| Anatomy of a
        coup
 By Manohar
        Malgonkar
 AS the details of Pakistans
        latest military coup began to emerge, they brought home
        the truth of Byrons assertion that truth was
        stranger than fiction. But then what was the
        truth? The men behind the coup were masters of the art of
        deceit. How could be believe that what they were telling
        us was the truth? The one thing we can be sure of is that
        the full story of what really happened is never likely to
        be revealed. We have to base our findings on such
        evidence that is there, rejecting obvious falsehoods and
        red herrings. Ever since its creation
        in 1947, Pakistan has been obsessed by a single fixation:
        Kashmir. Over the years Kashmir has come out as the
        single most important factor in Pakistans affairs. The founder of Pakistan,
        M.A. Jinnah, himself began it. One of his first actions
        on becoming Pakistans first Governor General was to
        invite the ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, to
        join Pakistan, on whatever terms he, Sir Hari Singh,
        chose to  the actual words of Jinnahs offer
        were "a blank cheque". At this time, Kashmir
        was at the mercy of Pakistan because both the roads
        giving access to it from Indian territory ran through
        Pakistan. Hari Singh was not taken
        in by that "blank cheque". He kept Jinnah on
        hold, as it were, for a few days, and then announced that
        he was joining his state to the Indian Union. Jinnah was infuriated,
        and reacted with virulence. He blocked off both the roads
        that went into Kashmir and thus, having isolated Kashmir,
        as it were, sent in his army to take it over, but made it
        out that it was a force of Pathan tribesmen. At this time, Pakistan
        as a country was barely two months old...at war. India, even if a little
        belatedly, reacted with energy and resolution. It had to
        fly in the first troops to save the valley which had
        already been penetrated. Then the Indian Army, pushed the
        Pakistani force beyond the positions it had already
        seized. That was when the UN intervened, and what has
        come to be called the Line of Control, (LoC) came into
        being. That line has remained
        unaltered even though two more wars were fought between
        India and Pakistan, the second one in 1971, in which
        Pakistan, having lost its eastern wing, and with its
        entire eastern army of a hundred thousand made prisoners,
        accepted a ceasefire. A year or so later, in what came to
        be known as the Simla Pact, both countries solemnly
        agreed that all territorial disputes would be resolved
        only through discussions, and the LoC would be held
        inviolate. Since then, there has
        been a regular trickle of Pakistani agents being sent
        into Kashmir to set up cells, blow up buses and bridges,
        plant bombs in markets and generally to spread terror. By
        and large the LoC had not been breached by troops.
        Throughout those years, Kashmir has served successive
        Pakistani administrations as a reliable survival kit, to
        douse passions inflamed by rising prices, grinding
        poverty, drug wars. A passionate appeal, Kashmir, only
        Kashmir, has always helped to unite the feuding tribes of
        the Frontier, the Shias and the Sunnis, the Mullas and
        the professors, even Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The crucial importance
        of Kashmir to the men who rule Pakistan was highlighted
        by an admission that Nawaz Sharif made to Inder Gujral
        who was then our Prime Minister, at a one-to-one,
        cards-on-the-table, meeting in some foreign country. This
        was revealed by Gujral in the course of an interview
        broadcast by AIR. It seems that, in the relaxed
        atmosphere that prevailed, both Prime Ministers were
        unusually outspoken. So when Gujral pointed out to Sharif
        that there were dozens of other issues of common interest
        to both India and Pakistan which they could address
        instead of locking horns over Kashmir, Sharif said
        something like this: "Inder-bhai, I know very
        well that Icannot take Kashmir from you, and Ialso know
        that you cannot give it to me. But still, it is something
        that has to be talked about  to be kept on the
        boil." Whether or not Sharif
        used these precise words, they describe the stark
        reality. Anyhow, it was nearly two years ago. Since that
        time, Sharifs military think-tank seems to have
        been able to persuade him that there indeed was a way to
        force India to embark on a major military operations so
        close to the LoC, that Pakistan would be quite justified
        in rushing to the UN and complain of Indian aggression.
        Here was the scenario: Over the years, whenever
        winter came, it had become the custom of both the Indian
        and Pakistani forward units along the line of control, to
        abandon their summer positions along the higher ridges
        because of their sub-zero temperatures and
        inaccessibility, and take up winter positions in the
        lower plains. As soon as summer came, towards the end of
        June, both armies went back to their bunkers above the
        snowline. Why not, the
        dirty-tricks experts of Pakistans army suggested,
        send some handpicked commando troops to occupy Indian
        bunkers on the Indian side of the LoC, at the tail-end of
        winter? When the babus come back to re-occupy
        their bunkers, theyll set up a howl. Their army
        will just have to attack those bunkers  on their
        own side, but still, close enough to our borders for us
        to cry foul! Our boys can sit tight in those
        bunkers for months, while we get the UN and America into
        the act, saying, look the Indians are shelling our
        positions. Theyll just have to step in and
        tell India to stop. That way well
        internationalise the Kashmir problem. Internationalisation.
        That was the mantra, the buzzword, the sales
        pitch. It worked. If, Sharif asked his military planners
        the obvious question: "But surely, wont we
        have violated the LoC if we send our commandos beyond the
        line to occupy their bunkers?" The planners had the
        right answers. "But whos to
        know? Prime Minister! Theyll not be wearing
        uniforms or badges of rank, well make them grow
        beards and look raggedy  like any old freelance
        separatists." Except that this lot
        were fitted out with the latest regular-army weapons,
        grenades, cell-phones and, most incongruously, wore
        snow-boots especially made in England for wearing in
        sub-zero conditions and which the Pakistani army had
        bought in such large quantities that when, belatedly, we
        tried to buy some, the manufacturers just did not have
        any. Ironically, they were
        given the go-ahead at just about the time when what was
        called the Lahore-bus peace initiative was in full swing. The scheme worked
        beautifully  up to a point. Our bunkers along the
        Kargil ridge were occupied in strength, and it will be
        recalled that, literally every spokesman, from Pakistan,
        interviewed by the BBC or CNN had the stock answer:
        "Oh, we dont know anything about them 
        theyre your usual Kashmir militants." As expected  as
        planned  India reacted with virulence and began to
        pound the bunkers with artillery shells and from the air
        and that was the cue for the Pakistani Government to look
        outraged and rush to the super powers to get them to
        intervene. "Stop those aggressors!" What happened is
        history. No one believed Nawaz Sharif. "But we know
        theyre your men  you sent them. Its you
        whore the aggressors! The Indians have every right
        to throw back these troops who have invaded their
        territory." They even knew about those special boots
        bought in London. There was little that
        Nawaz Sharif could do but to agree to pull back his
        infiltrators or risk the consequences. He ordered the
        withdrawal. The whole exercise had misfired, indeed
        boomeranged. He blamed his military advisors who, in turn
        ganged up on him. There were dismissals and
        recriminations. Exiled and frustrated political leaders
        jumped into the fray and bared their teeth. The army, the
        mullahs and anyone who had reason to feel let down
        made thundering denunciations of Nawaz Sharifs
        leadership. The Americans were watching the situation so
        closely that they actually predicted the military coup
        three weeks before it took place. And, for the first time
        in the history of such convulsions, we actually saw it
        happen, on that evening on October 12, 1999. The BBC
        announcer was in a position to give a running commentary
        on it, as it were. For the fourth time in its brief
        history, Pakistan was once again under a military
        dictator.  
 
 
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