Public interest better served by timely action than condoning bureaucratic delays: HC

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled that “public interest is undoubtedly better served by timely governmental action than by condoning repeated lapses on account of avoidable delays,” in filing appeals against judicial orders.

The assertion came as the Bench cautioned that condonation of delay could not be treated as an act of generosity or benevolence in accordance with the settled position of law.

Holding that the law of limitation was founded on public policy and “admits of no exception in favour of repeated bureaucratic lapses or casual indifference,” Justice Sudeepti Sharma made it clear that courts must be slow in condoning delay where the reasons offered reflect bureaucratic apathy.

Justice Sharma asserted it was pertinent to note that the Supreme Court had repeatedly deprecated bureaucratic lethargy and red-tapism, leading to inordinate delay in filing appeals, and ruled that such explanations should not be readily accepted as constituting “sufficient cause.”

“The law of limitation, being founded upon public policy, is anchored in the well-recognized maxim `reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ — that it is in the larger public interest that there should be an end to litigation,” Justice Sharma observed, adding that the object is to ensure finality in legal proceedings.

Reiterating that the pursuit of substantial justice could not come at the cost of prejudice to the opposite party, Justice Sharma added: “The law requires that courts exercise circumspection, apply their judicial mind carefully, and be slow in condoning delay when the reasons offered reflect bureaucratic apathy.”

Dismissing the State’s plea for condonation of an inordinate delay of 992 days in filing an appeal, the court found that even after granting the State “every latitude,” the explanation tendered “neither discloses sufficient cause nor satisfactorily accounts for the entirety of the delay.”

“Faced with such an extraordinary delay, mere vague assertions or generalized difficulties fall far short of meeting the statutory threshold for condonation,” Justice Sharma held, concluding that the application was devoid of merit.