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Handling the Kasab case
The significance of apex court verdict
by T.V. Rajeswar
Ajmal
Kasab, who has sought mercy from President Pranab Mukherjee, was one of the Lashkar-e-Toiba jehadis who carried out the attacks on important Mumbai targets on November 26, 2008, in which 166 persons were killed. The death penalty awarded to him has been confirmed by the Supreme Court.It may be recalled that the 26/11 attacks were planned by the ISI of Pakistan in collaboration with the Lashkar-e-Toiba. The ISI had hired the building near Karachi International Airport, from where instructions were given to the jehadis for carrying out the horrible attacks. The evidence provided by Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal has given full details of the operation. The entire team of attackers sailed from Karachi port and midway to Mumbai, captured an Indian fishing boat, murdered the Indian boatmen and continued their sailing to Mumbai harbour. The targets for attacks had been earlier selected by the Pakistani-Canadian agent, Headley. After landing, the attackers made their way to Taj Hotel and carried out systematic attacks killing all those who were found. One part of the attacking group occupied an Israeli prayer hall-cum-residence in the neighbourhood and carried out systematic attacks and killed everyone found there. The jehadi attackers later dispersed in various directions and one of the team went to Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal where people were killed indiscriminately. Ajmal Kasab was wounded in the exchange of fire between him and the Mumbai security forces who were out on the streets and he was the only person who was arrested alive. But for his capture and his confession, which he made before the magistrate, the horrible story of the Pakistanis’ role in the Mumbai attacks would not have come out. Kasab was prosecuted along with two Indians who were also arrested during the attacks on suspicion that they were part of the jehadis. The trial court convicted Kasab and acquitted two others, Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed. The conviction of Kasab as well as the acquittal of two others was later upheld by the Mumbai High Court. The case eventually went on appeal by Ajmal Kasab to the Supreme Court. A Bench of Justices Aftab Alam and C.K. Prasad heard the case and pronounced the judgement on August 29. It is a landmark judgement in many ways. The judges upheld the conviction of Ajmal Kasab and the acquittal of two others charged along with him as was done by the trial court and the High Court. The judges said, "Hardly does one come across a case where the court does not resort to certain probability" as a working substitute for proof beyond all reasonable doubts. Justice Prasad commented, "I am more than certain that the planning and the conspiracy to commit the crime were hatched in Pakistan, the perpetrators were Pakistan-trained at different centres in that country and the devastations which took place at various places in Mumbai were executed by the appellant in furtherance thereof.” Justice Alam said that the accused persons and their conspirators committed offence of waging war against the Government of India. They added the attack was aimed at India and Indians and it was by foreign nationals. People were killed for no other reason than they were Indians. The judges referred to Pakistan's demand that India should withdraw from Kashmir and that it was intended to show to other countries that the attack was in furtherance of those objectives. The Bench went on to say that the deception carried out by Pakistan was ominous, but it was aimed at destabilising Indian society and government. The case presented an element of previous planning and preparation for the execution of the conspiracy. The appellant was a mere tool in the hands of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). He joined the LeT in December 2007 and continued as its member. Despite a number of opportunities to leave it, accused Kasab continued his association with LeT which shows his jehadi mentality and his commitment to terrorism. The judges also said that the role of state actors of Pakistan stood exposed and that this was the first time that it was being shown to the entire world through legal channels how India was subject to terrorism and how terrorism was being sponsored by Pakistan. The judges said that in terms of loss of life and, property and, more importantly, in its traumatising effect, this case stands alone. Or it is at least the very rarest of rare cases to come before the court since the birth of the Republic and, therefore, it should attract the rarest of rare punishment. They, therefore, confirmed the death sentence awarded by the lower courts. They said the death penalty could be the only sentence for Kasab’s crime. The Ajmal Kasab case and the Supreme Court judgement pronounced by Justice Aftab Alam and Justice C.K. Prasad are very important landmarks in the history of Indian jurisprudence. Of late, doubts have been expressed by high judicial quarters regarding the continuance of the death penalty in India. There are people who want abolition of the death penalty, including those in high positions in the judiciary. There are several judicial constraints which have been imposed on the pronouncement of death penalty in any particular case. Recently a well-known magazine carried an interview with one of the former Supreme Court judges. The judge explained that the Indian judiciary had moved away from the concept of retributive justice and that the death penalty for murder as a necessary concept was no more valid. It would be awarded only if it met the rarest of rare concept which was laid down in the Bachan Singh case judgement. The Judge was asked about the Ajmal Kasab case then pending before the Supreme Court. He was told to give his views on whether there were any mitigating circumstances in his case. Quite appropriately, the judge said that he would not express any view since the Kasab case was sub-judice. The interviewer, however, quoted some other observer as saying that even the Kasab case qualified for exemption from the death penalty because of two mitigating factors which were his age and the fact that he was ideology-driven. In the light of all these doubtful factors, the forthright judgement of Justice Aftab Alam and Justice C.K. Prasad, who constituted the Supreme Court Bench on the Kasab case, is very important. The judgement found no mitigating circumstances in the Kasab case. His age and ideology-driven mentality were obliterated by the fact that he was ruthless and remorseless in his deeds. He had many opportunities to free himself from the LeT but he continued in his jehadi venture. The judgement is also equally important for the forthright exposure of the role of the State of Pakistan in planning and executing the Mumbai attacks. No further proof is necessary for the world to realise that Pakistan has held on to terrorism as an instrument of state
policy. The writer is a former Governor of UP and West
Bengal
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Himachal's chilgoza
by Roshni Johar
IN Rekong Peo lying in Kinnaur, Himachal's tribal belt bordering Tibet, I was surprised to see Phulma Negi wearing a long necklace wherein raw chilgozas were strung. A shagan gift, it showcased ethnicity at its best. A product of lofty pines, costliest dry fruit chilgoza (neoza) is a pine nut to Westerners.Chilgoza tree, botanically called pinus gerardiana, derives its name from its discoverer Capt Alexander Gerard, a Scot officer and scientist who surveyed Himachal's Sutlej valley almost two centuries ago. Once imported from Afghanistan and Baluchistan, now chilgoza comes to us from snow-covered and picturesque Kinnaur, having India's only pine nut forest, covering 2,022 hectares. Unfortunately, these forests are dying gradually due to reckless harvesting by contractors who obtain chilgozas for commercial purposes. Natural regeneration of the neoza forest cover is already suffering. These trees check soil erosion as they grow in an arid and cold area, thereby protecting the environment. Today chilgoza, facing a dismal future, is declared as an endangered species. The Himachal government has formulated a 30-year project for the conservation of fast-depleting reserves of chilgoza. It will be a theme tree for the tribal region. Now saplings will be planted in office complexes, rest houses and schools. Kinnaur will have a park for the conservation of chilgoza varieties. An awareness drive on traditional sustainable management practices will also be launched. Its journey from pine trees to our table is unique. Chilgozas are actually seeds with edible kernels in them. Though this pine flowers in May-June, cones ripen in autumn. Chilgozas are obtained from ripe cones, which are its natural containers. But cones are plucked while they are green. They are heated, causing their scales to open. Then they are shaken and chilgozas just fall out, each cone yielding around 200 nuts. They are moisture-laden, being raw and soft. Kinnauris carry chilgozas to Lavi ka mela a commercial fair (held in Rampur, 135 km beyond Shimla, after Divali), the biggest trade fair of the inner Himalayas since ages, where bartering once prevailed. Merchants from the plains buy chilgozas from Kinnauris to auction them in Shimla and in the plains. However, raw chilgozas cannot be consumed. Paharis just heat a cauldron on medium flame with no oil in them. They are dry-roasted till the desired brown colour is obtained. They are cooled and stored in air-tight containers. In plains, they are dry-roasted before being retailed and processed in Delhi's Khari Baoli. Chilgozas can be dry-roasted manually in a
“bhatti” too. Having a heat producing effect, chilgozas have nutritive, carminative, expectorant and stimulant qualities. It's of immense medicinal value to Kinnauris and Pangwals, who use its oil to treat various skin ailments like wounds, ulcers, sores, etc. Further, this trees' wood that's tough, lasting and almost immune to fungus and water proof, makes it an ideal choice for building houses here. Tourists buy it as a souvenir of Himachal's lofty
pines.
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Reforming national security decision-making
Defence planning in India has been marked by knee-jerk reactions to emerging situations and haphazard single-service growth
Gurmeet Kanwal

Members of an inter-services guard of honour march past India Gate in New Delhi after a homage-paying ceremony. Force structures must be configured on a tri-service, long-term basis to meet future threats and challenges |
Snippets from the report of the Naresh Chandra committee on defence reforms have been appearing in various newspapers and have once again focused attention on the hollowness of the national security decision making process and the need for urgent reforms. For many decades defence planning in India has been marked by knee jerk reactions to emerging situations and haphazard single-Service growth. The absence of a clearly enunciated national security strategy, poor civil-military relations, the lack of firm commitment of funds for modernisation beyond the current financial year and sub-optimal inter-service prioritisation, have handicapped defence planning. Consequently, till recently, the defence planning process had failed to produce the most effective force structure and force mix based on carefully drawn up long-term priorities. With projected expenditure of 100 billion US dollars on military modernisation over the next 10 years, it is now being realised that force structures must be configured on a tri-Service, long-term basis to meet future threats and challenges.
Early effortsThe Sino-Indian Conflict in 1962 had aroused a new defence consciousness in the country after years of neglect and efforts to formalise defence planning began in 1964. Various organisational changes were tried out:
- Defence requirements were assessed on a five-year basis and the First Defence Plan (1964-69) was drawn up.
- A Planning Cell was established in 1965 in the Ministry of Defence
(MoD).
- The Second Defence Plan (1969-74) was instituted on a 'roll-on' basis. After a year was completed, an additional year was tagged at the other end so that the armed forces would always have a revised and up-dated five-year plan. This method was found to be impractical.
- In 1974, an Apex Group under the Union Minister for Planning suggested that a steady long-term defence effort would be more cost effective and economical than fluctuating allocations on account of periodic economic and security crises.
Structures for defence planningMost of the defence planning machinery and planning methodology was developed in the decade 1964-74:
- In order to integrate defence planning within the overall economic planning effort, defence and economic development plans were made co-terminus.
- The Committee for Defence Planning (CDP) was established under the Cabinet Secretary.
- The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was constituted in the Cabinet Secretariat to provide external and internal threat assessments.
- Planning Units were also established in the Department of Defence
Production and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
- A Planning and Coordination Cell was created in the MoD to coordinate and compile various plans into a comprehensive 'Defence Plan' for Cabinet approval. However, generalist civilian bureaucrats in the MoD lacked the necessary expertise to arbitrate between the three services and only succeeded in appending together the different requirements of individual services without any analysis.
- In the services HQs, perspective planning directorates were established in the late 1970s.
- In 1986, the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DG DPS), comprising officers from the three services, DRDO, MoD and the Ministry of External Affairs, was constituted to coordinate and harmonise defence planning under the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).
WeaknessesWhile efforts have been made to improve defence planning and suitable structural changes have been instituted within the defence ministry, implementation of the processes continue to be tardy. n Guidance: The CCS, chaired by the PM, meets as often as necessary to review emerging situations with adverse impact on national security so as to issue suitable policy directives. However, the National Security Council (NSC), also chaired by the PM, whose charter it is to evolve an integrated national security strategy and provide guidance for long-term defence planning, seldom meets. n Plans: Five-year defence plans are rarely accorded formal government approval. The Tenth Defence Plan (2002-07) was not approved at all and drifted along on an ad hoc basis. The Eleventh Defence Plan (2007-12), which ended on March 31, 2012, was also not formally approved. n Funding: Annual defence budgets, in which funds are committed only for one year at a time despite five-year defence plans having been in vogue for several decades, add an element of uncertainty to the planning process. Unutilised funds continue to lapse at the end of the financial year. n Coordination: The absence of an empowered CDS is a glaring anomaly. The COSC works on the basis of consensus and is unable to agree on inter-service priorities for force structuring and modernisation as every service wants a larger share of the pie. The services HQs make their own assumptions of the likely military strategy for future wars and plan their force structures accordingly. Consequently, the LTIPP is integrated merely in name and is actually only a compilation of single-service plans. n Acquisition: Despite the much-trumpeted reform in the procurement process, the acquisition of new weapons and equipment by the armed forces is still mired in bureaucratic red tape. n R&D: There is a dichotomy between the time consuming quest for technological self-reliance and the desire of the services to import arms and equipment based on immediate operational exigencies. The disconnect in the interface between R&D, production agencies and users remains unresolved. As a result, 'make' or 'buy' decisions are still contentious and DRDO projects continue to be delayed with consequent cost overruns.
Defence reformsIn 1999, the Kargil Review Committee headed by the late K Subrahmanyam had been asked to "…review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions." Though it had been given a very narrow and limited charter, the committee looked holistically at the threats and challenges and examined the loopholes in the management of national security. The committee was of the view that the "political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.'' It made far reaching recommendations on the development of India's nuclear deterrence, higher defence organisations, intelligence reforms, border management, the defence budget, the use of air power, counter-insurgency operations, integrated manpower policy, defence research and development, and media relations. The committee's report was tabled in Parliament on February 23, 2000. The Cabinet Committee on Security appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the Kargil Review Committee report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM, headed by the then Home Minister, LK Advani, in turn set up four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, border management and defence management to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets of the management of national security. The GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management system. On May 11, 2001, the CCS accepted all its recommendations, including one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) - which has still not been implemented. The CCS approved the following key measures:
- Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was established with representation from all the Services. The DG DPS was merged in it.
- The post of Chief of Defence Staff, whose tasks include inter-services prioritisation of defence plans and improvement in jointmanship among the three services, was approved. However, a CDS is yet to be appointed.
- A tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command were established.
- The tri-service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established under the COSC for strategic threat assessments.
- Speedy decision making, enhanced transparency and accountability were sought to be brought into defence acquisitions. Approval of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP 2002) was formally announced.
- The DPP constituted the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and the Defence Technology Board, both headed by the Defence Minister.
- Implementation of the decisions of the DAC was assigned to the Defence Procurement Board (DPB).
- The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up.
- The CCS also issued a directive that India's borders with different countries be managed by a single agency - "one border, one force" and nominated the CRPF as India's primary force for counter-insurgency operations.
Decision making is gradually becoming more streamlined. The new Defence Planning Guidelines have laid down three inter-linked stages in the planning process:
- 15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS in consultation with the services HQs and approved by the DAC.
- Five Years Defence Plans for the services (current plan: 2007-12), including 5-years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS in consultation with the services HQs and approved by the DAC.
- Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS approved by the DPB. Budgetary allocations for ensuing the financial year (ending March) are made on the basis of the AAP.
Ten years later, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security. The lack of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental coordination on issues like border management and centre-state disagreements over the handling of internal security are particularly alarming. In order to review the progress of implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001, the government appointed a Task Force on National Security led by Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary. The task force has submitted its report, which has been sent for inter-ministerial consultations.
ConclusionA fluid strategic environment, rapid advances in defence technology, the need for judicious allocation of scarce budgetary resources, long lead times required for creating futuristic forces and the requirement of synergising plans for defence and development, make long-term defence planning a demanding exercise. The lack of a cohesive national security strategy and defence policy has resulted in inadequate political direction regarding politico-military objectives and military strategy. Consequently, defence planning in India, till recently, has been marked by ad hoc decision making to tide over immediate national security challenges and long-term planning was neglected. This is now being gradually corrected and new measures have been instituted to improve long-term planning. It is now being increasingly realised that a Defence Plan must be prepared on the basis of a 15-year perspective plan. The first five years of the plan should be very firm (Definitive Plan), the second five years may be relatively less firm but should be clear in direction (Indicative Plan), and the last five years should be tentative (Vision Plan). A reasonably firm allocation of financial resources for the first five years and an indicative allocation for the subsequent period is a pre-requisite. Perspective planning is gradually becoming tri-Service in approach. It is now undertaken in HQ IDS, where military, technical and R&D experts take an integrated view of future threats and challenges based on a forecast of the future battlefield milieu, evaluation of strategic options and analysis of potential technological and industrial capabilities. Issues like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air defence, electronic warfare and amphibious operations, which are common to all the services, are now getting adequate attention. However, unless a CDS is appointed to guide integrated operational planning, it will continue to be mostly single-Service oriented in its conceptual framework. The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst
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