China’s 2025 military parade: Projection of power, perceptions, and implications for India

China’s largest-ever military parade on September 3, 2025, was less a commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and more a calculated performance of military modernity. Tiananmen Square became both stage and message: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not only upgrading its arsenal but also reimagining the image of Chinese power in global politics, taking place right after the conclusion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leadership summit in Tianjin. With Xi Jinping flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, the optics were deliberately designed to present an axis of defiance — famously termed axis of ‘autocracies’ in Western media — against the US-led order, while also signalling to immediate neighbours like India that Beijing’s military ambitions are accelerating.

Nearly 26 world leaders, many from Central Asia and Southeast Asia, attended the parade — an unmistakable nod to Beijing’s expanding diplomatic reach and its bid to project global influence.

The parade’s most striking feature was the showcasing of China’s full nuclear triad —land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the DF-5C and road-mobile DF-61, submarine-launched JL-series missiles, and air-launched systems. The message was unmistakable: Beijing can now threaten adversaries across all domains of strategic deterrence. In addition, hypersonic weapons such as the YJ-series anti-ship missiles, designed to complicate US carrier operations in the Western Pacific, underline the PLA’s intent to deny external powers access to contested zones.

Equally notable were the swarms of unmanned systems and directed-energy platforms. Drone submarines, stealth drones like GJ-11 stealth attack drone dubbed the “loyal wingman” that could accompany manned aircraft, and counter-swarm defences employing lasers and micro-missiles suggest a doctrinal shift toward unmanned warfare. While many analysts note that several of these systems are experimental and not yet combat-ready, the symbolism is critical. China’s defence industry is demonstrating not only innovation but also capacity for rapid, large-scale production. That capacity to scale —even more than operational readiness — gives Beijing a strategic edge that India must take seriously.

Yet, the parade also betrayed contradictions. Unlike in 2015, when foreign contingents marched alongside the PLA, this year’s parade was an all-Chinese affair. Also, behind the futuristic weaponry lies an untested force. The PLA has not fought a major war since 1979, and many of the systems on display lack battlefield validation, and hence it can be argued that this was more theatre than testimony of genuine military capability. But for India, dismissing the spectacle would be a mistake. Perceptions shape deterrence, and in this arena, China is playing a deliberate psychological game — instilling the sense that it is always a step ahead.

Need for nuance in India’s takeaways

For India, these displays should serve a dual purpose: highlight the sophistication of China’s deterrence architecture while reminding New Delhi of its own vulnerabilities in ballistic missile defence and undersea surveillance. Matching China system for system is neither feasible nor necessary. Instead, India should prioritise countering Chinese strengths in specific domains. Strengthening hypersonic missile defence, accelerating indigenous drone and counter-drone programmes, and investing in maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean will be critical.

Equally, partnerships through frameworks like the Quad can expand India’s technological resilience, allowing it to counterbalance Chinese advances without replicating Beijing’s parade of excess. The key lies in recognising that military power today is not just about possession but about integration across domains — something India’s armed forces must accelerate in doctrine and practice.

The parade also needs to be read against the horizon of 2027, when the PLA marks its centennial. Since 2020, Beijing has incorporated the “2027 goal” into its modernisation roadmap, presenting it as a milestone in the long march toward building a “world-class military” by mid-century. While the goal is often misrepresented as China fast-tracking modernisation to 2027, China engaged with the target in more symbolic fashion than transformative. It is a short-term benchmark designed to sustain momentum and bolster propaganda, rather than a sudden acceleration of capacity.

This distinction matters for India. The 2027 centennial will be less about material breakthroughs and more about political messaging. China will likely leverage the anniversary to highlight the PLA’s loyalty to the Communist Party, its technological achievements, and its readiness to defend sovereignty. In the Chinese narrative, 2027 is not a finish line but a stage in the journey toward 2035, when Beijing aims to “basically complete” modernisation, and 2049, when it seeks to be on par with or surpass the United States.

The Centennial Horizon

For India, the centennial year should be understood as a psychological milestone rather than an operational deadline. The danger lies not in believing that China will be militarily omnipotent by 2027, but in underestimating the political energy Beijing will pour into that moment. The PLA’s centennial will be wrapped in rhetoric of “great rejuvenation” and the inevitability of Chinese rise. That narrative, if unchallenged, can shape regional perceptions and erode India’s strategic confidence.

India must therefore respond not only with military preparedness but also with narrative resilience. Positioning itself as a credible security provider in the Indian Ocean and South Asia, expanding defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia, and demonstrating indigenous technological milestones in aerospace and cyber domains would allow India to project an alternative model of power. The centennial year offers an opportunity for India to frame its own story of military modernisation — not in reaction to China, but in assertion of its independent trajectory.

The 2025 parade was a warning written in steel and spectacle: China is not content with incrementalism but seeks to project inevitability. For India, the lesson is neither alarmism nor complacency. It is to recognise that perception, production, and propaganda are now as important as platforms and payloads. By preparing smartly for China’s evolving doctrine while shaping its own narrative of military innovation, India can ensure that the centennial of the PLA in 2027 does not cast a shadow, but rather sharpens its own path toward strategic maturity.

(The writer is the Director of the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA) in New Delhi, specialising in Chinese politics and foreign policy)