ASEAN diplomacy on test in Myanmar crisis

ASEAN foreign ministers have called on all parties in Myanmar to refrain from instigating violence, and for all sides to exercise restraint as well as flexibility. Reports suggest that only four countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore — called for the release of detainees, including NLD leader Suu Kyi. A lack of a more condemnatory ASEAN statement on the military coup is not surprising, considering the diversity of political systems in the region.

Out on streets: The military wants ‘disciplined democracy’ in Myanmar. Reuters

Luv Puri

EX-member of UN Secretary General’s Good offices on Myanmar

AS the anti-coup protests continue to rage in Myanmar and the military intensifies repression, the countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a premier regional intergovernmental organisation comprising 10 countries, have collectively and in their individual capacity stepped up their diplomatic engagement with the Myanmar military leadership and voiced concern over the fast-changing developments.

After convening an informal online meeting on March 2, ASEAN foreign ministers released a statement which called on all parties (in Myanmar) to refrain from instigating violence, and for all sides to exercise utmost restraint as well as flexibility. Reports suggest that only four members — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore — called for the release of detainees, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Suu Kyi. A lack of a more condemnatory ASEAN statement on the military coup is not surprising, considering the diversity of political systems in the region and their varied approaches on the issue. Within ASEAN, the engagement of Thailand and Indonesia has a greater relative salience in influencing events in Myanmar and it is this that requires more scrutiny. In that context, newly appointed Myanmar’s Foreign Minister (FM) U Wunna Maung Lwin, who had also served under President Thein Sein (2011-16), had met his Thailand and Indonesia counterparts in Bangkok on February 25.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi pointed out that in the three-way meeting between the FMs of three South East Asian countries, she had stressed that the “well-being of the people of Myanmar was the number one priority.”

“We ask for everybody to use restraint and not resort to violence... to avoid casualties and bloodshed.” Marsudi is no stranger to Myanmar. At the peak of August-September 2017 Rohingya crisis, Marsudi had shuttled between Bangladesh and Myanmar to lower tensions between the two countries. Indonesia has always maintained high profile on Myanmar-related issues. And going by Indonesia’s previous approach of avoiding megaphone diplomacy, including by Marsudi’s predecessor Marty Natalegawa, much of the substance of the interlocution that would have possibly embarrassed the military leadership seems to have been omitted in Marsudi’s press conference. Quoting sources, Reuters reported that Indonesia was proposing that the ASEAN members send monitors to ensure the Generals stick to their promise of fair new elections.

It is not hard to find out why Thailand and Indonesia are important in the present context. Apart from the 2,416-km-long Thailand-Myanmar border, a large number of low-paid Myanmar diaspora lives in Thailand, the source of remittance for the poverty-stricken country.

Many Myanmar dissidents, including those from the majority ethnic group Bamar and other ethnic minorities, had taken shelter after the 1988 uprising, particularly in Chiang Mai area in its north. It had been common for the Myanmar ministers, particularly minister from the President’s Office Aung Min, in Thein Sein government, to visit Chiang Mai to hold talks with the leaders of ethnic armed groups. Ironically, the position taken by the NLD in power was much more intransigent in this respect as it objected to any engagement with Myanmar-related dissident groups based in Thailand. Thailand, with its own recent history of coups, has refrained from taking a position on Myanmar. Present Thailand Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha had himself seized power in a 2014 coup and his present stay in power is attributed to anti-democratic means, including a skewed electoral system under a military-scripted Constitution.

In terms of an example to replicate, the Republic of Indonesia is seen as closer to the Republic of Myanmar than the Kingdom of Thailand, which is a constitutional monarchy. Founded in 1945 to fight against the Dutch colonial rule, it retained a pre-eminent role after independence, not too dissimilar to Myanmar military or Tatmadaw’s journey, through the self-serving doctrine known as ‘dual function’ (dwifungsi); protecting territorial integrity and maintaining political-cum-social order. President Suharto, a former army general, ruled the country from 1967 to 1998, even as General Ne Win was Myanmar’s ruler from 1962 to 1988.

One-fifth of seats in the Parliament were reserved for the military that ran the political economy in Indonesia. The Indonesian army used to invoke the term ‘guided democracy’ whereas Tatmadaw repeatedly mentions the term ‘disciplined democracy’. After President Suharto’s resignation, a period of reformasi (reformation) followed that witnessed reforms that aimed to limit the military’s role in politics even though the military and their families continue to wield considerable influence over the country’s political landscape.

In Myanmar, the military nominates 30 per cent of the Members of Parliament. No amendments can be passed in Myanmar’s Parliament without the approval of 75 per cent of Members of Parliament. With these similarities between Indonesia and Myanmar, there was an expectation that in the context of last one decade of Myanmar’s democratic transition, gradual extrication by the Indonesia army from civilian institutions was a possible roadmap for the Myanmar military.

Outside the ASEAN grouping, India’s position is unique in Myanmar’s context as it has a good rapport with both the military leadership and the pro-democratic forces. In contrast, there were protests by pro-democracy forces outside the Chinese embassy in Myanmar recently against China’s support to the military. India also enjoys goodwill with most of the ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia and Thailand, and India’s support to the regional initiative with calibrated messaging, both public and private, will carry substantial weight.

Even with greater ability to sensitise Tatmadaw to the international concern over the situation, the expectation that Thailand and Indonesia could cause an immediate course correction by Tatmadaw’s leadership will be a stretch. In the coming days and months, the much-touted ASEAN style of diplomacy or the ability of countries like Indonesia or Thailand, seen to be close to Myanmar, will be on test and it remains to be seen how far the regional entity or regional actors can influence Tatmadaw to shun its instinctual desire to rule indefinitely.