IAF at 93 : Balancing power, technology & reform

AS part of the 93rd Air Force Day celebrations, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, addressed a press conference in Delhi on October 3. The event was significant, marking both the completion of his first year in office and his first major media interaction since Operation Sindoor. During the briefing, the Chief covered a wide range of topics, including the Indian Air Force's role in Operation Sindoor, future strategic plans, operational readiness, theaterisation, indigenisation and training requirements.

The conference could, on one hand, be seen as a victory lap following Operation Sindoor's success; on the other, it was a signal of deterrence to adversaries and a message to policymakers about the steps needed to maintain the IAF as a credible offensive instrument for advancing national interests. While the Chief addressed a broad spectrum of issues, I would like to highlight a few key aspects.

Given the geopolitical environment in the subcontinent and the fact that India, a nuclear power, has territorial disputes with both China and Pakistan, who are also nuclear powers, no form of contestation can be ruled out. These could range from full-scale wars on one or two fronts to limited border clashes, salami-slicing tactics and coercive probing by China as well as persistent low-intensity infiltration and proxy warfare from Pakistan.

Any future conflict is likely to span multiple domains simultaneously, such as land, sea, air, subsea, space, electronic and information warfare and cyberspace. India must, therefore, be prepared to meet any challenge to its national security. The IAF is the only service that, by virtue of its inherent qualities, can operate seamlessly across all these domains.

Recent operations such as the Balakot airstrikes in 2019 and Operation Sindoor in 2025 have demonstrated that the air force has emerged as the offensive weapon of choice. This raises a relevant question: why has the IAF been consistently chosen for such tasks? The selection is based on its inherent operational attributes of mobility, flexibility, reach and speed, which enable timely, precise and effective response. Moreover, as the Chief brought out, with limited exposure, the IAF retains the advantage of striking and disengaging with minimal risk of escalation.

In addition to kinetic capabilities, the IAF also provides air dominance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as offensive and defensive electronic warfare support. These are not limited to aiding air power alone; they also assist other services in achieving their objectives, thereby supporting broader national security intersts.

In this context, discussions around theaterisation should move beyond the allocation of aircraft and systems across various commands. A more fundamental question for proponents of theatre commands should be whether theaterisation would actually help the IAF achieve national objectives.

According to open-source reports, the IAF deployed 72 aircraft for the initial strike in Operation Sindoor. Coordinating such a large-scale, time-sensitive operation likely required drawing resources from across its 30 squadrons, ensuring aircraft readiness, armament and pilot preparedness.

Introducing an additional layer of decision-making through theatre commands may have implications for operational agility and responsiveness. It is, therefore, important to assess whether such structural changes will support or hinder the IAF's ability to meet national objectives.

The next issue pertains to indigenisation. The Chief of the Air Staff noted that the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is expected to make its maiden flight in 2028 and may enter production by 2035.

These timelines are based on estimates provided by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which has historically experienced significant delays, often exceeding a decade in new aircraft development. Consequently, India may acquire a fifth-generation fighter by 2035, while its adversaries are likely to have progressed to sixth-generation platforms or beyond, the development of which is already underway.

This raises concerns about technological relevance. Fifth-generation fighters are network-centric and rely heavily on secure data connectivity for operational effectiveness. China has reportedly studied these vulnerabilities extensively and has developed capabilities to disrupt Link 16, a key data-sharing network used by the US and allied forces.

This forms a critical element of China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, aimed at isolating combat aircraft from their networks and intercepting them.

In response to such challenges, the US is developing sixth-generation fighters designed to operate independently of external networks, supported by autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

In this context, the strategic utility of fifth-generation platforms warrants careful evaluation. Policymakers may need to consider whether collaborative development efforts could enable India to leapfrog directly to sixth-generation capabilities using contemporary technologies.

While self-reliance in defence manufacturing is a desirable objective, it must be balanced against operational requirements and national security imperatives. In conflict scenarios, technological parity or superiority can be decisive; delays or mismatches in capability may carry significant strategic costs.

As the IAF celebrates its 93rd anniversary, policymakers must reflect on the fundamental rationale for maintaining an air force and consider whether the decisions made today would take us towards that basic aim.

Meanwhile, I am sure the IAF will continue to do what it does best, which is to protect our country.

Air Marshal Amit Tiwari (retd) is former AOC-in-C, Central air command.