The new, bigger T-11

AT its Johannesburg summit last week, the BRICS group of five nations decided to more than double its membership to 11. The debate over expanding BRICS topped the agenda, reflecting the unspoken assumption that the bloc was in dire need of rejuvenation and modernisation. BRICS needs to move beyond the success of the New Development Bank (NDB), which admittedly has risen to the challenge of meeting the needs of its members and other developing countries without the onerous terms that the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development Bank are prone to imposing as per the agenda of their predominantly western and Japanese shareholders.

The expansion brings countries with deep pockets to recapitalise NDB, as also nations that are trade entry points to Africa and Latin America, giving a fillip to trade in their respective national currencies. As was the case with the original BRICS, there is little cause to fear inordinate Chinese influence on the expanded grouping. Of the six new members — Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — only Iran can be termed anti-West and none has ever been accused of being pro-Beijing. In fact, all these nations take pride in their middle-of-the-road foreign policies. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among India’s key allies in the Arab world.

BRICS can never recreate the Bandung spirit of 1955 — the world and its leaders today are too transactional and opportunistic. But this is an opportunity for countries ignored or marginalised by the West to modify the current international system in their favour. BRICS will have to build institutions to strengthen the members’ resolve to trade in their own currencies. Success on this front would convince the sceptics that BRICS has a life beyond the anti-West sentiment.