Why India’s red revolution faded

WHEN the Communist Party of India (CPI) began mobilising peasants in Telangana — then a part of the territory of the Nizam of Hyderabad — for revolution soon after it was founded on December 26, 1926, little did the party know that its revolutionary politics would continue for eight decades.

This prolonged revolution passed through several generations of leaders. Their ideological orientation and focus also transitioned through various shades of red through different parts of India . The party factions not only dabbled with parliamentary electoral politics, but also shared power.

No wonder, there was a situation in the 1960s when the party-in-power in West Bengal negotiated strategies for resolving the problems with the party-in-revolution. Obviously, the meetings did not lead to any resolution of the problem.

To understand this eight-decade-long odyssey, marked by an unparalleled roller coaster of events, we must note that the Telangana movement reached its peak when the exploited people joined the 'revolutionaries' campaigning against the 'doras' (local landlords) who were exploiting the very existence of the local population. The movement reached a certain level of success in terms of seizing land and its produce and redistributing it among the poor.

Second, the movement lost its raison d'être and impact after Acharya Vinoba Bhave came to Telangana in 1951 at the request of the government and discovered that 'land' was at the root of people's miseries. Thus began the 'bhoo dan' (donation of land) movement.

The movement moved from there to West Bengal in the late 1960s, where in Naxalbari village, it enkindled a revolution with the shot of an arrow and gave the movement its name — 'Naxalism' — for eternity. The coalition governments during the 1960s, with the partnership of the CPI(M) and communists such as Jyoti Basu joining the government, gave effect to land reforms.

As in Telangana, land became a key issue that both ignited and ultimately ended the movement. By the beginning of the 1970s, the movement was crushed.

From there, the movement spread to Srikakulam in the late 1960s and later, during the 1980s and 1990s, to Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh region), Bihar, Odisha and Maharashtra. With this, the hopes of a red carpet from Pashupati (Nepal) to Tirupati (in southern India) were inflamed.

The movement thereafter got fragmented into several groups (dalam), leading to instances of fratricide and pillage. This diminished the esteem of its revolutionary character. The revolutionary character was also undermined by the members' involvement in electoral politics — not to participate, but to support some candidate or the other for consideration.

This went on till the beginning of the millennium, when the consolidation of various factions took place. They merged and created the Communist Party of India (Maoist), a deadly revolutionary group.

Even as the CPI(Maoist) began its fierce acts in the states and strongholds, the Union government and the governments of the affected states created the specialised armed police forces to counter them.

Various Naxalite groups were involved in nearly 16,500 violent acts, killing nearly 7,000 persons between 2004 and 2014. During 2014-24, they killed over 2,000 persons in 7,744 incidents.

The Union government's concern on the growing violence led to the formation of an expert group on 'Development issues to deal with the causes of discontent, unrest and extremism' by the Planning Commission in May 2006.

The 16-member group submitted its report in March 2008. It said, "There is no denying that what goes in the name of 'Naxalism' is to a large extent a product of collective failure to assure to different segments of society their basic entitlements under the Constitution and other protective legislation." It suggested to the government "to mount programmes on a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem" and "to aim these programmes for high impact in the immediate future in order to close the gap between promise and performance."

The movement thereafter began ebbing under the pressure of the security forces and developmental initiatives of the government. The government formed and trained special forces, such as the Greyhound and COBRA under the CRPF, and set up special training centres for the commandos in order to target the guerilla commandos of the various Left-wing groups.

Over the past decade, they have been able to successfully confront and eliminate the leadership of the Naxal groups.

Obviously, that has had an impact on the rank and file. Equally important are programmes of rehabilitation of the Naxalites and their leadership. The state governments concerned have been able to successfully achieve that.

The beginning and expansion of India's revolutionary politics since 1946, as it clearly emerges from its historical growth, suggest that more than the security aspect, socio-economic factors have been the key drivers.

The governments, both at the national level and in the states, have looked at the this development from the security point of view. The two key movements, the Telangana and Naxalbari one, historically show that the revolution ended only when its socio-economic aspect was effectively tackled.

The Supreme Court judgment on the Salwa Judum in Madhya Pradesh clearly pointed out that poverty was the root cause.

Hence, if the government brings about land reforms, ensures forest and tribal rights and strengthens welfare schemes, the causes of revolutionary politics will weaken. Naturally, the people in such cases would not be attracted to the call for a revolution.