Why Indonesia is holding up Brahmos deal

The President of Indonesia, Probowo Subianto, seems quick to strike but afraid to wound. This repudiates his derring-do image as the special forces commando who rose to be a General and married former President Suharto's daughter. But prevarication has trumped patience in clinching the long-awaited deal on the Indo-Russian Brahmos missile.

In the 55-para joint statement after his state visit to India as the Chief Guest of the 76th Republic Day, the word Brahmos was conspicuously missing. Also, during the briefing by MEA officials, questions by journalists on Brahmos were sidestepped.

But PM Narendra Modi introduced the CEO of Brahmos, Jaiteerth Joshi, to Subianto and a presentation on the $450-million Brahmos system was also made. Neither the Sabang port project in Indonesia nor the Aceh-Andamans connect has crystallised. Come to think of it, despite all the pomp and panoply accompanying the visit, there was no spectacular agreement, either economic or strategic.

In contrast, after becoming President last year, Subianto's first visit was to China, where deals worth $10.6 billion were realised even as Jakarta maintains an ambiguous policy towards it.

The Indonesian archipelago occupies strategic geography in the Indo-Pacific, especially the South China Sea stretching east to west 5,150 km with 1,780 islands. It enjoys commanding heights along with littoral states Malaysia and Singapore in conducting the collective Malacca Strait patrol — a passage critical for China. And, in case it is blocked, Jakarta enjoys exclusive rights to alternative routes along the Sunda and Lombok Straits.

Although it has expressed neutrality in South China Sea disputes and made no claims there, China has clashed with it over the Natuna Islands in its EEZ (exclusive economic zone), which overlaps the Chinese nine-dash line.

In 2020, it was Defence Minister Subianto who prevented Chinese incursions in the Natuna island. So, the MoU on joint development in disputed waters of the South China Sea around Natuna was both surprising and risky, though later, Jakarta clarified that the MoU did not amount to recognition of the Chinese maritime claims.

This is where the famed Brahmos missile comes in. In 2023, the Philippines was the first and, so far, the only country to buy Brahmos. It is deployed in Luzon, facing the Filipino Sea, to deter Chinese vessels from entering it.

The US Typhon missile system has terrified the Chinese Coast Guard and fishing vessels though the Chinese Coast Guard ships have seriously jittered the movement of Philippines naval and fishing vessels from resupplying its disputed Scarborough shoal in its EEZ, which China claims falls within its nine-dash line. Last month, Manila said it would dismantle the US Typhon missile system if China stopped its bullying tactics in its waters.

Before Subianto's arrival in India, huge excitement prevailed over the Brahmos deal. Reuters had reported that Jakarta had decided to sign the Brahmos deal. Jakarta said it was thinking 'positively', while most Indian newspapers reported categorically that Brahmos was a done deal.

The Indian optimism was not misplaced. In December 2024, the Navy Chief, Admiral Dinesh Tripathi, had visited Indonesia and Brahmos was widely discussed. In January, the Indonesian Navy Chief, Adm Muhammad Ali, was in Delhi and Brahmos topped the agenda of defence issues. He toured various Brahmos production facilities, raising expectations.

Subianto is known to be a hands-on foreign and security policy President. He believes military strength is integral to national security and economic prosperity. In 2021, as Defence Minister, he had obtained $10.6 billion for defence, with focus on navy modernisation. He secured another $46.6 billion for modernisation in the 2024-29 period, when the defence budget rose from 0.7 to 1.5 per cent of the GDP.

So, Jakarta, which runs a trade surplus with India is not short on funds and Delhi is ready to provide a letter of credit (LOC) for it.

Jakarta has no enemies, internal or external, though, at one time, Australia used to fear it. In the 1965 war, Indonesia supported Pakistan and was its staunch partner in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Kashmir. In 1987, when India was spending nearly 3.5 per cent GDP on defence and was considering reviving a World War II airbase in the Andamans near Indira Point, which is just 90 nautical miles from Indonesia, it protested strongly.

But, it is bonhomie now. So, what is holding back Subianto from acquiring the Brahmos? The will is there, but a way has not been found to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles.

The fear of annoying China and the reluctance to become a countervailing force (to China) in Asean is evident. Although China has laid claim in the Natuna Sea, Indonesia does not want to antagonise Beijing as it receives plentiful economic assistance and waits patiently for the Chinese code of conduct in the South China Sea. Like India, it is non-aligned (its constitution bars military alliance) and covets its strategic autonomy.

A second problem is the equipment acquisition process which is more complicated than India's Defence Procurement Procedure 2020. The bureaucracy is the bane. Circumventing it is not easy, not even for Subianto.

Third is the question of agents, who are a normal in Indonesia but banned in India following defence scandals two decades ago.

Fourth, Jakarta is unfamiliar with the use of the LOC and is loath to provide sovereign guarantees. It prefers commercial loans, like the ones Chinese provide.

Lastly, it fears attracting CAATSA (the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) ever more, now that Trump is back. Sources in the Indian Embassy in Jakarta say hesitation in decision-making has not diminished.

But Admiral Tripathi seems convinced that sooner than later, the Brahmos deal will be done. For the present, an Indonesian naval officer will be posted at the Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Gurugram.

After 15 years of coordinated patrolling in the Andaman Sea, will Subianto invite India to join the strategic trilateral Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Malacca Strait patrol, while it keeps Brahmos pending?