Peace interrupted: Evolving militancy tactics and the security of normalcy

The April 22 attack in Kashmir’s Baisaran meadow, which left 28 civilians dead, was not just a tragic event—it was a strategic blow to the fabric of peace that has been painstakingly woven over the last few years. The choice of target, timing, and manner of execution underline a shift in militant tactics that is widely seen in other parts of the world as well. Insurgents now increasingly focus on soft civilian spaces to disrupt perceptions of security and unravel the normalcy that lends legitimacy to democratic stability.

In Baisaran, tourists and families had returned. Pony rides, picnics, and local guides were again visible. These were not only signs of tourism but of trust. And that trust is what was targeted. Militants, dressed in camouflage, approached silently and disappeared with equal precision. It was not a clash; it was a message: that nowhere is truly safe, not even the most peaceful corner of the Valley.

This pattern is neither new nor local. It is part of a global trend. Whether it’s Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, Paris’s Bataclan Theatre, or the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the intent is the same: to turn civilian spaces into zones of fear, to rupture the rhythm of life, and to provoke an overreaction. By doing so, militant groups seek to dismantle the public’s confidence in the state’s ability to protect.

India’s internal security response must now move from event-specific counteraction to systemic deterrence. The goal is not just to pursue attackers—it is to prevent recurrence, protect civilian confidence, and preserve the credibility of peace.

To do this, our approach must align across six critical pillars:

⁠Strategic Mapping of Civilian Corridors

Our traditional focus on infrastructure and convoys must expand. Tourist circuits, religious yatras, educational hubs, and commercial markets must be geotagged, prioritised, and integrated into district vulnerability assessments. High-density civilian zones need civilian-centric security doctrines.

⁠Community-Integrated Intelligence

The local ecosystem is rich with natural informants. Guesthouse owners, pony operators, trekking guides, and transporters often notice early signs of suspicion. If trust-based channels are institutionalised—protected by anonymity and incentivised for accuracy—we can detect patterns long before damage is done.

⁠Discreet Security Architecture

Visible force is sometimes necessary, but in civilian zones, it can also deter tourism and create unease. Instead, we must emphasise presence without intrusion: plainclothes patrols, hidden surveillance nodes, terrain-trained QRTs stationed nearby—not seen, but swiftly deployable.

⁠Tech-Augmented Monitoring

High-altitude locations and seasonal sites like Baisaran need support beyond local manpower. Drone mapping, motion sensor deployment, mobile tower data analysis, and AI-assisted anomaly detection should become part of SOPs during sensitive periods or flagged alerts.

⁠Crisis Communication Protocols

In the age of social media, silence is dangerous. Within 30 to 45 minutes of an incident, verified information must reach the public. Strategic communication isn’t just optics—it prevents panic, stops rumour-mongering, and protects institutional credibility.

⁠Centralised Case Learning Repository

A national archive of soft-target attack case studies—cataloging timing, methods, lapses, and lessons—should be accessible to all law enforcement units. Cross-state and inter-agency learning will ensure that the same mistake isn’t repeated in multiple places under different names.

These steps are not standalone. They are interlinked. A drone will not help if local intelligence is silent. A patrol is ineffective if the terrain isn’t understood. And communication, if delayed or conflicting, can do more harm than good. Our goal should be to treat civilian life itself as a strategic asset—to be defended with the same intensity we reserve for vital infrastructure.

Pahalgam is a wake-up call not just because of its brutality, but because of its symbolism. It tells us that militants are watching where peace is taking hold—and they will strike precisely there. What must follow is not a routine deployment, but a calibrated response that combines vigilance with restraint.

This is especially important in a place like Kashmir, where every action has layers. Over-militarisation risks alienation. Under-protection risks loss of life. The balance lies in intelligence-led policing, institutional coordination, and respect for civil liberties even under stress.

We must also invest in narrative resilience. Terror is not just about the act—it’s about what the act is made to mean. In a world driven by digital consumption, a single incident can overshadow years of progress unless we own the story. Institutional credibility, transparency, and public reassurance must be part of our operating model.

Ultimately, our challenge is not just to defeat terrorists. It is to protect the right of ordinary citizens to walk in a meadow, take a pilgrimage, or shop at a market without fear. These are not luxuries. They are democratic rights. When they are attacked, we must defend them not just with weapons—but with systems.

The message from Baisaran is clear: the nature of the threat has changed. Our response must evolve accordingly—not by shouting louder, but by listening better; not by reacting harder, but by anticipating smarter.

And most of all, by defending peace not just as an outcome—but as a daily, institutional practice.

The writer is DGP & Head, Haryana State Narcotics Control Bureau.