Operation Sindoor has ticked the right boxes

A defining feature of Operation Sindoor, which has been paused for the time being, is that India launched it without being perturbed by international opinion. This approach is a far cry from how things panned out during Operation Parakram, which began shortly after terrorists attacked Parliament on December 13, 2001.

At that time, several Cabinet meetings were held to monitor the situation and work out an action plan. The military mobilisation underlined India’s resolve to punish Pakistan. A strike by the Indian Air Force (IAF) on a terror camp was proposed with the aim of deterring Pakistan from sponsoring terror attacks. However, some Cabinet members were apprehensive that an airstrike could make the situation spin out of control. For that reason, proposals to strike the terrorists’ headquarters in Bahawalpur and deploy the Navy in the Arabian Sea to carry out a blockade of Karachi, as and when required, were declined.

International pressure started mounting on India to call off the offensive because some countries feared that Pakistan may use nuclear weapons. Presidents of the US and Russia voiced their concerns. The India-Pak skirmish upset the Americans, who were deeply involved in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. They did not want any distraction caused by a war in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood. Besides, the US needed Pakistan’s support for their Afghan engagement.

A series of events happened in the first two weeks of January 2002. LK Advani, then Home Minister, travelled to the US. The Americans told him that they would persuade Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf to avoid going to war. Prodded by the US, then UK PM Tony Blair visited India to dissuade the Vajpayee government from taking military action. In a public speech on January 12, Gen Musharraf promised to reduce tensions; he condemned the Parliament attack but emphasised his stand to use nuclear weapons in accordance with Pakistan’s right of ‘first use’. His speech was reason enough for the Indian government to call off the planned airstrike. By then, around 500,000 Indian and 300,000 Pakistani troops had been deployed at the border.

On May 14, 2002, Pakistani terrorists attacked an Indian Army camp at Kaluchak (J&K), killing 30 people, mostly wives and children of defence personnel. However, Pakistan refused to extradite the terrorists’ handlers, even as Lashkar-e-Taiba continued to operate under a new name. The Indian Cabinet felt that a limited airstrike would serve no purpose under these circumstances. By May-end, both India and Pakistan were fully mobilised. Pakistan’s terror network was extremely well organised. It was practically used as an extension of the Pakistan army and was given huge technical and financial support.

On June 5, 2002, then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage extracted a commitment from Gen Musharraf that he would stop cross-border terrorism and dismantle infrastructure supporting terrorism. On June 10, India called off Op Parakram and the entire strike plan against Pakistan with the hope that the promise secured by the Americans would be fulfilled.

However, the ‘love story’ between the Pakistan army and terror outfits continued unabated. India witnessed one major terror attack after another — Mumbai (2008), Pathankot and Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019).

The April 22 massacre in Pahalgam was promptly followed by the deployment of the Navy’s Carrier Battle Group in the Arabian Sea and the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. On the intervening night of

May 6-7, Operation Sindoor was launched. The IAF struck nine terror sites inside Pakistan and PoK. In retaliation, Pakistan sent some 300 drones across the border, the majority of which were lightweight quadcopters; in between them were embedded unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) that carried munitions. These UCAVs were identified and shot down by the Indian air defence system; they caused practically no damage to Indian assets.

India’s response this time has been kinetic as well as non-kinetic. What has stood out is the Prime Minister’s resolve to teach Pakistan a lesson; he has declared that any future terror attack will be viewed as an act of war against India. This resolve was reflected in the directions to the armed forces. Decisions were taken spontaneously and fearlessly.

Long-range precision-guided munitions proved lethal and accurate, especially the BrahMos and Akash missiles. Radars and sensors also performed exceptionally well. It is estimated that Pakistan suffered heavy losses that may take it years to recoup.

Military planning was fully integrated, including all intelligence agencies and national space assets. The entire operation lasted just three nights, with no loss of aircrew – a remarkable achievement indeed.

The IAF’s pilots flew in the dead of night and unleashed weapons with pinpoint accuracy. High-end technicians worked long and hard with confidence. The Integrated Air Command and Control System proved exceedingly good. The IAF, despite facing a serious shortage of combat equipment, has been consistently working to modernise its inventory, training and management, ably supported by the government.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has done the nation proud. The policy of Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) is now well established in the defence sector. Apathukatha Sivathanu Pillai (BrahMos designer) and Prahlada Ramarao, the brain behind the Akash missile system, deserve a special mention.

We have every reason to be proud of our armed forces and the national leadership for achieving what seemed to be nearly improbable.

Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy (retd) is former chief of air staff.