HEREe have been two sets of reports from Pakistan relating to talks with the Taliban. The most important, from Pakistan's perspective, is the offer made by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in terms of ending violence, if the state accepts the demands made by them. The second one is important from a regional (Af-Pak) perspective, in terms of the talks with the Afghan Taliban, led by the international community in Paris, with Pakistan playing a crucial role.What are these two dialogues about? What do they signify? From a regional perspective, are these talks likely to enhance stability, or worsen it further? More importantly, are they likely to succeed?
After a series of high-profile killings during November-December 2012, towards the end of last year, suddenly the TTP announced its willingness to talk to the government with certain pre-conditions. These high-profile attacks include the bombing in Jamrud bazaar in Khyber agency which killed 17 people, assassination of Bashir Bilour, the moderate political leader belonging to the Awami National Party (ANP) and a member of the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) provincial assembly, killing of numerous health workers engaged in an anti-polio drive in the FATA and KP, and the kidnapping and massacre of 21 levies. All these attacks took place immediately before and during the TTP's announcement of its willingness to negotiate with the government .
The most important question is why the TTP is willing to negotiate when its killings and massacres have peaked, as explained above. Perhaps, the TTP is planning to negotiate from a position of strength. The state and its forces have undoubtedly been brought to their knees. Consider the following: The security forces are yet to claim any major success in terms of their anti-militancy operation. After the Swat military operation in 2009, one is yet to hear or witness a strong anti-militancy drive by the state and its security forces. On the other hand, between January 2009 and December 2012, the TTP was on the rampage, including its ability to strike deep on PNS Mehran in Karachi in 2011 and Kamra airbase in Punjab in 2012.
Clearly, the TTP is on an offensive. Political response to the TTP has been feeble and non-existent. Last month also witnessed the fifth death anniversary of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, with the trial going nowhere. Everyone knows who was behind the assassination, yet the government led by Benazir's party and her husband has not taken a strong approach vis-a-vis the Taliban. Given its track-record, the PPP is unlikely to pursue any strong political strategy vis-a-vis the TTP. Nor are the political parties in opposition led by the PML-N pressurising the government to formulate a cohesive political agenda in dealing with the TTP. Worse, the ANP, whose minister and a senior party member (Bashir Biolour) was assassinated by the TTP, is welcoming a reconciliation with the militants.
No doubt, the TTP has offered to negotiate from a position of strength. An equally important question is: What is that the TTP willing to negotiate? What are its preconditions?
According to news reports in the Pakistani media, the preconditions focus on the following four aspects: repealing of all laws repugnant to Islam, rewriting of Pakistan's constitution based on Shariah, withdrawing from the US-led Afghan war and refocusing on India.
What do the four preconditions mean? The first two relating to the repeal of laws repugnant to Islam and re-writing of Pakistan's constitution based on the Quran and Sunnah, are not new demands from the TTP. Anyone who was following the developments in Swat before the military operations in 2009 would understand that this was almost a déjà vu. This is exactly what the Swati Taliban demanded before 2009 and the federal government of Pakistan, supported by the provincial government, yielded to their demand. The rest is history; even today, Swat is unable to recover from the blunder the government committed in terms of yielding to the Taliban then.
Laws repugnant to Islam, the Quran and Sunnah are what the Taliban say it is. The conclusions and findings of the Taliban in terms of what Islam is and what the interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah are not based on a theological discourse, agreed by the rest of the community within Pakistan. This demand, for any sane government in Pakistan, should be an absolute non-starter. But is there a sane government in Pakistan? What has been its track record in terms of negotiating with the Taliban and their success rates?
Since the first negotiation with Nek Mohammad in 2004, the recent history of Pakistan is full of failed negotiations with the TTP. For any successful negotiation, there should not only be a ceasefire, but also laying down of arms by the non-state actors and, more importantly, the state should negotiate from a position of strength. Unfortunately, in the case of Pakistan-TTP negotiations, it has been the opposite. The TTP never laid down its arms; rather it was the state which stopped its military operations and looked the other way. In a way, it was the state that laid down the arms, but not going after the non-state actors. It was always the TTP that negotiated from a position of strength and not the state. It is not that the state is weaker, but it appears it has abdicated its writ to rule, and its ability to command. The TTP has only seized what the state has provided.
The third and fourth demands of the TTP are external — to pull out from the US-led Afghan war and refocus on India. In fact, this has been the position of even hardliners within Pakistan's Establishment — military and intelligence. Can Pakistan afford to pull out from supporting the US-led war in Afghanistan? While the international community needs Pakistan's assistance leading up to the exit in 2014 and installing a stable government in Afghanistan, Islamabad also needs the international community.
Any overtly hostile approach to Afghanistan will undercut Islamabad's only leverage in any future political establishment in Kabul. Pakistan's recent support to the international effort to reach out to the Afghan Taliban should be seen in this perspective. There has been a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan had, in fact, released more than 20 Taliban leaders from its prison during the last two months, as a part of a larger understanding in taking the peace process forward with the Afghan Taliban.
During the initial period, Pakistan was upset and apprehensive of the peace talks with the Afghan Taliban, as the US-led international process attempted to sideline Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The earlier rounds led by Germany and Qatar, took place during 2010-11 by passing Pakistan, could not move forward. In fact, even before Berlin and Doha attempted to reach out to the Afghan Taliban, the US was in touch with a few of these extremists, without informing the ISI. Some independent accounts, in fact, reveal that the Afghan Taliban themselves wanted to keep Pakistan out of the picture!
An infuriated Pakistan, then by arresting Mullah Baradar, attempted to sabotage any direct negotiation between Washington and Kabul with the Afghan Taliban. Now Pakistan seems to be on board in the France-led talks with the Afghan Taliban. Hence it is unlikely to yield to the third request of the TTP — to pullout from Afghanistan. Unlike Pakistan, the US is pursuing a consistent military strategy despite its efforts to negotiate with the Taliban. Pakistan cannot overtly refuse the US; not at this juncture.
Getting back to the TTP's four demands, what is surprising is its insistence on "refocusing on India". While the TTP has always remained focused on Pakistan and Afghanistan, there has not been any significant statement on targeting India.
While the first two demands are not in the interest of the state, can Pakistan afford to take measures on the last two in terms of pulling out from the Afghan war and refocus on India? Is this TTP rhetoric? Or, is the script written elsewhere, and the TTP is only conveying
it?
The writer is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.