Begin anew in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is on the cusp of another dramatic political change after the Trump administration struck a sly deal with the Taliban. What it means for India, especially the Doha deal since it is limited to Taliban’s pledge not to let al-Qaeda attack the US or its allies from Afghan soil? It underscores the point that the JeM and LeT do not pose a threat to the US, but since India is not its ally, it must fend for itself. It has ‘welcomed’ the agreement but finds itself in a precarious situation. The future remains uncertain—major powers are finding ways to reconcile with the new reality, recasting choices to protect their interests.

Given the high stakes, India can’t remain a bystander, (a) for protecting the $3 billion worth of investments, and (b) preventing its cascading effects on Kashmir. There have been three significant developments so far. First, Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla rushed to Kabul to convey India’s support to the government in Kabul. Second, the External Affairs Minister expressed disquiet when he decried the peace deal, equating it with the movie Pakeezah that took a decade and a half to complete. Third, India sent 5,022 MT of wheat consignment and medical kits to help Afghanistan deal with the Covid crisis.

India seems unwilling to change horses midstream, hoping for Ghani and Abdullah to resolve their qualms. This means no immediate engagement with the Taliban—hawks are already cautioning against such a move. Some have floated the fancy idea of replaying the old regional game, the prospect of which is rather dim as most of the Northern Alliance leaders have aged. At this stage, the logic of charity and reliance on goodwill is hardly going to change the situation for India.

To presume Delhi has no contact with the Taliban would be erroneous, but embracing it seems problematic. At the same time, New Delhi can’t afford to repeat the past mistakes of choosing sides and ignoring reality.

We need to remind ourselves of our traditional policy: commitment to uphold Afghanistan’s independence and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in its internal strife. Another principle was to avoid viewing proximity of any Afghan political faction with Pakistan from a zero-sum prism. This sprung from the Afghan ethos, their loathing for being run by a puppet master—Pakistan.

The template afforded Delhi with flexibility to respond to power transition in Kabul with great amount of consistency. The regimes in Kabul looked towards Delhi for legitimacy and protection against Pakistani hegemonic threat.

When the Soviets left in 1989, the Mujahideen, whom the ISI helped create, immediately turned to Delhi to find a gateway to the world outside. Whether they were Sufis, Wahabis, Deobandis or secular scholars, their craving for tracing roots and ancestry, or even the severe pangs of nostalgia for Hindustan, eventually turned them to Delhi. This hurt the Pakistanis the most.

What worked for Delhi was its non-prescriptive approach, its minimal economic and humanitarian assistance and the culture of open communication with all groups that helped India gain ready political acceptance and weaned off Kabul from Islamabad’s hold.

The problem started when the Taliban overran Kabul in 1996. Delhi refused to derecognise the Rabbani government and had valid reasons to rebuff the Taliban, especially the way they were used by Pakistan.

This was a gross deviation from its past practices. For the first time, Delhi chose the long shot binary option to openly side with the Northern Alliance group against the Taliban. This ought to have been avoided in favour of taking a more nuanced, if not a dual policy option. Instead, Delhi lobbying with Iran, Russia and others got Taliban’s opponents back to power and even lent financial support to the group.

It even took to playing a sort of mini great game in Afghanistan, and strengthened India’s strategic footprint in Tajikistan with a field hospital and a military base. Delhi squandered away hundreds of crores knowing well that it was untenable.

The opposition BJP then criticised the policy to be ambivalent, others termed it unrealistic, considering the ground reality and called for building contact with the new winner in Kabul. However, by siding with one warring faction (non-Pashtun), Delhi not only shunned the prospect of engaging with the Taliban but also induced an impression that it was opposed to the majority Pashtun. The political frailty, especially IK Gujral’s testing of his much-touted doctrine of ‘neighbourhood first’, provided the political underpinning for the subsequent weakening of India’s handling of the situation. No clinical assessment was made on the Taliban, except being dubbed Pakistani protégés.

A US-sponsored Pakistani solution was unviable, but a long-time, one-sided perspective proved unfeasible. Whereas India’s partners like Iran and Russia retained their litheness for opening talks with the Taliban, we perhaps played into Pakistan’s hands.

India today finds itself unable to either mediate or influence rival groups, as it is viewed as a foe of the Taliban rather than being neutral. That the Taliban will push Kashmir into another vortex of turmoil is far-fetched. If the past is any indication, the Taliban’s preoccupation within Afghanistan proved better for India. The flow of Afghan militants into Kashmir declined after the Taliban came to power in 1997.

Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Suhail Shaheen recently told an Indian audience through a webinar speech that it wanted to build ties with India, and was even willing to enact a law against foreign terror groups conducting operations against any other country. The statement needs a fair scrutiny.

It is time to engage with the Taliban and to revert to embracing our principle of restraint, and deal with whoever comes to power in Kabul.