China’s Afghanistan-Pakistan outreach challenges India’s regional push

China’s accelerated efforts to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan marks a decisive inflection point on the strategic landscape of South Asia. While Beijing’s recent agreement with New Delhi to resume border trade through Shipki La, following Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit, projects an outward image of rapprochement, the simultaneous deepening of China’s connectivity initiative westward exposes the fragile limits of any true diplomatic reset.

During his state visit to Pakistan on August 21 — immediately after his high-profile meetings in New Delhi — Wang Yi openly discussed plans for an “upgraded version 2.0 of CPEC”. While no formal public announcement about expanding CPEC into Afghanistan was issued, Wang’s emphasis on accelerating CPEC 2.0 signals Beijing’s intent to scale up the initiative’s regional connectivity — focusing particularly on agriculture, mining, and industrial zones — and reinforces China’s strategic commitment to its ‘all-weather’ partnership with Pakistan. The timing, overlapping with Wang Yi’s diplomatic outreach in India, underscores how Beijing’s economic and strategic ambitions in South Asia continue to move forward even amid attempts to signal rapprochement with New Delhi.

The latest push

Earlier this month, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan have reportedly agreed to expand CPEC into Afghan territory, reaffirming a trilateral axis last during high-level meetings in Kabul. The discussions on this supposed extension have been gathering increasing momentum since May, when the foreign ministers of the three countries met in Beijing.

China’s vision is clear: by weaving a corridor that runs from Xinjiang through Gwadar and now into Afghanistan, it constructs a contiguous sphere of influence across regional fault lines. The practical effect is a strategic chokepoint circumventing India’s western access, potentially running over 3,000 km and projecting Chinese power closer to Central Asia and Iran.

For India, the project’s route — already traversing Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) — is a sovereignty red line and diplomatic provocation. New Delhi has consistently protested CPEC’s transgression of what it considers Indian territory, branding by extension its entry into Afghanistan, or involvement of third countries, as “unacceptable” and a violation of its territorial integrity.

The CPEC’s geographic expansion is matched by its security and military implications: Chinese infrastructure, troops and technical assistance are likely to accompany these projects. China’s growing role as a security guarantor — offering to protect its nationals and key infrastructure from extremist attacks — may deepen its military imprint on Afghan-Pakistani soil, while providing support to both Taliban and Pakistani authorities.

This deepens the Sino-Pakistani military alignment, with direct consequences for India, which already faces a two-front dilemma at both the western and northern borders. Of particular concern is the risk that new trade and transport routes could be exploited by extremist networks operating in Afghanistan.

Although Beijing seeks assurances from the Taliban that no anti-China groups (like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement or TTP) will threaten CPEC assets, the reality is more fraught: Chinese citizens have remained repeated targets of attacks, and the porous nature of the corridor could facilitate movement of illicit actors — destabilising India’s western frontier.

Connectivity politics

China’s position as a key broker between Islamabad and Kabul further sidelines India from strategic decision-making. While India has been investing in alternative connectivity platforms — most notably the Chabahar Port in Iran and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) — these efforts pale when Beijing can offer immediate infrastructure largesse and security guarantees to Afghanistan, cementing Kabul’s tilt towards the Sino-Pakistani axis. India’s Chabahar outreach risks obsolescence despite being a universalist and open project, especially as Afghan priorities increasingly align with Chinese unilateral and opaque investments, and regional powers coalesce around the Belt and Road Initiative rather than India-led alternatives.

In a positive move, China agreed in principle to reopen the Shipki La border trade route in Himachal Pradesh. Trade through Shipki La, Lipulekh and Nathu La had been suspended since 2020 due to the Covid pandemic and the Galwan clash — their reopening revives centuries-old trans-Himalayan economic and cultural exchanges. The Himachal Pradesh government and India’s External Affairs Ministry, citing active diplomatic engagement during Wang Yi’s recent visit, credited the breakthrough to persistent diplomacy. Yet, while symbolically significant — as Shipki La once formed an offshoot of the legendary Silk Road — this modest step contrasts sharply with the scale and ambition of China’s regional connectivity projects encompassing Afghanistan and Pakistan via CPEC, and the implementation of the agreement in principle remains delicate amidst China’s Pakistan outreach actions.

Ultimately, while reopening Shipki La is a gesture towards normalisation, it does little to offset the seismic shift underway across India’s western approaches. The extension of CPEC into Afghanistan is not merely an economic or infrastructural initiative — it is a geopolitical gambit to solidify a contiguous Sino-Pakistani counterweight to India, legitimise sovereignty violations in PoK and militarise key trade nodes adjacent to sensitive Indian territory. CPEC in Afghanistan is thus not an isolated event — it’s the linchpin of Beijing’s long-held ambition and a budding diplomatic challenge to India’s sovereignty, security and regional leadership.

(The writer is the Director of the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA) in New Delhi, specialising in Chinese politics and foreign policy)