Attack on Imran pushes Pak to the brink

Shalini Chawla

Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

THE assassination attempt on Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan on November 3 in Wazirabad district of Punjab province has led to a massive disruption of law and order in Pakistan. Khan was leading his party’s long march to Islamabad when a shooter opened fire on him. While the former Prime Minister is demanding the ouster of the Shehbaz Sharif government and early elections, the nation is witnessing violence, and day-to-day life has been severely impacted by the closure of educational institutions and the blocking of roads near the capital.

Three aspects of the attempted assassination of Khan are being debated. He clearly holds the political leadership and the military responsible for the attack and blames PM Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah, and a senior ISI official, Major General Faisal Naseer, for being part of the sinister plot to assassinate him. The military and the intelligence agencies have called the accusations “baseless and irresponsible”.

Sharif has denied his involvement and claims the assassination episode was stage-managed by Khan himself. Numerous reports following the attack are being dissected and point fingers at Khan, who is the biggest beneficiary of the unsuccessful assassination attempt. The third aspect is Naveed Mohammad Basheer, the young man who fired the shots at Khan’s container. Naveed’s background and his phone records disclose that he has been following the sermons of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) leaders Khadim Rizvi and Saad Rizvi, indicating that this is a case of inflamed religious sentiment. The alarming rise of extremism within Pakistan has been evident over the last two decades, and the possibility of a radicalised youth taking the initiative to target Khan or being rather conveniently used to target Khan cannot be ruled out.

Khan, after being democratically removed through a no-confidence vote in April, has been on a rally spree to demonstrate his mass appeal and sustain the momentum of his popularity. Undoubtedly, Khan has a following and enjoys support from all strata of society and (within) state institutions. Today, we see extremely smart information warfare being conducted successfully by Khan and his supporters. His narratives have struck the right chords with the masses, and there are a number of distinct trends that are seen evolving in Pakistan, bringing out the paradoxes within the state.

Khan’s anti-corruption narrative and targeting of the opposition leaders as corrupt have gathered significant support. Constant calls for the PM Sharif’s resignation seem to be resonating with people, who are tired of dynasty politics and hold corruption as a critical factor responsible for Pakistan’s rolling economic crisis.

Khan’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), has managed to sweep the recent byelections. Khan’s victory in Punjab was a major setback for the Sharifs, who have guarded their popularity in the province for years. Khan was removed from office in April, given his failure to keep up the election promises made in 2018, his incompetence to address the alarming economic challenges, his disruption of Pakistan’s relations with its crucial strategic partners like the US and Saudi Arabia, and, most importantly, losing the confidence of the military. But Khan, with his positioning, constant protests, and popularity, has not only managed to erase his failures from people’s memories, but also prevented the achievements of the current regime to register with people.

The Sharif government (and the military) has some significant achievements in its kitty, including a much-awaited International Monetary Fund loan approval of US $1.2 billion, Pakistan’s exit from the FATF grey list, negotiating US $450 million from the US for sustaining the F-16 fighter jets, and restoring relations with Washington and Saudi Arabia, which have brought strategic and economic dividends for Pakistan’s military and the ailing economy. Although resetting ties with the US has brought Pakistan conspicuous gains, Khan has kept up his anti-US narrative, which seems to be echoing the popular sentiment.

Pakistan’s military is facing blatant accusations from Khan (and his supporters) of being corrupt, being tagged as agents of foreign powers (the US), and being traitors. Not long ago, Khan labelled Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa ‘Mir Jafar’. Given the fact that Pakistan’s history has ample examples of the military unrelentingly guarding its position within the state, the current situation raises multiple questions about the army’s position. Does Khan have strong backing within the military? Is the military waiting for the decision on the appointment of the new Army Chief as General Bajwa is scheduled to retire on November 29? Or, is the Pakistani military fragmented, weakened and lacks consensus to act against Khan?

The emerging dynamics present four probable scenarios. First, Khan’s street power continues to grow; there is a complete breakdown of law and order; and fearing a civil war, the political and military regime agrees to Khan’s demand for early elections. Given past experience, it’s unlikely that the military will give in and agree to Imran’s threatening posture and aggressive demands.

The PML (N) cannot afford elections at this point as rising support for Khan has been reflected in the bypoll results. Second, Khan and the military and Sharif reconcile (if reports of some back-channel talks are to be believed), and Khan is given some kind of assurance to wait until the elections sometime in October next year. This might not be seen favourably by the PTI, which is keen to leverage popular support now. Third, the situation continues, the regime tries to manage the instability, waits for the popular support for Khan to fade away and buys time until the 2023 elections. In this situation, Khan is likely to come up with fresh pressure tactics to coerce the ruling elite into agreeing to his demands. Fourth, military intervention takes place and the military takes control (after the issue of the appointment of the new Army Chief has been addressed) at the request of the political leadership or an emergency is declared in the affected provinces.

Pakistan is on the brink once again, and New Delhi needs to carefully watch the situation. While the change of regime may not essentially alter the existing dynamics of India-Pakistan’s strained relations, instability in Pakistan will invariably have strategic and security implications for India.

Join Whatsapp Channel of The Tribune for latest updates.

#imran khan #Pakistan