Ailing Manipur needs healing touch
PM Modi must sensitively address legitimate political aspirations of Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups
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PRIME Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Manipur on Saturday, just over a week after the Centre claimed to have cleared two roadblocks to restore peace in the state that has been roiled by violence for over two years.
The first development pertains to the extension of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with two Kuki-Zomi-Hmar armed conglomerates — the Kuki National Organisation and United Progressive Front — after the matter was stalled for one-and-a-half years due to opposition from the then N Biren Singh-led BJP government. The second is about affirming the primary role of the Central forces in providing security on the National Highway-2 and securing the commitment of the Kuki-Zo Council to open it in ways that allow free movement of commuters and goods.
That the Centre chose a tight balancing act is evident as the tripartite pact it forged with the state government and these armed groups on September 4 reiterates ‘the territorial integrity of Manipur’ on the one hand and the ‘need for a negotiated solution’ on the other.
On the face of it, the lexical priority accorded to the question of ‘territorial integrity’ in a note issued by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs is significant in two senses. First, it seeks to instil confidence in the minds of the dominant Meitei community about their longstanding concerns about the state’s ‘territorial integrity’.
Second, prefixing the qualifier ‘reiterate’ and not ‘protect/uphold’ to ‘territorial integrity’— although the original text commits the armed groups to ‘abide by’ — comes through as a deliberate and ingenious contrivance to lend flexibility to the agreement. This ensures that future negotiation on the political demands of the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar armed groups, including a ‘separate administration’, remains open-ended.
A deeper probe into the pact, however, suggests that the imprimatur of the old political chessboard of a counter-insurgency approach by the Centre is apparent. Driven by the Kautilyan statecraft of saam (persuasion), daam (incentive), dand (stick) and bhed (ethnic fractionalisation), this approach seeks to contain and control armed insurgent groups within a disparate set of nested territorial space.
The return of arms to the nearest CRPF/BSF camps, the relocation — albeit a reduced number — of designated camps away from ‘areas vulnerable to conflicts’ and the promise of ‘negotiated solution’ represent saam. The renewal of monthly stipends and the financial incentives that come along with the relocation of designated camps constitute daam of this agreement. The saam and daam components are, however, contingent on dand, namely ‘stringent verifications… to delist foreign nationals’ and close monitoring on the ‘enforcement of ground rules’ by the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG).
The containment of armed factions within their designated camps, which would be closely monitored and sternly dealt with in case of any ‘violation of ground rules’, implies that ethnic fractionalisation (bhed) within the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups gets institutionalised. While this may be amenable to leveraging interlocking balance within and across armed groups, it privileges the unrivalled power/control of the Centre.
Blunting the bargaining power of these groups is the immediate consequence. As rival armed factions get preoccupied with zealously guarding their operational areas under the close watch of the Army/Central paramilitary forces and the JMG around their designated camps, it is likely to dent, if not permanently forestall, the prospect of the emergence of a larger framework of unity and solidarity across armed groups.
If previous experience of ceasefire agreements with armed groups in Manipur or elsewhere in Northeast India is any guide, political patronage under the SoO may normalise and leverage the outsourcing of law and order to non-state actors in the long run. Putting the onus on armed groups to maintain peace by enforcing the ‘ground rules’ through the Army/Central paramilitary forces, especially under the overarching ambit of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, has fostered a precarious regime of human rights and citizenship in the past. It also serves as a convenient excuse to justify the abdication of the State’s primary responsibility to maintain law and order.
This problem is accentuated in a deeply fractured state like Manipur, where the police forces conspicuously lack professionalism and are now deeply communalised in the aftermath of over two years of violence. As the State failed to ensure security of lives and properties to citizens across the divide, communities have resorted to ‘self-help’ to guarantee security to themselves. Given that Manipur sits on the cusp of the Golden Triangle, the easy availability of arms and ammunitions across the India-Myanmar border is not likely to help augment their security but may exacerbate ethnic security dilemma as more groups arm themselves to the teeth.
It is in this sense that despite its inherent limitations, involving SoO groups in negotiations is necessary but not sufficient to foster durable peace and normalcy in the strife-torn state.
Howsoever much frontal organisations in the valley areas and oppositional groups in the hills want to discredit them, the considerable hold of SoO groups on society means that they cannot be wished away anytime soon. Yet, involving them cannot be a substitute for an inclusionary space of political dialogue where important stakeholders are given effective participatory rights and voice. Another formidable challenge is to not replicate the mistake of Chhattisgarh’s Salwa Judum model, wherein unscrupulous government agents have used these groups as proxies to witch-hunt rival groups and dissenters who espouse legitimate grievances.
This is a compelling need, especially given the complete rupture of demographic and territorial space across the divide in Manipur since the outbreak of violence on May 3, 2023. This rupture has already raised the pitch for de jure political separation, a demand which remains increasingly distant with the turnaround of the SoO groups on the ‘territorial integrity’ of Manipur. Hence, PM Modi must sensitively address the legitimate political aspirations of the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups during his visit so that they are not subjected to dehumanisation and oppressive rule in future.
His government must now walk the talk on upholding a rules-based constitutional order where rioters who committed egregious violence, including rape, arson and murder, are immediately nabbed and their cases put on the fast track irrespective of their political connections and positions.
The jury is out on whether the PM’s visit can salvage his dented image for having ignored Manipur for so long. This will be contingent on his political willingness to turn the wheels of justice and uphold a rules-based order. Reopening a national highway and signing an agreement may create favourable conditions for peace and normalcy. Yet, durable peace in Manipur will require non-partisan, sustained and credible political commitment to provide a healing touch to the deep psychological wounds, massive displacement of people and destruction of lives and properties caused by the prolonged violence.
Views are personal
Kham Khan Suan Hausing is Professor, Political Science, University of Hyderabad.
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