‘Trial by Water’ by Uttam Kumar Sinha explores India-Pakistan relations vis-a-vis Indus basin
The Indus Waters Treaty marked the end of the canal waters dispute, which had arisen in 1948
Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations by Uttam Kumar Sinha. Penguin Random House. Pages 332. Rs 599
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Book Title: Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations
Author: Uttam Kumar Sinha
Amid the continuous clicking and flashing of movie and still cameras, three signatures to three copies of the Indus Waters Treaty, bound in black, were signed on the fateful day of 19 September 1960 in Karachi — the port city from where, not too far away, the Indus meets the Arabian Sea and is regarded by its dwellers as the modern urban centre of the Indus civilisation. The treaty marked the end of the canal waters dispute, which had arisen in 1948, and the culmination of the World Bank-inspired negotiations that had formally begun in Washington, DC, on 6 May 1952.
Meticulously drafted to leave nothing to chance — it consists of twenty-one pages of Articles I to XII and includes eight annexures (A to H) and four appendices — the treaty was ratified in January 1961 with effect from 1 April 1960 and India registered the treaty in the UN on 16 January 1962. (Jawaharlal) Nehru, after affixing his signature, passed it on to Ayub (Khan), who, after a flourish of his pen, presented it to (William) Iliff for the final act.
The process was repeated two times. All this while, (Niranjan) Gulhati, away from the limelight, was silently repeating the Gayatri Mantra in thanksgiving. The Indian delegation included irrigation and power minister Hafiz Mohamad Ibrahim and his deputy minister Jai Sukh Lal Hathi. Both later served as governors of Punjab, like (NV) Gadgil, who coincidentally was also the irrigation minister.
A hush descended as Iliff, who began the proceedings, described the day as historic, acknowledging foremost the two principal negotiators of India and Pakistan, Gulhati and G Mueenuddin, and with sincerity commended the engineers for their unwavering commitment. Mueenuddin, unlike Gulhati, was not an engineer but a senior civil servant and had engineer advisers under him.
Pakistan had consistently advocated for the inclusion of ‘non-technical’ civil servants, if not political leaders, in the negotiating process. As Gulhati notes, ‘Presumably, because of this and because of the general trend in India to keep technical men out of the highest positions under government, a decision was first taken to appoint BK Nehru as the Indian Representative, with me as his chief engineer adviser.’
BK Nehru had joined the civil service and specialised in financial work. However, he declined the decision and instead recommended Gulhati as the leader of the Indian delegation. BK Nehru was known for his candour, unhesitatingly advising the prime minister to temper his anti-Americanism if he wanted economic aid. In fact, he had helped create the Aid India Club, a consortium of donor nations, in 1958. This initiative, starting in 1961, committed $2 billion over two years to development projects in India with a promise to fund $3 billion later.
While serving as commissioner-general in Washington, BK Nehru recounted in his memoir that Mueenuddin would frequently turn up at his apartment and the ‘…political difficulties of the negotiations were settled between him and me over a drink’.
Ayub described the treaty as a ‘spirit of cooperation’ and underlined the ‘generosity’ of the donors.
Nehru’s socialist outlook in the ‘scientific and economic sense’, a throwback to his presidential address at the Lucknow Congress in 1936, was hard to miss: ‘But in particular this is memorable [referring to the treaty] because it will bring assurance of relief to large numbers of the people, farmers, agriculturists and others in Pakistan and India. All of us in spite of many scientific improvements, still depend upon the good earth and good water and the combination of these two leads to prosperity for the peasant and the countries concerned.’
The treaty, with some backstage discussions, opened the door for India and Pakistan to address other ‘irritants’ that were straining their relationship: resolving Partition-related financial disputes; border settlements; disputes over moveable properties left behind by refugees; promotion of scientific, technical and agricultural cooperation; exchange of water resources information in the East Pakistan area; and increasing the possibility of trade.
Representatives of the World Bank, Pakistan, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Germany (Federal Republic) signed three agreements guaranteeing financial support, including the $900 million Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement.
India was also to contribute financially, as stipulated in Article V of the treaty. Additionally, the World Bank and Pakistan signed a loan agreement for $90 million, and Pakistan and the US signed a development loan fund agreement worth $70 million.
The Indus Fund, to be administered by the World Bank, was for a ten-year period with the possibility for an additional three-year extension, if necessary. The fund would enable construction of two grand dams on the Indus and Jhelum alongside five barrages and the digging of seven link canals and drainage channels.
Of the total cost estimated at $1,070,000,000, Pakistan was to get 81 per cent of the fund for its water works, mostly in grants, and India a little less than 19 per cent, mostly in loans.
An Irishman, Iliff was no stranger to the Indian subcontinent. Forty-five years prior, he had served in the British Army regiment in Punjab and was later stationed in Simla as a financial adviser to the Governor of Burma. Having joined the World Bank in 1948 as a loan director, he had no pretensions about his profession. In a speech, he once amused the gathering, saying, ‘…some people say the only thing wrong about our title is that they don’t think we are a bank.’ And then with a pause explained, ‘It is true we do not take deposits. But we take every possible precaution that the loans we make will be repaid, and at an appropriate rate of interest.’
The national leaders, who had fought for independence and resented capital flight from India, viewed the World Bank as an unsuitable partner for the country’s development. Indian civil engineers looked beyond ideological concerns and recognised the benefits of effectively merging science and technology to address societal needs through the harnessing of rivers.
— Excerpted with permission from Penguin Random House
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