Atmanirbharta in defence inventory needs more funds

PRIME MINISTER Modi’s address at the 16th Combined Commanders' Conference in Kolkata on September 15 carried a significant context — it was the first time that the PM was addressing the military top brass after Operation Sindoor.

While the operation has been hailed as a major success, notwithstanding some early setbacks, it has introduced a new normal and operational challenge for India's security establishment. This is in relation to the linkage between nuclear blackmail and terrorism — the NWET (nuclear weapon-enabled terrorism) syndrome — and there are many strands that need to be objectively reviewed.

Op Sindoor has not concluded; it remains ongoing. This means that the military continues to be on alert status. New regional geopolitical and strategic alignments emerged during Op Sindoor, particularly the China-Pakistan cooperation that had moved into the tactical realm and the new challenges this fusion will pose in the next combat exigency.

Further, the more recent strain in the bilateral relationship with the US over tariffs has led to considerable uncertainty about the future of cooperation in the maritime domain, particularly the future of the QUAD.

However, these complexities and challenges were not touched upon and the gist of the PM's address (as released by the PIB) was relatively sparse — a mere 275 words. The formulation was familiar and focussed on defence reforms, operational readiness and the evolving security landscape. The 2025 conference titled "Year of Reforms — Transforming for the Future" dwelt on jointness, self-reliance (atmanirbharta) and innovation.

The subtext of Modi's exhortation is significant and it is instructive that he directed the Ministry of Defence to accelerate initiatives for 'greater integration' (emphasis added) among the Army, Navy and Air Force, promoting indigenous technologies and innovative practices. He also noted their success in Operation Sindoor as a testament to tri-service synergy.

These two policy issues, namely greater integration among the three armed forces to enhance combat capabilities and visible progress in atmanirbharta, have been on the Prime Minister's radar since he assumed office in 2014 and, to his credit, major initiatives have been taken.

These include the setting up of the post of CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) in 2019 and the creation of a DMA (Department of Military Affairs) in the ministry to allow the uniformed fraternity to be a part of the decision-making process.

However, both these decisions have not resulted in the kind of output that had been envisioned and merit a preliminary review against Modi's Kolkata address. Unity of command is a much-revered military tenet and in the Indian context, this has been a subject of acrimonious debate among the three armed forces since 1965.

The distillate is that while the Army is an ardent advocate and the Navy has endorsed the concept, the Air Force has had reservations about what the Modi government had unveiled as theatrisation and integrated commands.

India formally announced the establishment of integrated theatre commands (ITCs) in September 2024 during the Joint Commanders' Conference (JCC) in Lucknow, where the armed forces presented a detailed blueprint and modalities for creating three proposed ITCs — Northern (focussed on China), Western (focussed on Pakistan) and Maritime (for the Indian Ocean Region) for government approval.

However, post Op Sindoor, Air Chief AP Singh, has cautioned against radically altering the current arrangement, wherein each service chief retains full operational control over his own force.

With the many material constraints that hobble Indian air power, the argument is akin to 'why fix it when it is not broken?' The success of Op Sindoor is held up as a case of the current operational arrangement (a total of 17 military commands) working in a more than satisfactory manner.

The need to rationalise the existing military command structures is not a new issue. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in his last address to the combined commanders in late 2013, dwelt on the need for "urgent and tangible progress in establishing the right structures for higher defence management and the appropriate civil-military balance in decision-making that our complex security demands.

"Singh further added: "I encourage you to give this the highest professional consideration, harmonise existing differences among the individual services and evolve a blueprint for the future. I can assure you of the most careful consideration of your recommendations by the political leadership."

Hopefully, this issue will be addressed internally and a consensual modus vivendi will be found in the near future. The issue is complex and multi-layered and merits candid and informed policy discussion, both among the professionals and legislators in an appropriate manner.

Atmanirbharta in defence inventory is an old chestnut. In the early 1980s, PM Indira Gandhi exhorted the Combined Commanders' Conference and the DRDO to step up the indigenous effort and this resulted in the genesis of IGMDP (integrated guided missile development project), which finally led to the success of Agni. That was also the period when India was placed under severe technological restrictions by the US-led West for resisting nuclear subalternity.

Modi is to be commended for not taking his eye off the atmanirbharta needle. But, it has not moved ahead in a substantive manner. A case in point — India's LCA (light combat aircraft), the HAL Tejas, was approved for development in 1983 and now, in October 2025, the first missile firing is scheduled to take place.

The most critical factor to nurture meaningful self-reliance in the defence sector is sustained fiscal and technological support for military R&D and here the Indian allocation is very modest. The 2024 estimates in billions of dollars are: the US 131; China 32 and Indian 5. This needs to be redressed — a plea that has fallen on deaf ears.

And, one issue has been glossed over in Modi's address: the need for intelligence sector reforms. While the success of Op Sindoor is to be commended, the reason why the Pahalgam terror massacre happened and the policy correctives required need to be acknowledged. This kind of reality check would have been desirable in Kolkata in October 2025.

C Uday Bhaskar is Director, Society for Policy Studies.