Why J&K insurgency still persists

INSURGENCY in J&K, the longest invasion by infiltration in modern history, started in 1947 and is continuing despite three wars and the resounding success of Operation Sindoor, which is on pause because the threat has not been eliminated.

Why has India been unable to quell the insurgency, which Delhi calls cross-border terrorism? One reason is restraint in the use of force: minimal, proportionate and employed in good faith. Artillery and attack helicopters have almost never been used. India switched to calling the insurgency as terrorism. Force multipliers like hi-tech surveillance, drones and fencing no longer tie a soldier's hands behind his back.

India revoked Article 370 in 2019 and demoted the J&K state to a union territory under President's rule; even the elected Chief Minister's powers are circumscribed in the name of security. Still, on September 5, COAS Gen Upendra Dwivedi, while inaugurating a book, said: "Infiltration attempts will carry on; how many terrorists are neutralised, how many run away…." Yet, the government's every breath exudes Operation Sindoor.

Except former COAS Gen Nirmal Vij, no other Army Chief has spoken of reducing terrorist numbers from between 4,000 and 5,000 (60:40 foreign:local) at the 2002-04 peak to about 1,000. Achieving a zero figure was neither attempted nor mentioned. The security forces (around half a million personnel, including paramilitary, police and the Army) must be credited with reducing the number to about 100 terrorists, mostly foreigners.

Whenever terrorism begins to wane, Rawalpindi appears to fret, triggering attacks such as Pathankot, Pulwama or Pahalgam to keep the Kashmir issue alive.

Why have Indian security forces been unable to replicate quashing the anti-Khalistan operation (1990) in Punjab by defeating terrorism in J&K and like the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSF) quelled the 30-year-long insurgency in 2009? Two different answers come up. While officers of the rank of colonel and below say it is doable, flag-rank officers respond in the negative. The most recent responders (2024) to the question were the VCOAS/DGMO for reasons that will become apparent later.

How the SLSF, once called a funk-force, succeeded between 2006 and 2009 in terminating terrorism by the LTTE — a 35,000-strong force complemented by human bombers, underwater suicide boats and kamikaze pilots — is instructive. The LTTE is known to have launched 378 suicide attacks, which is more than the 248 suicide strikes by Palestinians during the Intifada.

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) claimed it respected human rights; perhaps, not as scrupulously as Indian soldiers who carried Gen Bipin Joshi's Ten Commandments — the dos and don’ts in J&K. The IDF was once guided by the teachings of Dr Boaz Ganor, President, Reichman University, and guru of counter-terrorism. His formula for defeating terrorism is: defeating terrorist capabilities; defeating their motivation and achieving both within the rule of law. For the IDF, the rules of the game changed drastically while fighting Hamas.

To those who argue that terrorism can't be defeated, three names are worth recalling: President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Defence Secretary, Col Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and the Army Chief, Gen Sanath Fonseka. After three Eelam wars (excluding IPKF intervention), Rajapaksa decided to fight a war to finish the LTTE. Colombo showed that domestic insurgency/terrorism can be subdued with the right mix of political will, adequate resources, unfettered use of force, favourable geography and a conducive geo-strategic environment. For Fonseka, a clear aim, full inventory, unified command and no political interference were a dream-come-true mantra.

The political management of India (phrase coined by Gotabaya Rajapaksa) topped the political and military drivers of the war-winning strategy. Indian intervention with Operation Poomaalai in 1987 prevented the SLSF from capturing LTTE supremo Prabhakaran. In 2009, with India tacitly neutral and maintaining a low profile in Sri Lanka due to national elections in Tamil Nadu, Delhi green-lighted the war, never in doubt after the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. India provided 80 per cent of the SLSF training, non-lethal defensive equipment and crucial intelligence of the LTTE naval flotillas on the high seas. The US complemented the intelligence cover, enabling a brown-water Sri Lankan Navy to sink eight LTTE floating warehouses that choked their supply chains.

Further, the SLSF engineered a split in the LTTE, weaning away a 6,000-strong Karuna group. Fighting forces were restructured: the army trebled from 100,000 to 300,000; the navy and air force were modernised; and military procurement was accelerated.

Diplomacy ensured 32 countries banned the LTTE. The US disrupted the LTTE international network engaged in buying anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons crucial to the longevity of the insurgency. In Phuket, Thailand, the construction of an LTTE submarine was thwarted. Sri Lanka tweaked military terminology; providing a humanitarian veneer to a kinetic military campaign. Insurgency and ethnic conflict were made synonymous with terrorism; and counter-terrorism with humanitarian operations. The last battle was described as the largest hostage situation and the biggest rescue operation to free 3,00,000 Tamil civilians who were being used as human shields by the LTTE.

The Fourth Eelam War was fought in two phases: liberation of the East and reuniting the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland. In 33 months, the LTTE was obliterated. When the LTTE political headquarters of Kilinochchi fell on January 1, 2009, Sri Lanka Health Minister Nimal Siripala deSilva said: "We thought India would make us stop the war."

The last battle was fought near Mullaitivu in an area the size of two football fields, where 30,000 LTTE fighters and 3,00,000 civilians were boxed in. The war ended with the killing of the entire top leadership of the LTTE, including Prabhakaran, on May 18-19, 2009.

Keeping India out of the war was the crown jewel of the strategy. Sri Lanka's use of disproportionate force was arguably justified in fighting a deadly and no-holds barred guerilla force to end the war on its terms. On May 20, Fonsek said: "Till yesterday, we had lost 5,096 soldiers this year; now we'll lose none." Sri Lanka became the first country in the 21st century to wipe out terrorism.

Conditions conducive to a political solution in J&K were created in 2019 as well as earlier. No military solution is feasible today. Achieving a zero terrorist presence will require kinetic force and risk alienating Kashmiris further. That’s why India has chosen terrorism-management.

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd) is former Founding Member, Defence Planning Staff.