Explainer: The complex issue of India-China boundary

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has suggested a “permanent solution of border demarcation” to his Chinese counterpart Admiral Dong Jun. Any such agreement would require both sides to undo the shackles of cartography that go back nearly two centuries.

The British foreign policy kept changing in response to Russian pressure during the ‘Great Game’ (1813-1907). The British shifted undecided boundaries several times, leading to confusion post-1947, and counter-claims by India and China. The 1949 invasion of Tibet by China added to the cauldron.

In the absence of a demarcated boundary, the 3,448-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) – running along the east-west direction of the Himalayan ridgeline -- is a loose understanding of a boundary that is disputed with overlapping claims. Status quo is maintained by the militaries on either side.

India and China have seen a full-scale war in 1962, and multiple military stand-offs – at Sumdrong Chu in 1986, Depsang in 2013, Chumur in 2014, Doklam in 2017 and in eastern Ladakh in 2020.

Not the first time

Rajnath Singh is not the first to suggest “demarcating the border”. The British made such suggestions from 1846 to 1914, but Beijing never agreed.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi came up with a proposal to the effect in 2014, China responded with “let the Special Representatives (SRs) sort it out”. Each India-China agreement after 1947 mentions “resolution of boundary”.

When India said no

India, too, has rejected multiple offers by China. In 1960, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai arrived in New Delhi to negotiate a final settlement of a proposed boundary on a “as is where is basis” — meaning China would accept India’s control in Arunachal Pradesh and in turn, New Delhi will give up Aksai Chin. PM Jawaharlal Nehru turned it down and asked the Chinese to vacate Aksai Chin.

In 1959, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had asked Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to settle the dispute in order not to alienate India.

The ‘package deal’ was pulled out of cold storage when Deng Xiaoping spoke about it in 1979 at a meeting with Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Foreign Affairs Minister in the Morarji Desai Government. Months later, the government fell. In 1988, Deng reiterated the ‘package deal’ to Rajiv Gandhi; India did not respond. The two sides ended setting up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary question. Beijing proposed a boundary on “present actualities”.

Maps and CBMs

In 1996, the two sides agreed to exchange maps on their perceptions of the boundary. Maps defining the boundary in Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Sikkim were exchanged. However, Beijing resiled on the commitment and maps of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh were not exchanged.

The SR mechanism was established in 2003, replacing the 1988 JWG. In October last year, Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping ended the military stand-off in Ladakh and asked the SRs to work out a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable” solution to the boundary issue.

In 2005, implementation of Confidence Building Measures *CBMs) along the LAC was agreed upon. This asked troops to exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation in a face-to-face situation. Norms were laid down on not using force against each other — all these were violated during the Galwan clash in June 2020.

In 2019, when Parliament approved carving out Ladakh as a UT, China questioned the “changed status” of the “boundary”, whereas, in reality, there is no boundary.

British role

In 1834, the Dogra army of Jammu, led by General Zorawar Singh, captured Ladakh. The Qing Empire invaded Ladakh. The Sino-Tibetan army was defeated and the treaty of Chusul followed in 1842.

In the mid-19th century, the British took over Jammu and Kashmir after the first Anglo-Sikh war. The British proposed boundaries five times — in 1846-47, 1865, 1873, 1899 and 1914. China rejected each proposal, and though Britain got China to send in troops during both World Wars, the boundary issue remained undecided.

Major Alexandar Cunnigham, who led the British attempt in 1847 to demarcate the boundary, writes in his book, ‘Ladak Physical, Statistical and Geographical’ (published in 1854): “The settlement of this boundary (between Ladakh and Tibet) was one of some importance.”

Britain and Czarist Russia expanded as part of the move described by historians as the ‘Great Game’. Kashmir, Xinjiang and Afghanistan were the buffers the British attempted to create between themselves and the Russians. Ladakh and its north-eastern edge called Aksai Chin was one such buffer.