Empower CAPFs with designated roles for a safer India

The spurt in terrorist incidents in Rajouri-Doda-Kathua last year was blamed on gaps in the security grid caused due to pulling out of the army division for the more pressing task of beefing up deployment to combat the Chinese build-up on the northern border. Even after this much-belated rebalancing, described as RB-1.0, we have just around 30 per cent force level deployed against China, our main adversary on the northern borders. Out of the balance, 30-40 per cent is deployed to combat the proxy war in J&K.

Notwithstanding the recent agreement on the restoration of patrolling in Depsang and Demchok, it is imperative to maintain vigil and enhance the deployment levels. The army is reportedly working on RB-2.0. The critical determinant for such rebalancing is whether the designated forces — the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and police — would rise to the challenge and free the army for addressing the primary challenge.

The CAPFs, with around 10,45,750 personnel, comprise seven formidable forces for maintaining law and order, internal security (IS) and counter-insurgency (CI) and protecting the borders. They can be broadly grouped as per their functions.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is meant for industrial and airport security. The Ministry of Railways also has a 75,000-strong Railway Protection Force (RPF). The question is whether the overburdened Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) should give control of the CISF to the designated ministries of aviation and industry, like the RPF.

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is mandated to beef up the state police forces for maintaining law and order and internal security. It was created as a reserve to the state police forces. Besides the regular constabulary, most states have around 10 armed police battalions, funded by the Central government, with a shared understanding on their deployment. These are also referred to as the Rapid Action Force (RAF).

Then, there are the Border Security Force (BSF), the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and the Assam Rifles (AR). Their mandate is border management (BM).

The Kargil Review Committee in 1991 had enunciated the principle of 'one border, one force' for border management and it recommended that the CRPF be dedicated for internal security. Consequently, rationalisation was attempted: the BSF for Pakistan and Bangladesh, the ITBP for China, the SSB for Nepal and Bhutan and the AR for Myanmar.

Each border has its own challenges. There is the problem of narcotics delivery by drones in Punjab, cattle and human trafficking on the Bangladesh border and terrorist intrusions in J&K.

The Pakistan border is properly fenced in the International Border (IB) sector and has a modified fencing along the Line of Control (LoC). The Bangladesh border is approximately 80 per cent fenced, but it has treacherous riverine and jungle stretches. Except for the 60-odd km out of 1,643 km, the border with Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet — the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — and Myanmar is unfenced.

Border management has two categories: border guarding or patrolling on settled borders and border defence on active frontiers (LoC and LAC), where the BSF and ITBP work in supportive role with the army.

The Assam Rifles is dual-tasked for the Myanmar border and the counter-insurgency role in the NE. It is paramilitary in nature as the officer cadre is from the army on a deputation basis.

The challenges of managing internal security and counter-insurgency are such that battalions of the CRPF, BSF, ITBP, SSB and AR are deployed in Manipur, reflecting the fire-brigade response of mustering whatever and whoever is available.

The force mix in J&K is similar, though the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), CRPF and J&K Police have become the main components. However, the recent induction of Assam Rifles units in J&K is indicative of the fire-fighting approach. The reputation of the AR — the original mainstay of North-East — has been tarnished in Manipur. It is not only unfortunate but also shortsighted. If there are black sheep in a force, fix them by all accounts, but why trash the 189-year-old legacy?

The National Security Guard (NSG) or Black Cat Commandos are on the other end of the spectrum. They do specialised counter-terrorism work, including hostage rescue.

The combined strength of the CAPFs and the armed police battalions matches that of the army in numbers. They also enjoy similar benefits in pay and perks and wear a similar uniform. They have recently even created similar sounding HQs, like the Command HQ, further adding to confusion.

The first and foremost requirement is empowerment of the CAPFs for their designated roles. It is predicated on the implementation of the police reforms recommended by the Prakash Singh Committee. They have been duly reiterated by the Supreme Court.

While the states have not implemented the suggested reforms, the Union government can set the pace for empowering the CAPFs and police in states ruled by NDA governments.

Next, the CAPFs have roles that require specialisation and force ethos. The use of the CAPFs as a cadre management avenue for senior ranks in the IPS needs to be reviewed. Para-dropping in CAPFs at apex ranks and shifting of DGs degrade cadre cohesion. The CAPFs must have their own integral cadres, like the Coast Guard. The army, too, should yield control of the Assam Rifles.

Regarding the border defence role, the BSF on the LoC and the ITBP on the LAC should operate under the undiluted operational control of the army.

Additionally, the large-scale deployment of the CAPFs for elections has impacted their availability for other mandated tasks. The electoral process should be made less dependent on the CAPFs, with the police and Home Guards shouldering the challenge.

The influx of infiltrators as an electoral issue has resulted in the counter-accusation that border management is ineffective and porous.

The BSF, except in West Bengal, has been allowed to operate up to 50 km in the hinterland along the borders, enhancing its effectiveness.

Viksit Bharat can only happen in a 'surakshit Bharat'. For that, the CAPFs need to take up the challenge and become accountable. The army is observing 2025 as the 'Year of Reforms'. The CAPFs could consider making it the 'Year of Empowerment and Accountability'.