How it’s done, former Army Chief General NC Vij reflects in his memoir ‘Alone in the Ring’

Aptly titled, ‘Alone in the Ring’ is the second book by General NC Vij, who headed the Indian Army from December 31, 2002, to January 31, 2005. His first book, ‘The Kashmir Conundrum: The Quest for Peace in a Troubled Land’, was well received.

During his tenure as Army Chief, Gen Vij initiated several innovative and ground-breaking operational projects that included fencing along the Line of Control (LoC) and the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. The South Western Command and IX Corps were also sanctioned during his tenure. Other important initiatives included improvement in career prospects of all ranks and the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS).

As DGMO and Vice Chief, he was also closely involved in the Kargil conflict, Op Parakram, Op Khukri — rescuing Indian peacekeepers in Sierra Leone — and the decision on not sending troops to Iraq.

His book is thus an enthralling account and a treasure trove of information on seminal events in India’s history, seen personally from the perch of higher command. Gen Vij also provides a window into the political decision-making during these critical times and how it impacted the Army. His exposition of contemporary military and doctrinal issues like the ‘Cold Start’, and issues of jointness, integration, theaterisation against the backdrop of the complexities of modern-day warfare, is masterful.

The Kargil war took place when the author was DGMO. He highlights Pakistan’s perfidy that while peace parleys were going on in Lahore during PM Vajpayee’s bus yatra, the Pakistan army had already started moving into the Kargil sector, occupying posts vacated for the winter by the Indian Army. However, he also underlines a serious flaw in the Pakistan army: good at planning tactical operations, but terrible with strategy as it did not realistically consider India’s response.

He feels that the intelligence agencies failed to provide critical inputs on Pakistani intrusion and the Army, too, could not gather intelligence at the tactical level. He also highlights the shortcomings in several areas, especially the lack of a National Security Doctrine, a theme that recurs several times in the book.

Operation Parakram was undertaken when Vij was the Vice Chief. He notes that the nation was aghast at the attack on Parliament in December 2001 and was strongly in favour of India responding swiftly to teach Pakistan a lesson.

The Cabinet Committee on Security was informed that the defensive formations could be readied for limited offensive actions in three to four days. However, the strike corps would need three weeks to be ready for offensive operations. Interestingly, no political goals or aims of military mobilisation were clearly defined. When the Chiefs asked for the rules of engagement, the Prime Minister asked them to first mobilise and other instructions would follow. However, no specific directions came and the instructions given later were only in the form of sketchy signals.

The author notes that the lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet on its war objectives could have undermined Operation Parakram from the outset. The government perhaps had its own reasons about not going to war, but these were not shared with the military.

Not surprisingly, Musharraf reneged on his promise. The arrested terrorists were soon let off, and LeT and other terror groups were allowed to operate as before. To rub salt on India’s wounds, on May 14, 2002, three terrorists dressed in Indian Army uniforms infiltrated an Army camp in Kaluchak near Jammu and killed 23 women and children. Once again, India exploded with outrage. Preparations for war were resumed. On May 22, PM Vajpayee announced at a military base in Kashmir: “The time has come for a decisive battle, and we will have a sure victory in this battle.”

Resultantly, the Indian Army concentrated all three of its strike corps, which was the most threatening posture. Once again, however, the Indian leadership decided to hold back its troops. Finally, on October 16, 2002, the crisis was declared over, bringing the curtain down on one of the most dangerous periods in India-Pakistan relations.

The construction of the LoC fence in J&K was conceived by the author when he was the Army Chief. People today would scarcely remember that at the time it was conceived and constructed, the total number of militants at any given time in J&K was between 2,500 and 3,000. The only way to control the militancy was to stop the infiltration of trained militants from Pakistan. This required creating an obstacle system that would reduce the rate of infiltration to such low levels that their operations became untenable. So, the idea of an anti-infiltration system, a fence, was borne.

The author mentions scepticism over this idea, considering it impractical and reflecting a defensive mindset. Despite the opposition and against all the difficulties of terrain, climate and adversary’s fire, Gen Vij stuck to his decision to construct the LoC fence. It was built in just over a year by September 30, 2004. The effectiveness of the fence in making infiltration very difficult is there for all to see.

Op Parakram had shown that while India could employ the massive combat power of its three strike corps, deployment took time because of the movement of strike corps from the hinterland to operational areas. Pakistan had the advantage of faster deployment due to shorter distances of its cantonments from the border, with all the logistical support. Thus was born the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, based on the idea of a ‘pivot’ corps and the creation of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that could be speedily deployed even while the strike corps were in the process of deployment.

Gen Vij holds that given the realities and challenges of the present-day operational environment, there is a need to graduate from mere ‘jointness’ to an advanced level of ‘integration’ among the three services. In this context, he talks about the role of the CDS and Theatre Commands.

Overall, this is an instructive book, imparting valuable insights into a critical period from the vantage point of a soldier who not only saw it happen, but shaped events and decisions. In a real sense, it is ‘passing on’ to future generations what happened, how it happened and who all made it happen.

The added advantage of the book is that it is not only an authoritative first-hand account, but also a candid scrutiny of military decision-making, yet written in an easy-to-read style that even a layman can understand. For military historians, the book has a wealth of details that they would cherish. For decision-makers and bureaucrats, it would help in formulating security strategy based on real-world experiences.

— The reviewer is former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat