Punjab Police has been in the news in the recent past for all the wrong reasons, whether it be excesses by them or attacks on them. For an organisation that has long had a reputation for courage and effective law enforcement, the sudden slide into ignominy seems puzzling and ominous. However, the slide is not sudden; rather it has been happening over decades. It is only the recent showing of symptoms that has created the impression of a sudden degeneration.For more than the past half century police malfunctioning has been attributed mainly to the colonial hangover by those outside the organisation, and to magisterial control — especially the control of the district magistrate — by the police itself. Both are simplistic explanations and give the parties concerned opportunity to indulge in self-pity. The fact is that the British left us a fairly sound and just administrative set-up, although it was for obvious reasons tailored to cater to their colonial interests.
The current state of the Punjab Police can be analysed in terms of certain key factors:
Recruitment: Earlier, the district superintendent of police (DSP) used to be responsible for recruiting the constabulary within laid down parameters, whereas assistant sub-inspectors (ASIs), inspectors and deputy superintendents were recruited higher up in the hierarchy. Over the years, recruitment has been centralised, and recruitment boards have been set up at various levels, while the Punjab Public Service Commission recruits DSPs.
Though this is theoretically a more equitable and efficient method, it lends itself to centralised interference both from within the department and without, tempting the political powers to influence and vitiate the process. Also, recruitment of ASIs and inspectors ensures patronage at levels of entry where the damage is qualitatively higher. Fair, honest, equitable and transparent recruitment will go a long way in giving the people a force to be proud of.
Training: The training has basically been sound, but too much innovation and experimentation without proper study has both diluted the thrust of training and overloaded the trainees. Matters that should form part of refresher, advanced or specialised courses are included in the basic course. Refresher training has suffered drastically, as everyone tries to get excused from it through external pressure.
Discipline: Discipline has taken a hit by the use of the very same pressures that influence recruitment, as well as the wishy-washy attitude of seniors. Also poor knowledge of rules has attracted the odium of courts. Political and other pressures to let off recalcitrant policemen has undermined discipline. The Punjab Police Rules, which were designed for a civilian police, are also very mild in terms of punishment compared to the rules for the Central paramilitary forces. Officers are reluctant to express themselves strongly in the Annual Confidential Reports, which form the bedrock of the system of rewards and punishment.
Leadership: This has suffered due to a number of factors. Post-Independence, the vacuum caused by Partition and the exodus of British officers pushed many officers way above their level of competence. The year 1967 brought in emergency-commission armed forces officers found unsuitable for regular commission there.
The induction of officers at various levels during the period of terrorism during the ’80s was a condemnation of the higher leadership of the Punjab Police; but it also groomed junior and middle-level officers who subsequently showed their mettle outside Punjab as well, even in top jobs in J&K and Manipur. However, these outsiders also left lasting problems like ‘own rank and pay promotions’ (ORP) and ‘special police officers’ (SPOs) whose absorption in the force has been a problem.
The growth of awareness in the political class has also had an effect on the police leadership since long. Officers at all levels develop political linkages. If the top does not have a strong equation with the highest political brass, officers down the line start wielding their clout. It is only on ascending the top chair that they realise how this undermines the system. Politicians also cultivate their own coterie of officers with similarly devastating results. In fact, reaching the top is a continuous process of emasculation.
While the situation cannot be corrected in near future, what is possible is for the government to empower the Director General of Police to enable him to run his organisation efficiently. Enhanced financial and administrative powers would immediately deliver results. The DGP can then prioritise his finances so as to be able to give adequate thrust to modernisation and enforce his writ by being able to transfer superintendents of police and below. Since governments do bring in a person whom they trust, why not empower him to be able to run his show?
Political interface: I avoid the usual expression ‘political interference’ because this has been a two-way interface, with police officers being as responsible as the politicians for the interaction. However, the attempt by the political hierarchy to take over the functions of the police is ill advised. I refer to the realignment of constituencies with police stations, creating a supernumerary class of controllers with no answerability. Add to this the system of ‘halqa in-charge’ and the police supervisory levels have been effectively bypassed. This results in the misuse of power — which in the case of police is generally brutal — and in letting ‘one’s own criminals’ go scot free.
In the end, the key lies in choosing the DGP wisely, and then giving him the confidence and power to run his force.
The writer was DGP, Punjab, from 1999 to 2002.