Authoritarianism triumphs at Xi-centric meet
THE 20th five-yearly Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), held in Beijing from October 16 to 22, was dominated completely by its general secretary Xi Jinping, who was able to pack its highest ruling organs with his loyalists and get his agenda approved. Xi not only got a third term for himself as the general secretary, but was also able to exclude the nominees of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao factions (previous two Presidents) from the 20th Politburo, thus clearing the way for his indefinite rule.
The CPC and state institutions in China are so fragile and prone to manipulation that an authoritarian can easily subvert them by controlling the military, other security agencies and ruling organs, decimating decades of progress. In picking up his nominees, Xi broke several rules regarding age, qualification or even performance; his sense of insecurity dominated his decision-making.
No. 2 on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) is Li Qiang, Shanghai party chief who is likely to be confirmed as the Premier by the National People’s Congress in March 2023. Despite his poor performance in implementing Xi’s zero-Covid policy earlier this year, Li was chosen as he had worked under Xi in Zhejiang province for years. Li will be the first Premier since 1976 not to be promoted from a Vice-Premier and lacks Central Government experience. Zhao Leji is No. 3 on the PSC. He implemented Xi’s anti-corruption programme, incarcerating hundreds of thousands on corruption charges without due legal process.
Former professor at Fudan University Wang Huning, who is Xi’s ideological guide and helped in drafting his “China dream”, retained his slot in the PSC and is now No. 4. Xi brought in three more close aides to the PSC: fifth being Cai Qi, who was Beijing party chief, had worked earlier with him in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, oversaw the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games and was associated with him in the National Security Commission.
Sixth position went to Ding Xuexiang, who was his Chief of Staff. He had worked under Xi in Shanghai in 2007 and was on the 19th Politburo. The seventh slot went to Guangdong party chief Li Xi, who had helped Xi in building his power base in Shaanxi, Xi’s ancestral province.
The number of seats in the 20th Politburo was reduced by Xi from 25 to 24. He appointed six persons with science and technology background to the Politburo to scale up China’s progress in these fields to counter the US’ stranglehold; they include Yuan Jiajun, former head of China’s space programme, and Li Ganjie, a nuclear safety expert. Chen Wenqing, a former spy chief and Minister of State Security, was included in the Politburo as was Foreign Minister Wang Yi. China’s Ambassador to the US Qin Gang was appointed to the Central Committee and may succeed Wang Yi as the new Foreign Minister when the latter takes over Yang Jiechi’s job as Director of Foreign Affairs.
The No. 2 on the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Xi’s right hand man in the PLA, General Zhang Youxia (72), was given another term and a seat on the Politburo despite his crossing the retirement age. He Weidong, who was in charge of PLA’s Western Theatre Command during the Doklam and LAC crises in Ladakh (April 2020), was named as the new (second) Vice-Chairman. He was also the key planner of the unprecedented military drills around the Taiwan Strait after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August. He received a double promotion, as he had never served on the CMC earlier.
Hu Jintao’s appointees — Premier Li Keqiang, who differed with Xi at times on economic policy, and No. 4-ranked Wang Yang — were shown the door. Former senior leaders like Jiang Jemin and Zhu Rongji were absent and Hu Jintao was made to leave in the middle of proceedings. Corporate China was shut out of not only Politburo, but also had few attendees to the party Congress, given Xi’s disliking for “disorderly expansion of capital”. No woman was appointed to the Politburo.
In his speech, Xi promised that China would strive to become a leading global power by mid-century. By rallying around the party core (Xi), the party would be able to “ride out the storms” and achieve “incomparable glory”. China would pursue an independent foreign policy and resolutely oppose “all forms of hegemonism, suppression politics and cold war mentality.” Maximum efforts would be made to seek unification with Taiwan by peaceful means, but Xi did not rule out the use of force.
The consolidation of power by Xi has left many groups such as the Communist Youth League, industrialists, professionals, ethnic minorities and pro-reformists unrepresented and disenchanted. There are few leaders with a strong understanding of economy; loyalty has won over meritocracy.
Non-inclusion of leaders from other factions would affect the availability of policy choices and quality of decision-making. A prolonged economic slowdown could provoke civilian strife, more repression and shifts in supply chains, impacting the global economic growth. Senior party leaders and others are unhappy with sudden switchover from the collective decision-making earlier to one-man rule now, reminding the travails of the Mao era.
Many analysts are worried at escalation in Xi’s aggression and confrontation during his third term, which could provoke new conflicts over Taiwan and other disputed territories. China’s prime contestation in Xi’s third term will be against the US, but the Xi regime would take steps to militarise and fortify China’s borders with India further. Given India’s policy of strategic independence, Xi would avoid pushing India completely into the US camp to avoid a two-front war. India would need to buttress its close relations with the US, Japan and others, boost its strategic balance on the borders and reduce its economic and military asymmetry with China, while remaining ready to deter any new misadventure by the PLA.
