Anti-terror forces should learn lessons from Hamas attack

Luv Puri

Journalist And Author

IN the past decade, with the possible consent of the Israeli security establishment, several books, including those written by former Mossad officials, and OTT shows such as Fauda have focused on the heroics of the Israeli security apparatus in a turbulent environment. This literature and mass media content have not only made a global audience familiar with the challenges that security agencies face but also provided psychological insights.

The Israeli-Palestine conflict is arguably the most reported and analysed confrontation across the world. Its vivid details, captured by journalists and scholars who have lived in the region for years, are in the public domain. The October 7 Hamas attack provides lessons for various countries that are involved in anti-terror operations. The Israeli lapses need to be scrutinised.

Intelligence and counter-terrorism preparedness are related to the relevant political and societal contexts. Israel’s counter-terrorism efforts are unique, with human intelligence historically forming the core of its capabilities, backed by cutting-edge surveillance technology. Of late, Israel has carved out a significant comparative advantage in surveillance technology startups. These companies export their technology to various countries as vendors and actively recruit individuals with diverse linguistic skill sets on a global scale.

The Hamas attack has revealed the limitations of surveillance technology, as it appears that Hamas may have trained, planned and executed it without leaving any discernible digital trace. The old-school and traditional human intelligence, supported by knowledge and grip on societal and situational nuances and developments, cannot be entirely substituted by technological surveillance. In fact, in many instances, it has been proved that technological surveillance can lead to faulty conclusions on account of wrong analyses of a spoken or written word, leading to wastage of resources and, in some instances, wrongful detentions. To be fair to Israel, it is operating in a difficult and exceptional environment. Mossad’s human intelligence has historically excelled in infiltrating Palestinian society, elite circles in neighbouring countries, many of which are hostile. This has significantly contributed to its reputation. However, in the recent attack, human intelligence was clearly lacking, and this came at a huge cost.

There is little doubt that domestically, Israel has successfully established the only truly functional multi-ethnic democracy in West Asia, even though it faces criticism for its human rights record with respect to Palestinians. The internal political system allows dissent much similar to the political landscape of Western countries and one can openly criticise the policies of the ruling elite without being victimised. There is also a broad spectrum of Israeli society that has displayed sensitivity towards the state of ordinary Palestinians. For instance, filmmakers like Shimon Dotan, through their documentaries, have presented a balanced perspective to the outside audience, including a vivid description of psychological triggers that created suicide bombers from Palestinian society. The unity in national resolve is not hampered by the democratic dissent against the ruling political party. The system has withstood the test of time as it is based on credibility and independence of various foundational institutions of a democracy that have in-built checks and balances like any other Western democracy.

The whimsical decisions of the right-wing coalition government led by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu to bring in regressive judicial reforms directly impacted the resilience of Israeli democracy. This was allegedly done to avoid possible corruption indictment in various trials. Even US President Joe Biden minced no words as he urged Netanyahu to seek consensus instead of pushing ahead with such unpopular measures. In 75 years of Israel’s existence, with the exception of the initial reverses of the 1973 Yom Kippur war with Egypt, this is the first time that Israel’s preparedness was challenged politically. The PM’s decision politicised the army, as many senior generals opposed the reforms, and caused divisions in the ranks as well. Hamas may have exaggerated the turbulence in the Israeli political context because of this, but the timing hints it was a factor in the Hamas calculus.

What gives the Israeli security apparatus a unique advantage in the region is its multi-ethnic and cultural character. Jews came from across the world to settle in the ‘promised land’, with significant populations originating from Western Europe, particularly the Ashkenazi Jews, who initially held elite status due to their access to better education. Additionally, there were Sephardic Jews, as well as those who arrived from the former Soviet Union and spoke Yiddish. There also are Mizrahi Jews, primarily originating from the Arab world; they have a strong command of Palestinian or Levantine dialects of Arabic. Additionally, 18 per cent of Israel’s population consists of Muslims, the majority of whom are Arabic speakers, and they are also represented in Israeli Parliament. The advantage of diversity is often blunted with the authoritarian policies of an executive that are aimed at the homogenisation of society and personal aggrandisement.

In asymmetrical warfare, like the one between Israel and Hamas, one cannot ignore the basics of border management. Despite Israel’s significant investments in intercepting low-cost missiles by Hamas, the infiltration and attacks reveal a failure to have traditional and old-school manned border checkpoints at several places.

Other standard operating procedures, such as the deployment of quick reaction teams, similar to the counter-militancy grid in the Kashmir valley, were conspicuously absent for a disproportionate time following the infiltration, as indicated by the accounts of various eyewitnesses.

In India’s case, those familiar with the nitty-gritty of border management are aware of the continuous vigil along the Line of Control and the international border. Nevertheless, terrorists and drug peddlers manage to infiltrate through tunnels from Pakistan’s Sialkot district.

The same technique was pioneered and mastered by Hamas in the past as they were able to clandestinely procure weapons from neighbouring Egypt.

The counter-terrorism ecosystem across the world should draw lessons from the Hamas attack, adapting them to local situations. One lesson that stands out is that an excessive or skewed reliance on technology and contestations on foundational principles of a democracy can blunt institutional preparedness and create blind spots.

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