Beijing’s moves need close watching

K. P. Nayar

Strategic Analyst

US President Joe Biden’s trip to Ukraine was not the only time the US and Russia were in communication directly or indirectly with each other to prevent ‘deconfliction’ during the Ukraine war, which entered its second year on February 24. Deconfliction occurs during manoeuvres between groups or the military in areas where overlapping operations are taking place in order to reduce the risk of accidents or incidents, according to the most standard dictionary definition.

A few months ago, the Russian media published close-up photographs of Americans travelling in Ukraine, standing on Humvees, the US Army’s trademark four-wheeled, all-terrain military vehicles. On board the Humvees, the Americans wore their equally trademark dark sunglasses and other paraphernalia, sported usually to demonstrate overwhelming power and send chills down the spines of their adversaries. In some photos, they appeared to be in combat gear, the presumption being they were US military personnel. If the Russians could photograph these US personnel up-close, they could also have shot them dead, but they did not. Russia uses its controlled media to send out unambiguous messages and this was one example. By publishing these pictures, Moscow was warning Washington to keep off Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, the four administrative regions in Ukraine, which Russia annexed after conducting referendums, which have not been recognised as acceptable legal process by most countries.

Since the publication of Russian media pictures, there have been no subsequent reports of any American presence in these regions. No doubt, there are US personnel training and equipping the Ukraine’s military, but they are confined to Ukrainian territory, which is beyond the scope of any dispute — they are not in areas that Moscow now claims as its own.

Nor are they too close to project any direct threat to Russia’s security by their presence. On the day Biden was in Kyiv, White House Communications Director Kate Bedingfield categorically said in a conference call with mediapersons that “the US does not have a military presence on the ground in Ukraine.” This was further acknowledged by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan during the same conference call that it was unprecedented for an American President to “visit the capital of a country at war where the US military does not control the critical infrastructure.” In Moscow, Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responded: “Biden did not dare to visit Kyiv without informing Russia and without asking the Russian side to ensure his safety.”

As the world watched the first anniversary of the Ukraine conflict, its most remarkable features are the restraint by Russia and the US, the caution exercised by both countries to ensure that there are no accidents which could trigger an escalation on the battlefield, and most of all, an entire year of confining nuclear threats to words, or at their worst, abrogating some confidence-building nuclear treaties.

The Ukraine war has brought forth immense suffering and its fallout has been a global food crisis, a catastrophic energy shortage and an economic slowdown worldwide. But unlike in the periods immediately before two world wars, the international community has watched the two big powers act responsibly. That is the most remarkable one-year legacy of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The other aftermath of this war is the pervasive extent to which deal-making now passes for conventional diplomacy. China has abstained on important resolutions against Russia at the United Nations — and not voted against those — as part of the deals struck with the West, including last week’s General Assembly resolution to mark the first anniversary of the war. This has had special significance in the Security Council, where a ‘no’ vote by China would have amounted to a veto, while an abstention constituted a moral victory for the US and Europe, sponsors of those resolutions.

Deals have also been rife in oil transactions, but, most notably, in arms transfers to all parties to the conflict. India has not been approached for deals by the West except in the initial months of the war when it was thought that the Narendra Modi government could be persuaded to end its neutrality. Besides, India had no veto when it was a member of the Security Council, unlike China. Now that India’s term in the council has ended, it is less likely to be tempted into diplomatic deal-making. However, India is a lucrative target for trade-offs in commercial transactions, especially in energy, food and fertilisers. Deals have been part of diplomacy throughout history, but, until now, they were limited in scope and geography. Iraq’s ‘oil-for-food’ proposition was the most notorious of such deal-making, but that too was regional, unlike the global deals in the last one year, which have pushed conventional diplomatic practices to the back seat.

The first anniversary resolution in the UN General Assembly demonstrated that support for Russia has not fallen in the international community although the US and Europe have left no stone unturned in the previous 12 months in their efforts to diplomatically isolate Russia and cut the ground from under Moscow’s feet. When a similar resolution was put to vote in the General Assembly soon after the war started, the number of countries which voted against Russia was 141 — exactly the same number that voted the same way last week.

The only other similar resolution that received marginally higher support in the General Assembly was the one against Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian ‘oblasts’ (regions) in September.

As the war continues into its second year, one country whose diplomacy needs to be put under the microscope is China. Beijing marked the first anniversary of the war by offering a peace plan. In India, that plan has been trashed in public discourse following a familiar pattern of running down everything China does without logic or reason. This is a mistake. Indians should particularly note that China came up with its peace plan after India vacated that presumptive role.

For some time after Modi’s now-famous remark to Russian President Vladimir Putin that “now is not a time for war”, India gingerly explored a peacemaking role, but concluded that peace efforts had little scope for success. China has greater leverage than India in pushing its ceasefire plan because of its proactive Ukraine policy, including a speculated military role. Beijing’s moves need close watching.

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