supplementary to Indian Airlines networks and Indian Airlines are not complimentary or supplementary to Air India’s networks. So though, physically speaking, on a map we will show you connectivity from London-Delhi-Raipur but actually you have to spend more than 48 hours to go to Raipur. The first thing we did was to make sure that our international flights are all in sync with Delhi so what we have done is given you connectivity. So now if you are coming from London to Delhi and if you want to go to another Indian city, you could do this in less than six hours for 25 cities. That makes us far more competitive.
Will all this help salvage Air India?
We are joining the Star Alliance in a few months from now and ours will be a new brand, a new image and let’s say a new avatar. We are also hoping that our plan to restructure Air India would go through. That would include utilising our excess engineering capacity and ground handling to service other airlines by making them separate business units. These measures should revive Air India.
You run the risk of ending up being the last Maharaja of Air India!
There might be a mascot of Maharaja; but I am neither a Maharaja nor do I think on this line. We have to be globally professional, contemporary and totally customer-focussed. We need to put every effort for the betterment of the airline. My conclusion is that if this organisation is allowed to be run professionally and ruthlessly, it will do well again.