Punjab BJP's tightrope walk: Navigating the saffron party’s national policies and local alienation

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Punjab finds itself in a deepening political quagmire. It is caught between its national leadership's aggressive centralising agenda and the state's deep-seated sensitivities around autonomy, Sikh identity, and regional grievances.

Once a junior partner in a decades-long alliance with the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), the BJP has been struggling to establish an independent foothold in Punjab's polarised electoral landscape since September 2020 over the contentious farm laws.

The BJP's efforts to stand on its feet since then have increasingly reduced to damage control and firefighting perceptions of "anti-Punjab" decisions emanating from the BJP-led Central Government. The recent controversies regarding the administrative and democratic changes at Panjab University and Chandigarh have shown how precarious the BJP's position is in Punjab. Traditionally strong among urban Hindu voters but weak in rural Sikh areas, the BJP risks losing further ground.

According to party insiders, negative events often follow moments when workers feel the momentum building. The state BJP leaders often find themselves blindsided by key decisions made by the central leadership related to Punjab, such as the restructuring of Panjab University’s senate and the administrative set-up of Chandigarh. These leaders are left to defend or clarify these decisions, often being on the defensive against rival parties.

Punjab's Sikh-majority farmers strongly opposed the central farm laws, framing them as a direct threat. This shaped a widespread narrative of Delhi’s "anti-Punjabi" bias, which the Punjab BJP continues to wrestle with. Since breaking away from the Shiromani Akali Dal, the BJP has faced marginalisation. In the 2022 assembly elections, it contested all seats but failed to win even one, securing only 6.6 per cent of the vote. Its campaign rallies frequently faced protests, with hostile crowds expressing anti-BJP and anti-Modi sentiments.

The 2024 Lok Sabha elections were no better for the BJP in Punjab. Despite high-profile candidates, including Union Minister Ravneet Singh Bittu, the party did not win any seats and only secured under 7 per cent of the vote share. The poor results are largely attributed to ongoing resentment against the farm laws, perceptions of economic neglect (Punjab trails the national average in per capita income, with high youth unemployment), and insensitivity towards Sikh cultural sentiments.

Since then, the party's strategy has been a mix of trying to reach out to Sikhs (where it is the weakest) and consolidating urban Hindu votes. State BJP chief Sunil Jakhar, a former Congress leader, has emphasised a focus on "Punjab first," but the national BJP often overrides local concerns, forcing the state unit into taking a defensive stance. Despite efforts, electoral success remains elusive.

The November 2025 Tarn Taran bypoll, held in a rural Sikh-majority area, illustrated this struggle. The BJP candidate managed less than 3 per cent of the vote share, finishing a poor fifth, reflecting the party’s continuing difficulty in breaking into former SAD strongholds. The Aam Aadmi Party and SAD performed strongly in that election. However, the BJP noted that this time it was allowed to campaign and set up booths without widespread protests, which they saw as a slight improvement, indicating a slow reduction in outright hostility.

A significant personal move by Union Minister Ravneet Singh Bittu in August 2025 may have helped ease some tensions. He publicly supported releasing Sikh political prisoners convicted of crimes during the Punjab militancy in the 1980s-90s, including those involved in the assassination of his own grandfather, Beant Singh. This bold statement of reconciliation may resonate with Sikh voters who demand prisoner releases — an issue the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) strongly advocates.

However, recent central government actions have reignited tensions. On October 30, 2025, the Union Education Ministry amended the Panjab University Act, eliminating the university’s elected Senate and replacing it with nominated panels under the Vice-Chancellor’s control. This move was immediately branded as an attempt to impose central control and ideological influence over a historic university, sparking protests by student groups and condemnation from state political leaders.

Soon after, the proposed Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill sought to place Chandigarh under Article 240 of the Constitution, effectively giving the President (and thus the Centre) direct regulatory power over the city. Chandigarh, as a Union Territory and shared capital of Punjab and Haryana, is deeply symbolic and politically sensitive for Punjab, which views it as integral to its sovereignty. The Bill provoked a united backlash from Punjab’s major parties, including the BJP’s own state unit. Concerns were raised that it could be a step toward undermining Punjab’s authority and possibly trigger greater unrest.

The Punjab BJP felt caught off guard by both these central initiatives. After protests and intense political pressure, the Centre retreated from both contentious moves, withdrawing or deferring the university changes and the Chandigarh Bill. These reversals highlighted disconnects within the BJP at different levels between the national leadership, possibly driven by bureaucratic inputs, and the state unit trying to manage local sensitivities.

Punjab BJP leaders privately express frustration at being sidelined from major decisions affecting the state and warn that such measures only deepen feelings of alienation among Punjab’s population. The party’s struggles reflect the broader difficulties the BJP faces in Punjab, where federalism, regional identity, and Sikh cultural concerns clash with the Centre’s centralising, unitary agenda.