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Peace, stability in Afghanistan
Regional neighbours have a role to play
by Gurmeet Kanwal
At
the Tokyo summit that concluded on July 8, 2012, donor nations pledged $16 billion up to 2015 for the socio-economic development of Afghanistan. The 70 nations that participated in the summit sent a strong message to the effect that Afghanistan will not be left alone to fend for itself after the withdrawal of NATO-ISAF forces. However, the completion of the drawdown will create a security vacuum, particularly in the south-eastern and southern provinces, and the Taliban are likely to step in to fill it. The Afghan National Security Forces are unlikely to be in a position to assume independent responsibility for security by end-2014. No plans have yet been made to put in place post-exit arrangements to supplement the capabilities of Afghan security forces. Unless the key regional neighbours, including India, Iran and Pakistan, contribute meaningfully to the efforts to stabilise the country, rather than pursuing narrow national agendas, Afghanistan may be plunged into civil war. This will reverse the gains made in socio-economic development. The Afghan National Army (ANA) now numbers 195,000 troops and the strength of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has gone up to 149,208. The ANSF (ANA plus ANP) are being increasingly called upon to take over responsibility for security in districts from which the NATO-ISAF troops are gradually withdrawing. While the number of ANSF personnel is growing steadily, they are not yet operationally and logistically ready to assume independent charge of security operations in areas vacated by NATO-ISAF troops. Besides numbers, ANSF personnel lack the requisite weapons and equipment, and are inadequately trained and motivated – desertions and incidents of fratricide are fairly frequent. The standards of junior leadership – the bedrock of counter-insurgency operations – are far from satisfactory. Also, the ANA lacks critical logistics support such as helicopters and high-mobility vehicles and are completely dependent on the NATO-ISAF logistics and casualty evacuation system. The NATO-ISAF strategy to “clear-hold-transfer-exit” has only partially succeeded in achieving its political and military goals. The security deficit that will emerge post-exit can be filled to a large extent by the regional neighbours if they can be persuaded to accept the responsibility, including contributing troops to a UN-mandated peacekeeping force. However, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia have divergent agendas. India has historically had friendly ties with Afghanistan and wishes to see a stable government installed in Kabul that does not lean excessively on any neighbour. India had supported the Northern Alliance during its operations against the oppressive Taliban regime. Despite its own economy facing a sluggish growth, India has invested heavily in Afghan reconstruction and development plans. India has contributed $1.2 billion so far, and has pledged additional funds to take it total commitment to $ 2 billion. The funds have been spent on road construction and building projects approved by the Afghan government and the local communities. India is also providing training assistance to Afghan administrators, teachers, medical staff and officer cadets, but only within India. Though the Indian private sector has invested only $ 25 million so far, this is set to change as new investments worth $ 10-12 billion are in the pipeline. India’s sustained help and abiding commitment have not received due recognition. Under the right conditions – Afghan concurrence, UN flag, viable logistics support – it may be possible to persuade India to send up to one infantry division (15,000 troops) to supplement the ANSF. At the very least, due to the Indian Army’s immense experience in counter-insurgency operations and cultural affinities that make it easier to train new recruits, India could be invited to train ANA personnel in Afghanistan itself. This will lead to larger numbers of ANA personnel being trained simultaneously than is the case at present. Iran’s wait-and-watch policy that has been in place since December 2001 is continuing unchanged. Iran is concerned about the flow of fundamentalist terrorism and narcotics from Afghanistan. It also fears the exodus of a large number of refugees if the security situation deteriorates rapidly after the exit of NATO-ISAF troops, even though Iran would be happy to see their backs. Iran is also under pressure due to US sanctions over its quest for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and fears a joint US-Israel attack on its nuclear installations. Under the circumstances, Iran would not like instability in Afghanistan to add to its strategic challenges and is more likely to cooperate rather than confront the international community in Afghanistan. However, Iran is unlikely to join a UN stabilisation force. Iran could contribute by allowing the use of the road from Chabahar port to Zaranj to open up a new route for logistics supplies. Such a move will substantially reduce the present dependence on the two land routes that pass through Pakistan’s Quetta and Peshawar. This can happen only if the US mends its fences with Iran. The Pakistan Army and the ISI are continuing to support militant groups like the Haqqani network that are fighting the NATO-ISAF forces by providing safe havens to them, from where they can launch attacks across the Durand Line into Afghanistan. This is so even as the Pakistan Army itself faces well coordinated attacks by Pakistani Taliban like the TTP and the TNSM from across the border. With a stand-off in US-Pakistan relations, the US is continuing with its strategy of trans-border drone strikes to eliminate the Al-Qaeda leadership, and Pakistan is delaying the launch of operations against the TTP in North Waziristan. Pakistan still seeks ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan and would prefer to have a pliable regime in Kabul when the NATO-ISAF mission ends in 2014. Pakistan does not support the Afghan reconciliation process as a successful outcome will reduce Pakistan’s role in conflict resolution. Pakistan has failed to realise that continuing insurgency in Afghanistan is fuelling instability in its own northwest and will further destabilise the country when its economy is in ruins and the political situation is spiralling out of control. Pakistan seeks to limit India’s influence in Afghanistan and opposes the induction of Indian troops as well as in-situ training. Russia and the Central Asian Republics remain key players and have a huge stake in Afghanistan’s future stability. The agreement signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with the NATO-ISAF forces in June 2012 to permit military hardware being transported out of Afghanistan as part of the draw-down is a major concession and signals their desire to make a meaningful contribution to conflict resolution. Russia signed a similar agreement in early-July 2012. However, Russia and the Central Asian Republics are unlikely to go so far as to join the fight against the Taliban by contributing troops to a stabilisation force. Good governance, including a transparent system for the delivery of justice; sustained socio-economic development and a secure environment for the first two to flourish are the three pillars of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. In Afghanistan, the post-ISAF security environment is likely to spin out of control if supplementary security arrangements are not conceived soon and put in place quickly with the help of Afghanistan’s regional neighbours.n The writer is a Delhi-based strategic
analyst
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The joy of writing
by Jupinderjit Singh
It
does not matter if a person like this writer is not able to write much these days. After all, one is no Keats or Salman Rushdie. The world may not miss anything. But in such a situation one does feel suffocated.It is scary.All writers don’t produce best-sellers. All don’t get a Booker. All don’t even get published. And then, not everything we write is for public consumption. I know a number of my friends who have written
several poems and stories but they don’t want those to share with others. Still, people write. Why? It is because the real joy of writing is in writing itself. No doubt, the printed word brings with it some recognition but the greatest delight is to simply write. I miss that joy badly. The great philosopher Aristotle felt one of the major aims of an art form was catharsis — the cleansing of the soul. It clarifies, clears the haze in the mind of the writer much before it provokes varied emotions of the reader. As famous novelist Taslima Nasreen said in her novel the "French Lover” that she felt labour pains once a thought or an idea sparked her imagination. The pain remained till she ‘delivered’. She had to suffer for days, months or even years. Writing starts in the mind, a small faint thought; an idea that
throws multidimensional rays of light like through a prism on something or the other. It can just be a word or a sound or a scene that kindles fantasies of future or brings back memories of the past — both good or bad. It builds a storm inside one’s system to such an extent that the person becomes restless, uneasy and uncomfortable till he sits down to write. And as words flow from the keyboard to the computer screen, the person starts feeling light as if gravity has an effect on him no more. He
smiles by himself. His soul sings. It is like a stream flowing on a piece of paper through a pen. He feels like floating in the air. Aristotle’s catharsis or Taslima’s labour pains become crystal clear at that moment. I remember as a student of journalism I wrote a small piece on Mowgli — the jungle boy. It was one of my first attempts. There were too many errors in it. My teacher liked it while politely pointing out the mistakes. In the write-up, I envied Mowgli’s carefree life and his friend Jageera and others saving him from dangers. Most of all, I loved his Radha. A few days ago, I found that piece. It was never published. It did not deserve to see the light of day. It was so childish. But I remember the joy I felt when I was able to write, even in broken English, what I felt about Mowgli and Radha. I smiled. But now unable to write, I am lost like Mowgli in the jungle. Neither Jageera nor Radha is in sight. I wonder what will inspire me. It could be the wilderness of a forest or a Radha or the security of a Jageera or the challenge of a new path, a new forest. I don’t know what the stimulus will be. I don’t know who shall be my muse. I know just one thing. I miss the joy of
writing.
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Myths about India-Pakistan relations
The very ideology of Pakistan, based on religion and the direction it has pushed itself by promoting Islamic radicalism, is not conducive to democracy. Pakistan is its own enemy of democracy. India's hard or soft stand against Pakistan has no role in this
respect
Baladas Ghoshal
Myths
abound when it comes to India-Pakistan relations. None of them stand to reason or for that matter conform to the ground realities in Pakistan. One of the most fallacious of all those myths is that if India remains soft toward Islamabad and relentlessly pursues the peace process, despite all provocations, lack of progress on the terror front and bleeding India slowly in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi can strengthen the hands of the democratic forces in Pakistan and eventually contribute to the growth of democracy in that country. For one thing, history has no example of any country pursuing policies that have contributed to democracy in another country. Wherever democracy has taken root, the impulses and desire for representative government have always come from within, and not from outside. Inspiration, however, can come from outside. Even Aung San Suu Kyi, one of the greatest icons of democracy, realized it despite her earlier belief that the Western sanctions could bring change in Myanmar. At the first instance of her visit to the United States she declared that the democratic development in the country has to be internally driven and pleaded with the West not to do anything that might upset the internal process For another, it is doubtful whether the Pakistanis, barring a few human rights activists like Asma Jahangir, journalists like Nazim Sethi and a few other fringe elements, are at all interested in democracy in their country. If they were, the country would not have remained under the spell of the armed forces ever since the country became separated from India. A totally isolated country like Burma could sustain an autocratic rule with the patronage of China for such long years despite people's strong urge for democracy. But Pakistan was not a closed country, rather it had excellent relations with the West, which alternately promoted both military dictatorship and democracy in the country. It is not that democratic experiment had not taken place in Pakistan, but they all failed miserably. The Pakistani military enjoys all the benefits and privileges of power and takes no responsibility for the direction in which Pakistan is headed. At every stage in Pakistan, the military subverted the process of democracy and rule of law, but the political parties and groups have also contributed their own share in paving the way for the military for having such a critical role through their sheer opportunism and short-sightedness, and in using the military to promote their own goals vis-a-vis other parties.
Islamic radicalismZia-ul-Huq sowed the seeds of Islamists' strong grip over the Pakistani society by creating the military-mullah chain, a nexus more explosive than its nuclear weapons, but all political parties have equally hobnobbed with the radical Islamist forces to promote their sectarian interests and electoral gains. Political parties have all lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the public in Pakistan through misgovernance, corruption and cronyism. One need not have to go too far to prove this point. The indictment and the arrest order for two successive Prime Ministers within the last months are enough testimony to the performance of democratic forces in the country. The less said about the democratically elected President Asif Ali Zardari the better. Rightly or wrongly, some even suspect his active role in the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, whose democratic credentials and personal integrity and record of governance were no better either. The very ideology of Pakistan, based on religion and the direction it has pushed itself by promoting Islamic radicalism is not conducive to democracy. In that respect, Pakistan is its own enemy of democracy. India's hard or soft stand against Pakistan has no role in any of these developments in Pakistan. On the contrary, India's peaceful initiatives towards Islamabad were always looked as New Delhi's weaknesses and had emboldened the Islamist elements both within and outside the armed forces to bleed India further. Indeed, after the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a civilian politician, India did pursue peaceful relations under the Simla Agreement, but did not prevent General Zia-ul-Haq from staging a military coup and ultimately sending Bhutto to the gallows. Furthermore, democracy is no guarantee for peaceful relations between countries. In fact, India's relations with Nepal have actually worsened after the onset of a messy democracy in that country. The victory of the two major political parties in the last elections and the formation of a civilian government, the exit of Musharraf and the seeming neutrality of the army chief, General Pervez Kayani, in political developments, had given a temporary respite to Pakistan's fledgling democracy. But, the challenge of exercising civilian supremacy over the military always remained a formidable task, and the prospect of the military taking centre stage again had always haunted, as the political parties struggled hard to continue their marriage of convenience. Even while a civilian government is in power, the army has since long established its supremacy in the political process and in foreign policymaking by its right to suspend an elected prime minister and keeping complete control over certain policy decisions like Kashmir, Afghanistan and nuclear weapons. Its intelligence unit, the ISI, continues to use Islamic terrorism as a foreign and defence policy tool and resists any kind of civilian oversight of its harmful and clandestine activities that have often boomeranged on Pakistan and wrecked its social, political and economic fabric.
The cleric's messageAs the next election approaches, Pakistani politics is getting even more tumultuous with Pakistan-born but Canadian national cleric Tahirul Qadri leading a protest in the heart of the capital, Islamabad, against the incompetence and avarice of the political class and calling for the government to quit. The Pakistani court's decision to issue its orders for the arrest of Prime Minister Ashraf, just as Qadri and his supporters had massed in the capital, triggered fears of a broad, synchronized effort to mount a "soft coup". The developments brought into question who is behind Qadri and his suspiciously well-greased campaign. The cleric's central message - "forget politics, save the state" - is no different from the long-standing slogan of Pakistan's powerful military establishment. Even during the current civilian rule for the last five years, the generals have manipulated events from behind a thin veil, including rigging elections and backing proxies. The court's order to arrest the Prime Minister, whether it is given effect immediately or not undoubtedly weakens the government, and diminishes its chances of being returned to power after the elections. It would not be wrong to doubt whether the court is acting independently in the interest of the law, or making a political power play that suits the military establishment's political agenda. In such internal political dynamics of Pakistan politics, India's hard or soft stand cannot make any qualitative change in the prospect and survival of democracy in that country. So New Delhi should not entertain any illusion that India can either help in the flowering of democracy in Pakistan, or that a democratic Pakistan would be more amenable to peaceful relations between the two countries. History is replete with instances where democracies have fought against each other. A similar ideological outlook is no guarantee for peace and stability between countries. If that were so, China and the erstwhile Soviet Union would not have fought against each other.
High stakes and costsThis is not to suggest that India should give up the peace process and dialogue with Pakistan for creating peace and stability in the subcontinent that are extremely important for India's broader foreign policy objectives in the indo-Pacific region. But that dialogue should be directed towards the creation of mutual stakes and raising the cost of misadventures in the form of violation of the LoC and cross-border terrorism. All relations, including human, are based on stakes and high costs. Malaysia-Singapore relations are an interesting example to prove my point. If one looks at the sources of conflict between the two countries and the mutual perceptions of each other, it is no better than India-Pakistan relations, yet they do not cross the red lines or go to war, for the stakes and the costs of any misadventure are so high that neither can afford any conflict, even though both are armed to the teeth to any eventuality of that sort. Each cannot survive without the other. As an anti-status quo country and having very little economic interactions, Pakistan currently has no stake in friendly relations and peace with India. To bring Pakistan on board India will need to make every effort to create an environment whereby Islamabad feels encouraged to develop some stakes in friendly relations with India either on its own or is compelled to do so by raising the cost of enmity and conflict. When Islamabad realizes that the benefits of peace with India far outweighs its irredentist misadventures, only then peace and stability will prevail between India and Pakistan. Another course of action India must pursue with all earnestness and at all costs to neutralize both China and the United States from whom Pakistan receives succor, directly or indirectly, to carry on much of its misadventures vis-à-vis India. Until and unless the US and China are taken out of the India-Pakistan equation, peace and stability cannot be achieved in the subcontinent. It is a difficult, but must find some ways to do that. The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi
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