Coastal areas need to pre-empt security threat

INDIA’S national security approach is predominantly influenced by geographical and historical factors of invasions from the North-West. Consequently, the Himalayas and Indo-Gangetic plains continue to remain in focus and determine our preoccupation with their security challenges. In the last few months, incidents and controversies with communal overtones in the southern part of India have highlighted the dormant fault-lines, a fertile breeding ground for radicalisation and recruitment by fundamentalist non-state actors. This makes the ecosystem conducive for exploitation by inimical elements. However, attention to security challenges in peninsular India is episodic and transient. While disturbing events and trends impinging on security do figure in vernacular and regional media, they are not adequately covered in the national media, and therefore, do not receive due attention.

Importance of this region, which accounts for land borders and a coast-line of almost 7,500 km, needs no emphasis. As per the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation data updated on March 1, 2021, eight states and union territories in peninsular India contribute over 60 per cent to the national GDP. Moreover, most of our nuclear plants are located in these states.

Peninsular India faces multiple security challenges, including external, internal, traditional and non-traditional. The line between these is blurred and the challenges are intertwined inextricably. Non-traditional threats in peninsular India are varied and complex. These range from smuggling of drugs and contraband, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing to human trafficking and flow of migrants.

Being home to large cities, industrial hubs and financial centres, the southern part of India is exceptionally vulnerable to high-profile terrorist incidents. For the 1993 Mumbai blasts, it was widely reported that the explosives were smuggled through the Raigarh coast. More vividly, the terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 highlighted the loopholes in the coastal security mechanism.

On April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday, three churches in Sri Lanka and three luxury hotels in the commercial capital, Colombo, were targeted in a series of coordinated Islamist terrorist suicide bombings. Later that day, there were smaller explosions at a housing complex in Dematagoda and a guest house in Dehiwala. There were reports that the ISIS-linked local group, Thowheed Jamaath, had possible India connections. Movement of terrorists from Sri Lanka to the Tamil Nadu coast has also been frequently reported. Similarly, there were reports of movement of inimical elements to Lakshadweep group of islands.

PFI activities have been extensively covered in the media after the recent communal incidents in South India. Reports also exist of sectarian strife to dominate places of worship. Out of over 100 recruits from India who travelled to join the ISIS, majority were from the southern states. The situation in J&K also has a spillover effect in southern India, with external forces fanning discontent among the population.

Similarly, Sir Creek area in Gujarat is disputed with Pakistan. Abandoned Pakistani boats, discarded transponders, narcotics smuggling and presence of suspicious persons are quite common in this area.

The threat of Left-wing extremism is omnipresent and receives adequate coverage. However, a few years back, there were reports of emerging separatist movements in southern India — news totally missing from the national media. Communal fault-lines can give a fillip to such separatist movements, which need to be continuously watched and profiled by the police and intelligence agencies.

How can we make our response more robust? First and foremost, there is a need to increase awareness in the security establishment of the existing and emerging security challenges in the southern states. These require a multi-agency approach where the Union and states need to cooperate more and develop synergy. Appointment of the National Maritime Coordinator is a welcome step, who should strive to usher in synergy and coordination between myriad agencies, viz., Navy, Coast Guard, marine police, Customs, Fisheries Department, population, especially fishermen and others. The Defence Forces and the Coast Guard need to increase their footprint in the Lakshadweep islands. On the lines of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a long-term perspective plan for capacity and capability building needs to be prepared and implemented.

Coastal surveillance needs to be made more effective by integrating the coastal radar system and other sensors. The passage of information from and to the fusion information centre also needs to be invigorated. Defensive cyber capabilities need to be made more robust to protect critical infrastructure. More importantly, sensitisation of the population and its participation to act as eyes and ears for the police need to be ramped up speedily.

Terrorist financing and ideological radicalisation networks also need to be continuously monitored, blocked and countered with alternative narratives. More importantly, fake news on social media and provocative posts also need to be countered in real-time to check the rise of passions. This should take into account the speed of communication of such networks and their footprint.