A case of hits and misses

Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd)

Former Northern Army Commander

One year ago, the Home Minister, in his speech in Parliament, said Article 370 had to go as it was the biggest hurdle to normalcy and was the root cause of terrorism. Calling Jammu and Kashmir as the jewel in India’s crown, he promised to make it the country’s most developed state in five years. The state was also broken up into two union territories, although the minister promised that full statehood could be restored at ‘an appropriate time’ when ‘normalcy’ returns.

While the government emphasised that the decision taken on August 5, 2019, would pave the way for development and spell the end to terrorism, others warned that there could be an intensified spell of violence and bloodshed in the Valley. Fortunately, the latter has not happened, but unfortunately, neither has the former. One year after the abrogation of Article 370, the government's scorecard is mixed. There are a few successes and some missed opportunities.

Let us first look at the successes. From a security perspective, we could say that the situation has been reasonably well controlled. 2001 was the peak year of violence in J&K, with more than 4,000 fatalities of civilians, security forces, and terrorists. By 2012, these figures had come down to a little over 100. Since 2013, there has been an increase in violence levels, but the average fatalities in the past three years number less than 400.

Civilian collateral damage and terrorist violence have also been kept in check. More than 1,000 civilians were killed in terror-related violence in 2001. The past five years have seen about 200 civilian deaths. Today, there are less than 200 active terrorists in Kashmir and have limited capacity to force any change in Kashmir through the use of arms.

The alteration in the status of the state has brought relief to certain communities who had been denied domicile rights. West Pakistan refugees, Balmiki Samaj members, and Gorkhas settled in the state have started receiving domicile certificates. Discrimination against women who marry outside the state has also been removed.

On the other hand, there has been little progress in finding a long-term solution to this intractable conflict. This is the result of a strategy that has focused on conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Conflict management could be understood as attempts to mitigate the damaging effects of conflict, primarily through the use of force. To be fair, this strategy has also been followed by past governments, but the almost singular focus, in the past one year, to controlling violence has pushed efforts at resolving the conflict into the background.

The unprecedented lockdown that continues in some form till today has ensured that there are no violent protests of the type witnessed in 2016 but has caused enormous distress to the common man. In January this year, the J&K home department cited ‘security of the state’ and ‘maintaining public order’ as the reasons for the continuing restrictions on the Internet.

Ensuring security is an essential aspect of combating internal conflicts. A few terrorists should not be permitted to hold the state hostage through the power of the gun. However, even as the terrorists need to be neutralised, our definition of security should be expanded to provide security to the common man. This includes the creation of an environment where the citizens have confidence that they will get justice, liberty, and equality as enshrined in the Constitution.

As opposed to conflict management, a conflict resolution strategy aims to address the root causes of conflict to find solutions that take into consideration the aspirations of the people, narrow down divisions between communities, and leave all parties with a sense of victory. This is no simple task in a conflict as complex as Kashmir, but a start can be made with an approach that is people-centric rather than security-centric.

The government must initiate confidence-building measures that address the existing trust deficit and allay suspicions and fears. Visible actions on the ground in terms of accelerated economic development, lifting of restrictions, and an outreach to the society could lessen anxieties, although it will be a gradual process.

For any conflict-resolution mechanism to succeed, the civil society must also play a big part. The various communities that reside in J&K have their own set of genuine grievances, but these grievances cannot be solved if the conflict continues and civil society members shun reconciliation among themselves. It is also inexplicable and unacceptable for people in the rest of India that a section of the population in the Valley continues to raise issues that directly impact the unity and integrity of the nation.

Ethnic and religious activists in Kashmir have exploited fears about loss of identity and raised unfounded hopes of autonomy and self-rule. For those looking at Pakistan for succour, it must be realised that Pakistan’s only role is in stoking further terrorism and violence. A deep introspection by the civil society would perhaps find that all solutions lie within the Indian State and that some compromises are preferable to the continuing bloodshed.

It is also rightly argued by many that one year is too short a time to assess any progress towards achieving the government’s objectives. This is a valid point as the armed conflict has lasted more than 30 years, and it is impractical to expect visible results in a very short span. However, what can certainly be done is to evolve a future strategy that emphasises conflict resolution over conflict management and gives primacy to the needs of the people.

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