Address IAF’s depleting offensive capability

The IAF today stands at an inflection point. On the one hand, it has articulated a doctrine that is sweeping in its scope and ambitious in its aspiration. On the other hand, the gap between its articulation and the capability to execute is growing ever so wide. The gap merits serious examination through a concerning lens of an erosion in its offensive capabilities.

At around 30 fighter squadrons, the IAF is at its lowest strength ever. And what is more alarming is that the pipeline of fighter replacements is restricted for at least the next five years to a trickle from the Tejas Mk IA assembly lines.

It has taken Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) almost nine years to deliver the first 40 Mk1 jets. Even a dramatic improvement in the production of the Tejas Mk1A, that doubles the delivery numbers (83) in a little over half the time frame (five years), will only cater to the corresponding phasing out of the existing squadrons (the remaining MiG-21s and Jaguars).

Even a speedy finalisation of the multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) deal of 114 fighter aircraft will, at best, fructify in deliveries commencing by the end of the decade if it is a government-to-government (G2G) deal. If the process continues its present trajectory, ie a global tendering process, it could take almost a decade to result in deliveries.

That alarm bells are ringing in New Delhi is quite apparent by the speedy submission of an inhouse report from the MoD on an 'IAF roadmap for expedited capability enhancement.' While the scope of the report is as expansive as the IAF doctrine, it is too early to assess when the deliverables will start flowing in.

By any logical assessment, there are no answers in the short and medium term other than impressing upon the US to ensure that the deliveries of the GE 404 and 414 engines are expedited so that at least the light combat aircraft (LCA) programme is on track.

The willingness of the political executive to unshackle the IAF over eastern Ladakh and test its coercive capability at Balakot in 2019 were steps in the right direction. But the two episodes also brought into focus the after-effects of coercion in an adversarial environment of parity or near-parity on both the northern and western fronts.

The sheer lack of numbers, capability gaps in long-range air-air missiles that still exist and other structural deficiencies in the IAF's air defence networks and sensors are a cause for concern. To the IAF's credit, it has done its best to plug these gaps, but there is only so much it can do with the dismal decline in the numbers.

The current inventory of offensive multi-role platforms is about 14-15 SU-30 MkI, three Mirage-2000, three MiG-29 and two Rafale squadrons. A few Jaguar, Tejas Mk1 and MiG-21 squadrons make up for the rest of the force.

If this depleted force is to punch above its weight, it must have the following: an 'overweight' complement of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons; electronic warfare (EW) capability to degrade an extremely dense and sophisticated adversarial air defence network, particularly in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR); a readily available and 'on call' complement of aerial refuellers; airborne warning and control systems (AWACS); and airborne early warning platforms, all of which are as scarce as their fighter brethren.

Considering the reported likelihood of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) acquiring the multi-role stealth fighter, the JF-35 (export version of the J-31) by the end of this decade, coupled with the speedy operationalisation of an Italian data link network akin to the NATO Link-16, any competitive advantage enjoyed by the IAF over the PAF is speedily getting eroded.

Even if one looks at the Chinese fifth generation capability with a pinch of salt and reckons that platforms like the Rafale, with its entire suite of EW and weapons will be a fair match till India acquires or develops its own fifth and sixth generation fighters, any talk of catching up with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) sounds rather far-fetched and the possibility of any leap-frogging seems remote.

What then is the way forward? Considering that several recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) of over two decades ago are still unrealised, it is important to assess which of these recommendations attach themselves to the IAF's offensive capability. These should be addressed on priority, with accountability and clear deliverables, a facet that has been missing in our aeronautical development ecosystem.

Next is to mitigate the gap created by the continuing shortage of the fixed wing offensive platform. To do this, there is a need to fast-track the induction of systems, such as drone swarms, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and long-range surface-to-surface missiles of the Brahmos family without succumbing to the false narrative that these would ultimately replace manned aircraft.

Policymakers must digest the inescapable reality that so long as full-spectrum threats exist for India along its northern and western borders, the IAF will be compelled to wield a mix of fixed wing, unmanned and surface-to-surface weapons.

On a different plane, after a decade of successfully building its non-kinetic capability (transport and helicopter fleets), which has contributed brilliantly to statecraft and nation-building, it is time for the IAF to concentrate on building credible offensive capability. Notwithstanding several propositions in the air, such as the development of the advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) , red herrings like the F-35, the long gestation periods of new acquisitions and the collaborative development of jet engines, the future is largely uncertain.

The IAF will have to be innovative and nimble to harness its depleting offensive assets with a very high quality of training and operational preparedness.