Snakes in the backyard

MORE than 50 people were killed and around 200 injured in the terror attack that took place on July 30 at a gathering of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) in Pakistan’s northwestern Bajaur district. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility for the attack. In the past, the Islamic State has carried out several attacks against the JUI-F; the prime reasons include the JUI-F’s association with the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State’s opposition to the JUI-F’s support to democracy in Pakistan. The recent attack on the Zhob garrison in Balochistan, where nine Pakistani soldiers were killed, prompted a severe reaction from the Pakistan military. Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), the latest player in Pakistan’s terror landscape, claimed responsibility for that attack. The TJP maintains its affiliation with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the deadly organisation that continues to conduct attacks targeting Pakistan’s security forces.

While the military will weigh its options vigilantly, the fact remains that Pakistan is caught in the mire of its strategic choices.

Advertisement

Even as Pakistan is struggling to stabilise its economy and find solutions to the political crisis, the security situation in the country has worsened, with the TTP escalating attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan after the ceasefire with the government ended in November last year. During the first six months of this year, the country witnessed close to 270 terror attacks.

Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan has been strained; it runs contrary to what the former’s civilian and military leadership perceived as a strategic victory after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021. Two issues have been critical in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations after the US exit. First, the Taliban’s reluctance to acknowledge the Durand Line as the border and their resistance to the fencing of the border. Second, the Taliban’s patronage of the TTP, despite the Pakistan military’s repeated messaging to abandon the support base for the militant group. The TTP has been emboldened significantly after the defeat of the representative regime in Kabul; this was predictable since the TTP does share a strong ideological (and tactical) alliance with the Taliban. The TTP is an ideological extension of the Afghan Taliban and had extended support to the Taliban during the US war on terror. The Afghan Taliban now feel obliged to return this favour by providing assistance to the TTP. The Taliban have denied the presence of TTP in their territory and have also warned Pakistan against attacks on Afghan soil.

On the other hand, the Pakistan military has acknowledged the Afghan Taliban’s support to the TTP and is issuing strong statements on follow-up action on this front. Following the Zhob attack, the Pakistan military said that it has “serious concerns on the safe havens and liberty of action available to TTP in Afghanistan… such attacks are intolerable and would elicit an effective response from the security forces of Pakistan…”

The 32nd report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning ISIL (Da’esh), al-Qaeda and associated individuals/entities, submitted to the UN Security Council, says the TTP might become a regional threat as the organisation “might provide an umbrella under which a range of foreign groups operate, or even coalesce, avoiding attempts at control by the Taliban.”

There is ample speculation regarding the military’s response to the TTP. Over the past year, conflicting statements have been issued by the regime (civilian and military) regarding the state’s response. Three options can be evaluated in this context:

One, the Pakistani government brings the TTP back to the negotiating table and attempts a ceasefire. This is less likely because of two factors: Imran Khan has been repeatedly held responsible for the rise in terror attacks as his government tried to negotiate with the group and released more than 100 TTP prisoners, which added to the group’s strength; the TTP has not shown any sign of willingness to compromise on its demands, which would be unacceptable to the state.

Two, Pakistan takes the Afghan Taliban into confidence, and the latter take on the responsibility of controlling the group. This option has been explored in phases, and some cosmetic measures have been taken. Strong links between the Taliban and the TTP and the fact that the TTP draws inspiration from the Taliban and views them as role models raise questions over the efficacy of this option. However, given the volatile situation in Pakistan, this option seems to be a possible choice for the regime.

The third option is counter-insurgency military operations targeting the TTP. The military has previously conducted counter-terror operations — Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 and Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017. The operations did impact the TTP’s numbers and ability to carry out terror attacks, but the group sustained itself and eventually flourished with the Taliban’s support. Despite the rising number of attacks by the TTP, the military response has been restrained due to four factors: counter-insurgency operations in the past led to significant displacement in the tribal areas; given the alarming economic crisis (and the misery caused by the floods), any military operation will aggravate the financial stress on the country; military operations against the TTP have an immense potential for a blowback from the Afghan Taliban; and speculation regarding a conspiracy theory suggests that it might be intentional on the part of the military to not control the group’s activities and leverage the security situation to attract US counter-terror aid and assistance.

While the military will weigh its options vigilantly, the fact remains that Pakistan is caught in the mire of its strategic choices. Pakistan continues to prioritise covert war as a foreign policy tool (vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan) but desires immunity from terrorism on its own soil. The rise of terrorism and expansion of the TTP are alarming and indicate serious security challenges not only for Pakistan but also for South Asia in the near future.