Afghanistan’s future on a knife edge
ALMOST a year and a half after the Taliban retook Afghanistan by the use of force, with the international community abandoning it, the question remains: whither Afghanistan? David Loyn, author of two seminal books on Afghanistan, including The Long War, provided part of the answer: disengage to put pressure on them, and later oust them from power to restore democracy and revive the gains of previous 20 years.
Loyn’s unconventional solution elicited a cautious response from former Ambassador to Kabul Gautam Mukhopadhaya. Advising patience, he said, “Remember, last time it took five years, 9/11 and Northern Alliance to get rid of them. These conditions will not be easy to recreate.”
Another western intervention in the graveyard of empires is unlikely, Loyn remarked. This exchange took place last week at the India International Centre, New Delhi. And so the country, mired in 43 years of conflict, will plod on under conditions of dire human and women’s rights violations, and abject misgovernance under a fractured but more puritanical version of the Taliban.
Fifteen countries have established relations without recognising the Islamic Emirate, with China the most visible power. Although the war has ended, violence has not. The security situation is bad and confused, with 21 terrorist and a few resistance groups contesting for space that the Taliban, without any organised army, police, intelligence and institutions, are unable and unwilling to handle. The most violent and feared is Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), which has targeted the Russian and Pakistani Embassies and spread terror among Hazara Shias. The IS (K) has conducted attacks in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Al-Qaeda is embedded even after Ayman al-Zawahiri was taken out by the US from a safe house linked with Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. The Pakistan Taliban, after their on-off ceasefires with Pakistan, are well settled. The Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish have established bases below the radar. Public floggings, revenge attacks on the old regime, disappearances and suicide attacks are common. Law and order is in a shambles.
The National Resistance Front (NRF) is evolving in the north astride Panjshir Valley, the Tajik bastion. Youthful and literate Ahmad Massoud, son of late ‘Lion of Panjshir’ Ahmad Shah Massoud, is in Tajikistan, mentoring the resistance. In August 2022, the first Herat Security Dialogue was held in Dushanbe with attendees from the US, Europe, India, Pakistan and others. The NRF has extended its influence beyond Panjshir to Badakhshan, Takhar, Samangan, Nuristan and Bamyan. Its fighting strength has grown from 500 cadres to 6,000. Massoud says they do not control these districts as they cannot hold them, a strategy Taliban followed initially. Massoud admitted it has no foreign funding or support yet, but is hoping the international community may change its mind, watching Taliban excesses grow. Massoud said only external and internal pressure will force change in Afghanistan. The NRF has a ‘national’ label and in time could claim pan-Afghanistan support in alliance with other resistance groups.
Pakistan, once the major-domo in Afghanistan, finds its Afghanistan policy imploding as the Taliban are exercising strategic autonomy. When the Taliban captured Kabul, it was Pakistan which jubilated by saying: “The shackles of slavery have been broken.” The Pashtun distrust of the Punjabis has come alive since Islamabad appears to have failed in retaining its long-touted strategic depth; getting India banished from Afghanistan, obtaining expulsion of Pakistan Taliban and getting recognition of Durand Line. The Taliban have warned Pakistan of meeting the same fate of the 1971 war against India were it to indulge in any misadventure. The Taliban have welcomed India with open arms.
India, which has invested $3 billion in Afghanistan, is a late returnee to Kabul. Its engagement with Taliban is more tactical than strategic and designed to keep an eye on China and Pakistan. The Taliban are keen to see India resume the 20 remaining development projects, but there are glitches. New Delhi’s focus is keeping Chabahar Port operational and the International North-South Transport Corridor open for access to Russia/Europe and Central Asian Republics (CAR). India has lost immense goodwill among Afghans by denying visas to friends and allies. Against 60,000 requests, only 200 visas were given to Sikhs and Hindus who were evacuated under ‘Operation Devi Shakti’.
Typically, China in Kabul pretends to do a lot without doing anything. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Wang Yu is proficient in signing contracts without attaching funds to them. The recent $540-million contract for oil exploration in Amu Darya over three years may meet the same fate as its earlier mega deal at Aynak for copper. Beijing wants to keep the West out of Afghanistan and CAR, but this may change after Ukraine. It is trying to rope in Afghanistan into China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), but after the recent suicide attack against Chinese in Kabul’s Longan Hotel, Beijing may rethink its plans about Afghanistan’s economic uplift. It has received no assurances on Uyghur ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) operations in Xinjiang.
Afghanistan witnessed severe restrictions and rapid reversal of women’s rights, impacting their future in terms of education (no schooling beyond six years of age) employment, healthcare and freedom of movement. Afghanistan’s $8-billion budget used to come from the US and the West; this has stopped and its assets worth $9 billion are frozen. The UN has provided humanitarian aid worth $1.2 billion, while the US has added $1 billion. Taliban’s budget for last year was $2.3 billion, but it officially generated only $600 million. Its illicit financial activities included cash from opium trade taxation and hawala. Sanctions have had a devastating effect on ordinary Afghans rather than on 10 ministers and other entities subjected to them.
There is no happy ending to the Afghan story. Taliban 2.0 are unlikely to change as Afghans will continue to flee the country. Will the NRF and other resistance groups, with external help, be able to do a Northern Alliance? Or will the country divide as per the Blackwill solution: north to Tajiks, east to Hazaras and Uzbeks and south to Pashtuns? Or will Afghanistan, a failed state, simply wither away?
