Armed forces must confront the past

On February 27, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) released a 19-page report outlining the military failures leading to and during Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack, which claimed the lives of more than 1,200 people in Israel, while around 250 were taken hostage.

The report highlights that the threat of a surprise and wide-scale attack from Gaza was not perceived as realistic by the IDF due to a major gap in Israel’s understanding of Hamas. There was also a “false belief” that the IDF’s actions during the 2021 Gaza war were a successful deterrence against Hamas. Israel’s perceptions of Gaza were “rooted and deep”. Over the years, there were no meaningful attempts to question the perceptions, and no proper investigation was held to ask, “Where are we wrong?”

The report notes that the IDF struggled to mount a response as 5,000 Hamas terrorists breached the border in southern Israel. The IDF’s Gaza Division, responsible for this area, “was effectively defeated for several hours” on October 7. The Air Force responded quickly, but “there was significant difficulty distinguishing between IDF troops, civilians and terrorists”.

A month before the report’s release, IDF Chief of Staff Lt Gen Herzi Halevi tendered his resignation, stating that under his command, the IDF failed in its mission to protect Israel’s citizens that day. He requested that his tenure be concluded on March 6.

Investigations into military actions serve several crucial purposes. They provide essential insights into the successes and failures of military strategies and tactics. By analysing past operations, the military can identify areas for improvement and refine doctrines, thereby preparing itself better for future conflicts.

Following the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Congress set up the Afghanistan War Commission to examine in depth the key strategic, diplomatic and operational decisions spanning the 20 years of the war in that country and extract lessons for future leaders.

In September 2024, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which had been actively investigating the US pullout, released a report criticising the Biden administration’s handling of the matter. The report highlighted issues such as delayed evacuation orders and inadequate inter-departmental communication. In addition, the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has produced numerous reports on the lessons learnt.

Conducting thorough investigations demonstrates a commitment to transparency and accountability, which is vital for maintaining public trust. When the military openly addresses and rectifies mistakes, it reflects its professionalism and reinforces confidence among the people. There are also critical lessons for national leaders on the necessity of aligning military actions with political objectives. There are several examples in history where a lack of clear political objectives led to the defeat of a superior military force. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, in their book about the Vietnam War, The Irony of Vietnam, write, “Administration leaders persistently failed to clarify US objectives in concrete and specific terms. Uncertainty and ambiguity in reports were therefore bound to emerge, for no one could be certain what he was measuring progress against or how victory could be defined.”

India’s record of studying its military actions is poor, often marred by delays and excessive secrecy. Even routine reviews are treated with suspicion. The official history of the 1965 India-Pakistan War was published in 2011, 46 years after the conflict, and that of the 1971 war in 2014.

No official history of the 1962 India-China war exists. The Henderson Brooks report, which reviewed the Indian Army’s operations during that war, remains classified despite portions of it being leaked by Australian-British journalist Neville Maxwell.

In July 1999, the government constituted the Kargil Review Committee to review the events leading up to the Pakistani incursions and recommend measures considered necessary to safeguard national security. However, the committee was not mandated to evaluate the actual conduct of military operations.

The Indian military’s record-keeping also does not inspire confidence. In 2010, it was revealed that most of the records pertaining to the 1971 war, held by the Eastern Command Headquarters of the Army, had been destroyed immediately after the war. There was suspicion that this had been done deliberately.

In 2012, in a major embarrassment to the Army, the Armed Forces Tribunal directed it to rewrite portions of ‘Op Vijay: Account of the War in Kargil’. Incidentally, this is an internal document that has not been publicly released. To date, there is no official history of the 1999 war.

In recent years, the cloak around military operations has been tightened further. Much of the Indian military history is penned by authors who participated in the battles or were involved in the decision-making process. In recent times, books by retired military officers have faced increasing scrutiny.

Former Army Chief Gen MM Naravane’s memoir has been held up for more than one year after excerpts from the book were published in December 2023. Similarly, the launch of former Army Chief Gen NC Vij’s book was postponed just days before the event as the Army Headquarters asked the publishers to provide a review copy.

In June 2021, the Department of Personnel and Training imposed new restrictions, barring retired government servants who served in intelligence or security-related organisations from publishing any information related to the organisation after retirement without prior permission. Failure to comply carries penalties, including the withholding or withdrawal of pensions.

The reluctance to openly study and publish lessons from military conflicts carries profound risks. Military institutions could lose the ability to learn from their experiences, while political leaders may continue making decisions in a vacuum. The lack of publicly available records could also result in distorted narratives, where accounts of conflicts are shaped by political biases rather than objective analysis.

No matter how politically inconvenient, military actions must be documented and scrutinised. Only by transparently confronting the past can the armed forces adapt, transform and avoid the tragic results of fighting the last war.