Caught in the Middle: Is a softer India-China rapprochement brewing amid US tariff heat?

As President Donald Trump's tariff offensive pushes India towards unprecedented diplomatic manoeuvring, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's strategic calendar tells a revealing story.

Within 48 hours this week, PM Modi held detailed conversations with both Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Brazilian President Lula — two leaders similarly targeted by Trump's trade penalties — and provided swift endorsement of a Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska on August 15. Now, with his planned attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit hosted by China in Tianjin, Delhi is demonstrating strategic autonomy in its purest form: engaging all powers while being captured by none.

The convergence of these diplomatic moves — occurring as Trump escalates trade pressure over India's Russian energy purchases — suggests not capitulation to authoritarian powers but a calculated assertion of sovereign decision-making. Yet, while this tactical balancing may create temporary alignments of convenience, the argument that US pressure will forge genuine India-China friendship remains fundamentally flawed, given the structural contradictions that persist between Asia's two giants.

The defence dimension and diplomatic choreography

In two rapid moves this summer — a 25 per cent  tariff hike in July, followed by another 25 per cent penalty set to take effect in late August — Washington raised duties on key Indian exports to 50 per cent, punishing New Delhi for buying discounted Russian oil. The step has driven US–India ties to a new low. India’s Russian oil imports are driven by non‑negotiable energy security needs and represent prudent economic management, not geopolitical alignment.

As India continues talks with the US,  India is weighing tariff countermeasures, and frictions have entered the defence realm — with disputed reports about pausing major arms deals adding to mistrust. This uncertainty is unfolding alongside a carefully planned series of diplomatic moves. Modi’s call with Putin, in which both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to deepen the India‑Russia “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,” came just hours before Trump announced his planned Alaska summit with the Russian president. The timing signalled India’s refusal to let US pressure dictate its calendar or partnerships, a stance reinforced by New Delhi’s swift endorsement of the summit, citing Modi’s view that this is “not an era of war.”

By showing this support for the US while on the receiving end of harsh tariffs, New Delhi has subtly reminded the world that it supports dialogue and diplomacy, without allowing bilateral tensions to cloud its judgment on global peace efforts. This stance not only reinforces India’s image as a principled and autonomous actor in global diplomacy, but also sharpens the emerging paradox of Beijing’s parallel charm offensive — an opportunistic bid to cast itself as Delhi’s partner even as underlying strategic frictions endure.

China’s strategic opportunism — charm offensive meets contestation

Beijing has displayed tactical agility in capitalising on the current strain in US-India ties. In seemingly synchronised fashion, Chinese state media and diplomats are recasting Beijing as an empathetic partner to New Delhi’s grievances. The Global Times has run pointed commentaries arguing that to Washington, Delhi has “never been a guest at the table”, while Chinese Ambassador to India Xu Feihong has proposed the idea of a China-India “1 1=11” growth synergy.

China’s upbeat messaging before the SCO summit — calling it “a gathering of solidarity, friendship and fruitful results” — serves to strategically showcase Beijing’s convening power beyond Western-led forums, while appealing to Indian frustration with US pressure. Importantly, it avoids seeking an overt anti-US stance, instead casting China as supportive of India’s strategic autonomy — a clear contrast to Washington’s more transactional approach. This feeds into Beijing’s Global South narrative — that it offers “respectful” partnerships without Western conditionalities.

Yet, China’s outreach is undercut by actions that sustain Indian mistrust. Even in the SCO, which Beijing hails as a forum for “solidarity,” India pushed back by refusing to endorse the June Defence Ministers’ joint communiqué for naming Balochistan but omitting the Pahalgam terror attack, a move aimed at China’s shielding of Pakistan. The stance was a clear diplomatic rebuke, signalling that India will not dilute national interest for multilateral cooperation.

Beyond the SCO, Beijing continues to apply selective economic pressure on India. As detailed in recent bilateral interactions, China has slowed or informally blocked Indian-bound shipments of rare earths and specialised agricultural inputs — while maintaining supplies to other markets — in what amounts to lawfare through supply chain chokepoints. These activities, paired with China’s continued expansion of dual-use infrastructure in disputed areas, contradict the benign narrative being projected through state-controlled media and diplomatic statements.

Taken together, this dual-track behaviour — charm offensive in headlines, coercion and contestation in practice — echoes earlier cycles such as 2008-2012, when India and China maintained active multilateral engagement despite sharpening competition. Confidence-building moves such as the restoring tourist visas, resuming the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and discussing new direct flights fit this pattern and reinforce the sense of a thaw. However, these remain tactical gestures that ease atmospherics without resolving structural rivalries, while signalling to Washington that New Delhi retains options.

In this light, China’s overtures reflect opportunism more than convergence, and India’s SCO attendance showcases independent foreign policy rather than tilt. It reflects India’s strategic autonomy, enabling engagement with Eurasian partners, leadership in the Global South, and freedom from external constraints, rather than any tilt towards Beijing. For Washington, its heavy-handed tactics could backfire, nudging India and China into pragmatic, if uneasy, cooperation that subtly shifts the region’s balance.

(The writer is the Director of the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA) in New Delhi, specialising in Chinese politics and foreign policy)