Why AAP chose to confront farmers

THE well-planned action of the Bhagwant Singh Mann government against protesting farmers has surprised everyone. Farm union leaders were detained by the police when they were going back to Punjab after a meeting with Central and state ministers in Chandigarh regarding their long-pending demands, including assured procurement of farmers’ crops at a legally guaranteed minimum support price.

Was the crackdown a unilateral decision of the state government or was the Centre involved in some way? The detentions were followed by the eviction of farmers who had been camping at the Shambhu and Khanauri inter-state borders for the past more than a year. The temporary structures built there were demolished and the farmers were warned of serious consequences if they did not leave along with their tractor trailers and belongings.

The state government has justified its efforts to restore traffic movement at these borders, which were practically sealed by the Haryana authorities in February 2024 to stall the ‘Delhi chalo’ march called by the Bhartiya Kisan Union (Ekta-Sidhupur) and the Kisan Mazdoor Sangharsh Committee (KMSC), led by Jagjit Singh Dallewal and Sarwan Singh Pandher, respectively. The march was aimed at intensifying pressure on the Central Government to accept the farmers’ demands.

The Haryana Government’s heavy-handed tactics forced both unions to change their plans. The KMSC made its camp office at Shambhu, while Dallewal stationed his farmers at Khanauri. As these vital highways were blocked, Punjab remained cut off from other states on both routes.

Members of both unions made many attempts to reach Delhi, but they were repelled with brute force. The matter reached the Supreme Court, and a high-powered committee was constituted under the chairmanship of a retired High Court judge; however, no concrete progress has been made to address the farmers’ demands. The Centre set up a committee of Union ministers to discuss the key issues with the leaders of both unions. Several meetings, facilitated by the Punjab Government, have taken place so far, but to no avail.

What is the message CM Mann has sent to the people of Punjab by taking strong action against farmer leaders? Is it a sign of AAP’s shifting priorities after the defeat in the Delhi Assembly elections? Does this crackdown mark a strategic rebranding of the ruling party, positioning itself as a tough, no-nonsense government that is presumably fighting a battle on multiple fronts to safeguard Punjab’s interests? Mann’s approach can also be described as an attempt to assert his authority, particularly after the setback in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections — AAP won only three seats out of 13 in Punjab — and the below-par show in the urban bodies’ elections held in December last year.

It seems that the CM and the party top brass are eyeing urban votes — both as part of its short-term strategy to win the Ludhiana West bypoll and its long-term goal of winning the 2027 Assembly elections.

The CM made his intentions clear when he met leaders of farm unions under the banner of the Samyukta Kisan Morcha in Chandigarh on March 3. He asked them to call off their week-long dharna that was scheduled to begin on March 5, but they refused. Their stand annoyed the CM and he left the meeting in a huff. This was followed by a police crackdown on prominent farmer leaders to scuttle their plans. The situation went from bad to worse when both sides hardened their stand. Apparently, both the Central and state governments are well aware of the ideological differences among various farm unions in Punjab. This factor has influenced their response to the farmers’ demands.

What compelled AAP to take the plunge? Farmers had played a crucial role, particularly in Malwa, in AAP’s landslide victory in the 2022 Assembly elections. The party won 92 seats out of 117 in the state; the lion’s share was from Malwa — 66 out of 69. Farm unions of this region spearheaded the 2020-21 agitation against the three Central farm laws, which were eventually repealed by the Modi government.

Mann chose to take on this important vote bank because the prolonged protests were impacting the day-to-day life of the people, who were unhappy with the state government for its failure to end the stalemate. Frequent dharnas, road and rail blockades had dented the image of the AAP government both within and outside the state. AAP must have calculated that it would not be able to get in 2027 the level of support it had got from farmers in 2022; this forced the party to find alternative vote banks to stay in the race.

An important consideration for the strict action against farmers could be that AAP does not want to upset the ‘non-agricultural’ voters, who reside mostly in urban and semi-urban areas. Data compiled by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) shows that a large proportion of ‘non-agricultural’ voters opted for AAP in the 2022 elections. A post-poll survey conducted by Lokniti-CSDS in the state had found that dissatisfaction with the Modi government at the Centre was almost as high as the discontent with the Congress’ five-year tenure (2017-22).

Future decisions of the state government regarding farmers are also likely to be determined by such factors. It’s clear that the farming community will not be the be-all and end-all of AAP’s electoral campaign.