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Explainer: What are shortcomings in training of IAF pilots that CAG flagged

CAG observed that prior to December 2001, trifurcation of trainees into fighter, transport and helicopter streams was carried out after Stage-II of flying training
IAF's Hawk advance jet trainers. Photo: Vijay Mohan
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After 16 years, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) carried out a performance audit on the training of pilots in the Indian Air Force. The last such review was presented to Parliament in 2008, and prior to this in 1992.

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While the IAF is regarded as a largely well trained and professionally highly capable force, there are some gaps and shortcomings that need to be redressed.

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In its audit undertaken over five months from January 2022 to May 2022, CAG examined the functioning of training establishments for the period 2016 to 2021. Its major findings include deficiencies in manpower, obsolete equipment and inadequate infrastructure at some stations.

Availability of pilots, instructors and trainer aircraft

CAG revealed that in February 2015, the IAF had assessed that there was a shortage of 486 pilots. Between 2016 to 2021, against the planned initial intake of 222 trainees annually, the initial annual intake ranged between 158 and 204 trainees.

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Also, the annual intake after wastage ranged between 124 to 167. As a result, the shortage of pilots rose from 486 to 596 which was expected to be filled up between January 2021 and January 2030.

Furthermore, in respect of women fighter pilots, against the envisaged strength of 20 pilots by 2020, their actual strength was only 15 at the end of March 2022, which increased to 17 as of August 2023, CAG observed.

In March 2013, the Ministry of Defence had stated before a Parliamentary committee that the process was on to procure 296 aircraft by 2016 and the IAF would have sufficient resources to train its pilots till 2036.

In case of the fighter stream, induction of 106 Basic Trainer Aircrafts (BTA) and 73 Intermediate Jet Trainers (IJT), both being designed and developed indigenously by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), could not materialise due to delays in clearance from the certifying agency and design issues, respectively.

In case of Transport stream, despite availability of the latest glass cockpit series of Dornier-228 aircraft and assurance given by the ministry of providing new trainer aircraft, the IAF continued imparting training with older versions of Dornier-228 aircraft.

For the helicopter stream, training was being imparted on the Chetak helicopters which had been inducted more than 50 years ago. The training on new helicopters could not be imparted as procurement of 61 Light Utility Helicopters (LUH), being developed indigenously by HAL, could not materialise due to delays in production at HAL. Further, procurement of new Mi-17 V5 helicopters, which were supposed to replace the Mi-8, was completed, but they were placed with operational squadrons.

Quality of training

CAG observed that prior to December 2001, trifurcation of trainees into fighter, transport and helicopter streams was carried out after Stage-II of flying training. From December 2001, trifurcation was carried out after Stage-I.

The fact that trifurcation after Stage-I had led to a fall in the performance of trainees was pointed out in the report of 2008. Subsequently, in July 2020, it was decided that trifurcation would be conducted after Stage-II, which is being implemented from 2021.

Existence of a Long-Term Training Plan (LTTP), covering both the present and future requirements of trainee pilots besides the infrastructure and trainer aircraft requirements, ensures comprehensive assessment of training needs, timely provision of funds, induction of trainer aircraft and acquisition of required skills for the trainee pilots of different streams. The absence of a LTTP and its impact on quality of training was also commented upon by CAG in its reports of 1992 and 2008.

Due to delays in the aircraft modernisation plan of the IAF, deficiencies were noticed in Stage-II and Stage-III training of pilots in transport and helicopter streams.

In respect of the transport stream, all pilots are initially trained in Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II aircraft, which is the basic trainer aircraft with state of art glass cockpit platform. Post trifurcation, in Stage-III, transport pilots are trained on Dornier-228 HM series and AN-32 aircraft, which are technologically much inferior to the Pilatus aircraft in terms of both avionics and instrumentation.

To train pilots in the helicopter stream, the IAF held Chetak/Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters. These are legacy platforms with rudimentary cockpit equipped with obsolete avionics. Further, after completion of Stage-III training, majority of the pilots underwent another conversion training to familiarise themselves with the type of helicopters being flown by operational units.

Simulators, as effective tools of training of pilots, have been in use by the IAF since the 1970s. Although the flying training establishments (FTEs) for the fighter stream were utilising simulators, no full motion simulator was available for training of pilots of helicopter and transport streams.

For these streams, only virtual reality (VR) simulators and flying training devices (FTDs) were being used to familiarise the trainees with the aircraft systems. The VR simulators and FTDs being used were only procedural training simulators and lacked any physical movement which could help trainees get the actual feel of the aircraft.

Support facilities

CAG pointed out that even before prototypes of the design and development phase of IJT had achieved initial operational clearance (IOC), Air HQ created infrastructure costing Rs 33.59 crore at Air Force Station Tambaram. Further, due to non-supply of IJT aircraft, the simulator building constructed was being utilised for other purposes.

There was delay in all stages of the construction of a building to house the simulator for Dornier aircraft at Air Force Station Yelahanka. Further, despite a lapse of five years since the contracted date of delivery for commissioning of simulator, Dornier aircraft training continued to be imparted on FTDs only to satisfy the procedural requirements.

Due to delays and lapses on part of the IAF as well as the contractor, explosive decompression chamber and rapid recompression chamber were not installed at Air Force Academy, Dundigal, thereby depriving the trainees of practical exposure to decompression in higher altitude since July 2018.

The IAF was unable to narrow down for three decades the correct land requirement for establishing a weapons training range at Nirna near Bidar for conducting weapon training as an integral part of Stage-III fighter training. In the absence of weapons training range, IAF continued to incur substantial amounts, ranging from Rs 20 crore in 2012 to Rs 110 crore in 2022, towards ferrying cadets by air for weapon training.

Delay in the construction of sun shelters for Hawk squadrons at Air Force Station, Kalaikunda, deprived the aircraft of the necessary sun shelters for eight years from 2015 to 2023, resulting in the aircraft being exposed to the elements of nature till 12 shelters were completed.

Air Force Station, Begumpet, imparts training to navigators of IAF and possesses one hangar, five buildings and 10 aircraft parking bays which are located on the land under the control of the Airports Authority of India.

IAF took initiative for transferring the land to its custody. In February 2015, the Ministry of Civil Aviation desired to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the MoD before handing over the assets, but the transfer of land to the IAF is still to be resolved as MoD had not indicated ‘in principle approval’ for the MoU, CAG pointed out.

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