Capturing the crucial Hajipir Pass

I joined the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (Special Forces) in June of 1963 at Agra. In November, the Battalion, commanded by Lt Col GA Wright, moved to Jammu and Kashmir as part of 161 Mountain Brigade under 19 Division in the Uri sector. The battalion was given the task of manning nine picquets from Seb, opposite Pakistan picquet Sank, to the Kaman Bridge on the Uri-Muzaffarabad road along the Jhelum river. The Battalion Headquarters was at Uri.

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At that time I was second-in-command of ‘C’ company, occupying picquets Chakus and Chabuk-Kaman Bridge. In April of 1965, I took over as Adjutant of 1 Para (SF). The Uri sector was quiet then. On July 15, Lt Col Prabhjinder Singh took over command of 1 Para and Major (later Lt Gen) RS Dyal was second-in-command.

By mid-July, it had become clear that the Pakistani offensive, code-named “Operation Gibraltar”, had been launched wherein heavily-armed civilian guerillas (mujahids) backed by regulars in civilian disguise were infiltrating into Indian Kashmir at various points along the 470-mile ceasefire line. The regular Pakistan Army also began to get involved and Indian positions on the ceasefire line in the Uri sector were shelled. The Uri garrison was also shelled. 1 Para retaliated with small arms and heavy and medium gunfire.

One of the entry points of infiltration, causing so much mischief in Indian Kashmir, was the Hajipir Pass situated at an altitude of 8,652 feet. It lay south of Uri on the Uri-Poonch Road, 5 miles from the ceasefire line in the Pakistan-occupied zone of Kashmir. The eastern route from Uri to Hajipir is dominated by the steep and formidable Badori feature (12,360 feet). The western route from Uri to Hajipir Pass is dominated by Sank (9,498 feet) and Led Wali Gali (10,302 feet). These heights were physically held by Pakistani regulars. In order to seal off the above infiltration route, Hajipir Pass had to be captured.

The task of capturing Hajipir was assigned to 68 Mountain Brigade. It was commanded by Brig Zoru Bakshi. The following units were placed under command of the brigade: 1 Para, 19 Punjab, 4 Rajput, 6 Dogra and 6 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles. The brigade, along with the units, concentrated at Uri by August 24.

The 68 Brigade planned to capture Hajipir Pass by a two-pronged attack. The first phase was an attack along the right (western) flank by 1 Para to capture Sank and exploit up to Led Wali Gali up to Point 1003. On the left front (eastern) flank, 19 Punjab was to capture Badori and exploit up to Kuthnar Di Gali. The second phase called for 4 Rajput to roll down to Hajipir Pass.

Pakistan knew the importance of Sank. Therefore, it was held in strength and supported by medium machine guns and 3-inch mortars. The task of capturing Sank was given to ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies of 1 Para under the overall command of Maj Dyal. On August 25, at 8 pm, the ‘C’ company secured the Ring Contour, which was the forming-up-area for the frontal and silent assault on Sank.

At 10 pm, ‘A’ company led by Maj Dyal started climbing towards Sank. Due to heavy rain, visibility was very poor. The enemy also started firing from the top of Sank on advancing troops. At first light, it became clear that a frontal attack would not be possible and therefore it was abandoned with two dead and 20 injured. On the left-front flank, 19 Punjab could not proceed further and the attack was called off.

Sank had to be captured at any cost, therefore 1 Para was again tasked to capture Sank on August 26/27. ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies were assigned to capture Sank under the overall command of Maj Dyal. The second attack was preceded by very heavy shelling on Sank by 164 Field Regiment. Capt MD Naidu, the forward observation officer, gave very accurate covering fire to the assaulting troops. The enemy was totally shaken by the very heavy artillery fire.

With Maj Dyal personally leading the assault, 1 Para captured Sank by 4.30 am on August 27. The enemy withdrew, leaving behind their dead and wounded.

Expecting an early counter-attack, Maj Dyal quickly re-organised the defences. Maj Baicher, who was commanding ‘D’ company, was ordered to proceed to Led Wali Gali and occupy it. In the meantime, the enemy opened small arms fire from Sawan Patri. Capt MMPS Dhillon quickly moved with his platoon towards Sawan Patri and in a quick and gallant action occupied it. By 11 am, Sank up to Led Wali Gali was captured. On the eastern flank, 19 Punjab was still short of Badori.

By 2 pm on August 27, it was clear to the brigade and division HQ that the capture of Hajipir Pass from Badori was not possible. Therefore, as suggested by the commanding officer of 1 Para, Maj Dyal was assigned to proceed to Hajipir Pass with ‘A’ and ‘D’ companies via Hader Nala. I was ordered to move the battalion HQ from Seb to Sank.

By 4 pm, the force commanded by Maj Dyal started moving towards Hajipir Pass. The task involved moving down to Hyderabad Nala and then climbing up 4,000 feet to Hajipir Pass. The force was moving with the help of a compass. The terrain was very rugged and slippery and to add to the discomfort, it started raining heavily. By 4.30 pm, the force reached the base of Hajipir Pass. As the troops had been on the march for 48 hours, Maj Dyal gave them a break. At 5 am, the force again started climbing towards the pass. In an hour, it was just short of the objective.

Maj Dyal deployed the leading platoon on the ground with orders to engage the enemy if it opened fire from the pass, and himself with the remaining troops quickly climbed the right shoulder, unseen, and rolled down to the pass. At 7 am, Maj Dyal informed me on the radio set that Hajipir Pass had been captured.

I informed the Commanding Officer and Brigade HQ. By 11 am, Hajipir Pass was fully secured. The battalion commander was already proceeding towards Hajipir Pass; I also started moving the Battalion HQ towards Hajipir Pass and reached there by 4 pm. The complete battalion concentrated on Hajipir Pass by last light on August 28.

At 7 pm the same day, an enemy patrol moving towards Hajipir was intercepted. The patrol leader, Capt Maqsood, and nine other ranks were taken prisoner.

In the next 72 hours, the ‘C’ and ‘D’ companies captured the adjoining heights. In these mopping-up operations, Maj JCM Rao, commanding ‘C’ company, and Maj AS Bindra, commanding ‘D’ company, were critically wounded. Capt TB Gurung and Subedar Arjun and 10 other soldiers died.

While Maj Dyal was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, Hav Umrao and Capt MD Naidu were awarded Vir Chakra. Capt MMPS Dhillon and Sub Arjun Singh were conferred with the Sena Medal.

1 Para was awarded Battle Honour Hajipir and Theatre Honour Jammu and Kashmir (1965).

The huge success of 1 Para in capturing Hajipir Pass can be attributed to two factors: bold leadership qualities displayed by the commanders at every level, and the physical fitness of all ranks in the unit.

The writer was Adjutant, 1 Para, during the 1965 war and spent six months at Hajipir Pass