NPT: A pillar of global nuclear governance

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty plays a critical role in maintaining international peace and security

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, is a landmark international accord aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fostering cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also underscores the long-term vision of achieving nuclear disarmament. Often regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT plays a critical role in maintaining international peace and security.

Objectives and framework

The NPT rests on three fundamental pillars:

1. Non-proliferation: Non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons or seek assistance to do so.
2. Disarmament: The five nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—defined as countries that manufactured and exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967—commit to pursuing nuclear disarmament.
3. Peaceful use of nuclear energy: All parties retain the right to access nuclear technology for civilian purposes under safeguards.

The treaty mandates a verification regime supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensures that nuclear materials are not diverted for weapons development.

Recognised nuclear states and global significance

The NPT officially recognises five nuclear-armed states: the United States, Russia (successor of the USSR), China, France and the United Kingdom—who also hold permanent seats in the UN Security Council. These countries bear special responsibilities to lead disarmament efforts, though progress on this front has been inconsistent.

With 191 signatories, the NPT enjoys near-universal adherence, making it one of the most widely supported arms control agreements globally.

Notable non-signatories and withdrawals

Despite its broad reach, some significant states have remained outside the treaty:

• India and Pakistan have developed and tested nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework.
• Israel, while not officially acknowledging its nuclear arsenal, is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons.
• North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 but withdrew in 2003, citing national security concerns after being accused by the US of running a covert enrichment program. It later expelled IAEA inspectors and resumed nuclear testing.
• The treaty includes a withdrawal clause (Article X), allowing a member to exit if ‘extraordinary events’ threaten its supreme national interests. A three-month notice to other members and the UN Security Council is required.

Treaty review mechanism

NPT Review Conferences are held every five years to assess the treaty’s implementation and address challenges. The next review is scheduled for 2026, with recent conferences highlighting sharp divisions over disarmament commitments and compliance issues.

Case study: Iran and the NPT

Iran is a signatory to the NPT and is classified as a non-nuclear-weapon state. It has maintained that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, yet it has been under international scrutiny due to evidence suggesting covert activities.

The IAEA's Board of Governors, in a resolution passed on June 13, 2025, accused Iran of violating its safeguards obligations under the NPT. The resolution followed a damning IAEA report on May 31, which cited Iran's lack of cooperation regarding uranium traces found at undeclared sites, potentially linked to pre-2003 activities.

Iran’s government refuted the allegations, arguing that the findings were politically motivated and legally baseless. Officials also hinted at reconsidering Iran’s NPT membership in light of recent tensions, although the formal process of withdrawal had not begun.

Sanctions and the 2015 Nuclear Deal

In 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran after it refused to suspend uranium enrichment activities. A breakthrough came in 2015 with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement between Iran and six major powers (P5 1), under which Iran accepted curbs on its nuclear program in return for economic relief.

However, the accord suffered a major blow in 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal and reinstated sanctions. In retaliation, Iran resumed high-level enrichment and expanded its nuclear activities beyond JCPOA limits. Although indirect negotiations between Iran and the U.S. have continued, a full return to compliance remains elusive.

Conclusion

The NPT continues to serve as a bedrock of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, its credibility is increasingly tested by geopolitical rivalries, inconsistent disarmament progress, and emerging nuclear challenges. Addressing these issues requires collective global will and a reinvigorated commitment to the treaty’s core objectives—non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Civil Services prep box: Important points

NPT enforced: 1970

Pillars: Non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful nuclear use

Recognised nuclear-weapon states: US, Russia, China, UK, France

Non-signatories: India, Pakistan, Israel

Withdrawn: North Korea (2003)

Review every: 5 years; next in 2026

IAEA role: Verification and safeguards

Iran’s status: NPT signatory; JCPOA signed in 2015, violated post-2018

Escape clause: Article X – 3 months’ notice

Practice questions

Short answer type (50–75 words)

1. What are the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
2. Why is Iran often cited in global non-proliferation discussions?
3. What is the role of the IAEA under the NPT?

Long answer type (150–200 words)

4. Examine the significance of the NPT in maintaining global nuclear order. What are the challenges it faces today?
5. Discuss the impact of the US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal on regional and global non-proliferation efforts.

Analytical/essay type (250 words)

6. “The NPT is both a success and a paradox.” Critically analyse this statement in the context of evolving geopolitical realities and the nuclear ambitions of non-signatory states.
7. Evaluate the effectiveness of international institutions like the IAEA in enforcing nuclear compliance. Use Iran and North Korea as case studies.