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Afghanistan at the crossroads
Pakistan's terrorist troubles grow
G Parthasarathy

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani (centre) intends to test Pakistani "sincerity". AFP |
A recent report issued by the Pentagon has, for the first time, alluded to sanctuaries in Pakistan for harbouring terrorists on its borders with both Afghanistan and India. This is not the first time that the Pentagon has indicted Pakistan for aiding terrorist violence in Afghanistan. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, stated: “The fact remains that the Quetta Shura (Taliban) and the Haqqani network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations, serving as proxies of the Government of Pakistan, are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers”. Mullen described how the Haqqani network had attacked the US Embassy in Kabul in September 2011.Hillary Clinton has not minced words on Pakistani support for terrorism, warning that Pakistan will pay a high price for its actions. She has bitingly told Pakistan: “You cannot nurture snakes in your backyard and expect they will only bite your neighbours”. More recently, she is reported to have asked General Kayani: “How do you envisage Pakistan in 2020 — as South Korea or the Democratic Republic of Congo?” She left the smug General speechless. It is clear that the US now recognises groups like Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed and the Dawood network as inimical to its security interests. But while one can realistically expect some intelligence sharing and monitoring of funds of these outfits, India should not believe that the US will take any meaningful action to dismantle or degrade them. Action against the ISI-backed terrorist groups acting against India cannot be outsourced. The bulk of Pakistan’s diplomatic and military attention will be focused on developments across the Durand Line for the foreseeable future. Over 80,000 Pakistani troops are now battling those of its former “assets” now affiliated with Tehriq e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With nearly a million Pashtun tribals fleeing their homes, the Pakistan military has not destroyed but dispersed internal terrorism. The attack by the TTP in Wagah was a manifestation of this development. But, given the subterranean links the ISI doubtless retains with the TTP, one should not discount the ISI using the TTP brand name to mount terrorist attacks on India. Amidst these developments, India has also to keep a close eye on what is transpiring as the new Ashraf Ghani dispensation takes charge in Afghanistan. The most important development that India can ill afford to ignore is that the US no longer regards the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban as an Al-Qaida “asset” and is no longer prepared to designate Taliban attacks as a terrorist challenge, despite the ever-increasing Taliban attacks in Afghanistan over the past year in which American soldiers have been killed. Despite professions of reconciliation being “Afghan led”, the US appears prepared to give the ISI a major role in the entire process of Afghan “reconciliation”. Moreover, Karzai's exit has seen a paradigm shift in Afghans foreign and security policies. Learning from bitter experience, Karzai had little faith in Pakistani professions of good intentions. Ghani obviously intends to experiment with tests of Pakistani “sincerity”. The new formula of the Ghani dispensation with more than evident American enthusiasm is to try out China to help facilitate “reconciliation” with the Taliban. Seeking to reassure the Taliban and Pakistan of Chinese intentions, the Global Times proclaimed: “China will never take on the role played by the US and NATO and act as a powerful meddler. China supports peaceful rebuilding and ethnic reconciliation in the war-torn country. There is the cost of being a major power and we need to get used to it”. While Ghani insisted on an “Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process” China has longstanding Pakistani facilitated links, overt and covert, with the Taliban and its Quetta Shura. While Afghanistan needs billions in foreign assistance every year, the Chinese offered Ghani aid amounting to merely $350 million over three years. Pakistan’s strategy now appears apparent, with its “all-weather friend” China guiding the “reconciliation” process. The Taliban will be facilitated to take over parts of south-eastern Afghanistan and establish a de facto government there. The Afghan army lacks the firepower and airlift capabilities to retain control all across the country. With control of territory in Afghanistan the Taliban will demand “equality” in order to undermine the claims of the Ghani government as the only legitimate authority in the country. Given the ambivalence and indeed some would say duplicity involved in US links with the Taliban, commencing with the incarceration of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, it is questionable if the US would strongly object to such a Taliban strategy. While given his dependence on the US, President Ghani may well be reluctant to challenge the US, his position and standing within Afghanistan will inevitably be questioned and eroded. Nothing would suit Pakistan and the Taliban better than a political vacuum in Afghanistan. It also remains to be seen if President Ghani will adopt the same role that his predecessor did by taking note of Pakistan's vulnerabilities arising from its suppression of Pashtun tribals by its military actions in the tribal areas All this should not deter India from going ahead with its plans to join Iran in developing the Iranian port of Chahbahar. This project strategically guarantees India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Moreover, given the ethnic and sectarian challenges that Iran faces internally and externally, New Delhi will have to closely coordinate its strategies in Afghanistan with Iran, Russia and Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours. This will no doubt figure prominently during President Putin's visit to India. It should be remembered that Taliban control of southern Afghanistan was used in the past by Pakistan to train terrorists for "Jihad" in Jammu and Kashmir. Taliban control over any part of southern Afghanistan will undermine our security. It will also strengthen the ISI belief that it pays to use terrorism as an instrument of State policy. This concern should be conveyed unambiguously to both the Obama Administration and the Republican-controlled US Congress.
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Is consensus good for democracy?
The idea of India as a coalition of ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious and caste identities became implicit in India’s coalition politics that became a norm for over two decades. This seems to be getting lost by a single political ideology dominating the length and breadth of the country
Peter Ronald deSouza

A new phrase in Indian politics: The duumvirate is able to win anything in sight. PTI |
With
the rise and rise of the duumvirate, political scientists such as me have had to abandon our favourite propositions about the nature of Indian politics. Our wisdom, built assiduously over two decades, that Indian politics after 1989 has entered the age of coalitional government; that the expansion of the polity, purely in terms of numbers, means that there can be no political leader who has national appeal; that national elections are the aggregate of state elections and on their own have no overarching message, now stands challenged. That identity politics is the primary driver of politics; and that government will have to make huge concessions to the media, both mainstream and social, are all old propositions that have been consigned to the dust heap of history. They, the duumvirate, who seem to be able to win anything in sight — even Maharashtra, was a big victory since the googly of Shard Pawar was hit by them to the boundary — have inaugurated a new phase in the politics of independent India. Who is the duumvirate, Modi-Shah or Modi-Bhagwat or Bhagwat-Modi, is the subject of much speculation? One thing is clear, political scientists will have to come up with new propositions.
Exit, or voice dissent One of the most appealing treatises to explore as the months roll on, is that offered by Albert. O. Hirschman in his masterpiece Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. He sees the option of exit as that available to consumers who, if they are dissatisfied with a product or a firm, can migrate to another firm and another product. Exit is an option generally used by consumers to punish a firm and the effect of this exit is for firms to re-work their strategies, if the rate of exit is significant, or face extinction. Exit is an option in the world of economics. Voice is an option generally adopted in the world of politics. It represents protest, referring to the dissent that a supporter expresses if a party or political organisation adopts a position that he consider objectionable. Voice is protest against the party leadership and can be utilised to change the leadership or, if this is unavailable because the leadership is too entrenched, then exit is adopted. Both, consumers and party members, stay with the firm, or the organisation, because it has some feature that attracts them and gets their loyalty. This is a small book but rich in its insights into human behaviour particularly that between individuals, organisations and context. The three categories, of ‘Exit’, ‘Voice’, and ‘Loyalty,’ I believe, can be productively applied to Indian politics today, not to explain it as it is, but to speculate on what may happen tomorrow. But here I would like to reverse the sequence to loyalty, voice, and exit, to explain the current rein of the duumvirate.
Is dual loyalty possible? The present regime is not an NDA regime even though that is the nomenclature under which it prefers to be known. It is an RSS regime. Naming it correctly is important because by doing so one draws attention to the organisational culture which underlies the regime. In an NDA regime there would be contest between world-views. There would be positional play. There would be jostling, between groups, for greater power and each group would use both a battery of arguments and elected numbers to muscle their way into the charmed circle of cabinet ministers. In an NDA regime, the primus inter pares, the Prime Minister, would have to compromise with, and accommodate, the different claims and world-views. The threat of exit, and the consequent destabilisation of the regime, would be very palpable and cause much anxiety. A great deal of time would have to be spent on building consensus. In an RSS regime this threat, if at all, is more distant. In fact, it is a hypothetical threat since the key players are all members of the RSS. I am not just making a simple point about the majority of members belonging to one organisation, and hence the bargaining power of the other organisations being reduced, but am instead making the point about party behaviour, organisational discipline, and obedience to leadership. Since all the key players are members of the RSS they owe their allegiance to the RSS first and only then to the NDA. In 1979, Madhu Limaye tried to force the issue of dual loyalty in the Janata Party, asking the RSS members to choose between the Janata Party and the RSS, but it soon fell on this issue because the RSS was chosen. Since the RSS is a cadre-based organisation where members obey their seniors, and everybody obeys the Sarsanghchalak, where the organisational authority is on the principle of superior-subordinate, the dimension that must be added to the Hirschman thesis is the issue of organisational culture.
Loyalty as default mode An organisation whose members have, for many years, imbibed a culture of obedience to superior authority is an organisation where the options of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ will not be easily exercised. Loyalty will be the default mode in most situations. Tough it out even when one thinks the leadership is wrong. In fact, even when the leadership is wrong one may not think so for one is trained to believe that the leadership is always right. The CPM, which is another cadre-based organisation also has the same culture. Only here the Sarsanghchalak is the General Secretary of the party. The thick RSS culture of obedience makes the expression of dissent difficult. We can see this in the many changes in procedure regarding the PMO’s functioning and these have been accepted without much protest. But while this culture of obedience can be a defining factor in a small organisation, which is not very diverse, which is, in fact, mono-cultural, can it work in large organisations which are inherently plural. As the NDA government begins to conquer new territory, Haryana, Maharashtra, added to Rajasthan, MP, Chhattisgarh, Goa, and now possibly Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir, this mono-culture will be necessarily diluted. This is the inherent logic of size. It impacts all organisations. Plurality increases as size increases. This is a fundamental rule of all human communities. The plurality may be of world-views, food habits, group customs, attitudes to authority, or cultures of dissent etc., and thus could be either a strongly manifested plurality or a weak one, depending on the background culture within which the community is located. In the current NDA (RSS) government the background culture is a strong culture of obedience so even though there will be differences of opinion on policy, or of the direction being followed by the government, these will not be voiced since the bar at which the voice option will be invoked is much higher than it was during the UPA government.
Feeble voicesIf the option of ‘voice’ being invoked is faint, invoking the option of ‘exit’ is even more remote. Exit requires courage, requires not just the show of protest but the willingness to stand up for belief even if it means loss of political power. Expressing ‘voice’ is safer than expressing ‘exit,’ since in the former case the protester remains within the organisation and tries to change its agenda or its direction by mounting a counter-argument. As the RSS (NDA) government grows in size and as it conquers new territories, in terms of both social group and region, and thereby begins to alter the raucous landscape of Indian politics, will it be able to impose a discipline on the tumult? Will the Duumvirate move the polity away from the contestations and challenges, of interest and viewpoint, that have in the last six decades grown exponentially in politics? Our polity has evolved from the patrician world of benevolent authority of Jawaharlal Nehru to the feeble world of absent authority of Manmohan Singh where the Centre seemed to weaken and just about held together. Will the duumvirate reverse this process as it appears to be doing?
The missing argumentative Indian We now have to probe is what will happen to our Bharatiya culture of dissent. Alongside the growth of an organisation also grows differences of perception of reality, a feature of the human estate, and the question we observers of Indian politics, therefore, have to ask is whether the culture of authority of the RSS will suppress the culture of dissent that grows so naturally in any human community. Will we see less voice? This cannot be good for India which is too complex a polity and society for one viewpoint to prevail. Even modern physics has a plurality of viewpoints, which has scientists arguing about the nature of dark matter. Why should we social beings not argue about the nature of dark matter in society? And why should our expressions of our differences bring with it penalties? Strong leadership does not mean a culture of silence. This seems to be emerging. The unanimity we hear coming from North and South blocks is worrying. Such consensus is not good for democracy. A strong nation, ostensibly the highest goal of the government, does not come from an imposed consensus but from one constructed through the expression of ‘voice’ and in a process and practise of consultation. Truth is too complex to be grasped by one person, even by a duumvirate. The Mahatma and Gurudev differed on the burning of foreign cloth in the swadeshi campaign. Tagore used the option of ‘voice’ and we got the great novel Ghare-Bhaire as a result. Dr Ambedkar and Pandit Nehru differed on issues ranging from India’s foreign policy to the delay in enacting the Hindu Code Bill. Babasaheb, to be “true to himself”, used the option of ‘exit’ and left the Cabinet. His resignation speech is a master text where he sets out his differences with Nehru, who he charges with political dishonesty. Reading it is of great educational value not just for the clarity of its prose but for its record on the fundamental differences between the two men. Since ‘exit’, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’ are options available to all, in every organisation especially large ones, can we expect to see such options exercised in the NDA government? Or will it only be loyalty? India is a multilingual, multicultural
country.
Different strokes
- The fragmentation of the electoral space began as ideological challenges to the Gandhi-Nehru vision of India through 1960s, after the death of Nehru in 1964.
- The first real ideological challenge to the Nehruvian Idea of India — the communist movement — shed its extremist tendencies and reconciled with electoral democracy.
- The CPI gained office in Kerala in 1957.
- The socialists were always a divided lot and hence could hardly ever pose a consistent electoral challenge to the Congress. Lohia, the most original and organic Indian thinker since Gandhi and Ambedkar, thought of backward castes and classes as an electorally visible political constituency.
- Lohia’s initiatives anticipated two ideas that transformed Indian politics in the 1990s, Mandalisation and the Dalit Bahujan Samaj.
The writer is Professor at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies. The views expressed are personal
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