Britain’s lone wolf crisis exposes a counter-terrorism failure

After the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, the then Union Home Minister P Chidambaram outlined a new national counter-terrorism strategy in his Intelligence Bureau Centenary Lecture on December 23, 2009, by proposing a centralised model. That was the creation of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as its pivot to "prevent, contain and respond" to terrorism as well as "to perform functions relating to intelligence, investigation and operations."

However, this rigid structure of the Centre taking over the states' responsibility prescribed under Schedule 7 of the Constitution was not accepted. At present, counter-terrorism is handled by the state police and the National Investigating Agency (NIA), which was created in 2008 with the help of Central intelligence agencies and Central and subsidiary intelligence coordinating bodies. Simultaneously, wherever necessary, the states also started "de-radicalisation" efforts to wean vulnerable sections of society away from extremism. This flexible pattern is working well.

On the other side of the spectrum is Britain's rigid, statutes-based counter-terrorism policy named "CONTEST" (Counter-Terroism Strategy) started on July 18, 2003, wherein, besides the police, local authorities like education, social services, charities and health services participate. CONTEST has four strands of "P": Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. According to a deposition at the House of Commons in 2013, CONTEST was to be only for five years, but it was extended from time to time.

While 'Prevent' is done to spot persons inclined towards terrorism with the help of educational and voluntary bodies, 'Pursue' is done through intelligence and law and order agencies. 'Protect' is also done through government agencies and 'Prepare' is implemented by the government with the help of official and voluntary agencies.

Of all these, 'Prevent' is the most difficult task, with risks of infringing on several laws, including privacy. 'Channel' and 'Prevent Multi-Agency Panel (PMAP)' guidance are a part of the 'Prevent' programme. Sections 36 to 41 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 cast a duty on local authorities and partners of local panels to provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism.

However, in 2016, David Anderson, UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told a Home Affairs Parliamentary Committee that a lack of confidence in the 'Channel' programme among British Muslims was "undeniable".

Also, the "Do it yourself" or "Lone Wolf" terrorism inspired by the Islamic State changed the entire gamut of the problem. Had 'Channel' been effective, British citizens, including 140 women and 50 minors, would not have been able to go abroad to join the dreaded Islamic State, as reported in 2018 by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation of the King's College, London.

It was in this context that Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on January 21 a promise to undertake the Sisyphean task of framing new laws to get into the minds of "lone wolves" with a history of "extreme individualised violence." This was just before 17-year-old British national Axel Rudakubana, born of parents from Rwanda, was sentenced on January 23 to 52 years in prison for stabbing to death three young girls on July 29, 2024 and injuring 11 others, eight of whom were children, in what is called "2024 South Port stabbing".

Axel, described by the media as a "shy son of evangelical Christians", had a background of being obsessed with violence and, hence, was referred four times in three years to undergo the 'Prevent' programme, but each time he was "judged below the threshold to act."

Starmer said that his government would act faster to change the law to include "loners, misfits, young men in their bedroom" so that genocide aficionados like Rudakubana could be brought within the ambit of preventive law.

Several factors, including bureaucratic hold-up in releasing the identity of Axel, led to a serious situation, including communal riots. The BBC said on January 22 that "senior police officers became frustrated that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was advising them to withhold many details they felt should be made public, due to false claims online." As a result, misinformation through 27 million social media posts generated an impression that Axel's parents were Muslim migrants waiting to regularise their papers.

It also said that the police wanted to announce these charges and "reveal the discovery of the ricin and manual 11 days earlier, on 18 October 2024 but there was a hold-up as the CPS and the police negotiated over what could be said publicly." It was found that Rudakubana had stored ricin (a highly potent toxin produced in the seeds of the castor oil plant, Ricinus communis) and studied a file entitled "Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants, the al-Qaeda training manual".

As a result, a mob suddenly attacked the Southport Mosque on July 30, 2024 and set fire to a police car. Nearly 39 police officers were injured, 27 hospitalised, some with serious injuries. The perpetrators were allegedly members of the legally extinct 'English Defence League', a far-right organisation. Riots had spread to other cities, too.

The Prime Minister's announcement has not been received favourably by counter-terrorism experts. Neil Basu, former counter-terrorism chief of the London Metropolitan Police, while speaking to Radio 4's 'Today' programme, said that the new move "would be a mistake" to make, a "bad legislation" in haste "in response to shocking incidents", as it would result in "unintended consequences." He also felt that this would increase the burden on the police officers, who are already constrained through several legal and departmental checks.

Rudakubana's case flies in the face of what William Shawcross, independent reviewer on the 'Prevent' programme, had said in his report for 2023 addressed to the British Parliament, updated till February 20, 2024. While he praised 'Prevent', he added that the programme "is overly focused on issues such as mental health and social isolation as drivers of radicalisation." Rudakubana has disproved it.

The moral of the story is clear: Give the police, who are ultimately responsible for counter-terrorism action, sufficient autonomy so that they are not hamstrung by layers and layers of supervision.

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