Can’t quash fatal accident cases on compromise: High Court

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that an FIR or criminal proceedings for causing death by negligence cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the complainant or surviving family in a fatal accident case.

Justice Sumeet Goel ruled the deceased alone was the “real victim” in offences under Section 304-A IPC/Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita involving death. The victim’s consent was foundational to any settlement — a consent that was juridical impossible after death.

“It is clear, nay crystal clear, that an FIR as also proceedings emanating therefrom under Section 304-A of the IPC/Section 106 of the BNS cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise/settlement arrived at between the accused on one hand, and the FIR complainant/informant/surviving family of the victim, on the other hand,” Justice Goel ruled.

The court added that even attempts to rely on the compromise indirectly by raising pleas on merits would not salvage such petitions: “Even if credence is sought to be lend to such a compromise/settlement, by way of raising pleas on merits, including the plea that the offence of Section 304-A of the IPC/Section 106 of the BNS is not made out in the facts/circumstances of a given case, still such petition ought to be rejected”.

The issue for consideration before the Bench was whether an FIR registered in June 2022 and proceedings arising therefrom, including the judgment of conviction dated April 4, 2024, passed by Moga JMIC, deserve to be quashed. The Bench was told that a compromise had been entered into between the petitioner and the FIR-complainant.

Victim’s consent is sine qua non — but deceased cannot consent

Elaborating on the jurisprudential foundation behind compromise-based quashing, Justice Goel asserted that the “basic and essential edifice” of such a plea would rest entirely on the victim’s consent. “The consent on the part of the victim for compromise/settlement of FIR/criminal proceedings is sine-qua-non for such petition to succeed,” the court asserted.

Giving reasons why this principle defeated compromise in cases of death by negligence, Justice Goel distinguished between the informant and the actual victim. “Conceptually, the FIR-complainant/informant is different from victim. In a case pertaining to an offence, as a result whereof a death has occurred, it is the deceased who is the real victim.”

The Bench added even the closest family could not clothe themselves with the legal authority to settle the offence on behalf of the deceased: “The surviving family of the deceased, including the spouse/parents/children/guardian/care-giver etc. nay the FIR complainant/informant, cannot adorn the mantle of primary victim for purpose of settlement/compromise,” Justice Goel asserted.

Deceased’s “primary aggrieved party.”

Describing the deceased as the “primary aggrieved party,” Justice Goel asserted that the very rationale of compromise would collapse when the victim was no longer capable of expressing consent or grievance. “The deceased, being the primary aggrieved party is no longer capable of expressing consent or grievance, rendering any compromise with the informant or complainant incongruous with this foundational principle,” the court added.

Justice Goel was also of the opinion that a settlement with the complainant could not erase the legal consequences of an irreversible loss of life. “A settlement between the accused and the complainant fails to satisfy the underlying rationale. It disregards the irreversible harm inflicted upon the deceased and the broader societal interest implicated in crimes of this gravity.”

The Bench concluded that allowing quashing on such basis would “undermine the rule of law and trivialise the serious nature of the offence.”

Victimology, Article 21 and the shift from accused-centric jurisprudence

In its detailed judgment, Justice Goel’s Bench traced the evolution of criminal law from an overwhelmingly accused-centric model to a more balanced paradigm acknowledging victims’ rights. For decades, it noted, victims remained invisible. “For an extended period of time, criminal jurisprudence was, by and large, acquisitive, placing the crime and criminal act at its epicenter. The jurists have preoccupied themselves with the rights and safeguards concerning the accused, concomitantly, the victim, i.e. the de facto and real sufferer whose very misery put the criminal law into motion, remained a forgotten figure,” the court observed.

Dismissing the petition, the court added the victims were until recently rendered almost entirely passive, relegated to the periphery. Tracing the development of victimology. Justice Goel asserted: “The terminus of criminal justice system must transcend beyond the mere safeguarding of rights of an accused and must encompass the preservation and effective vindication of the rights of a victim…”