British army could have prevented Partition riots

In 1946, Wavell suggested to the Whitehall to aim the transfer of power by March 1948. “Wavell's own appreciation of any planned British withdrawal was that it must be treated largely as if it were a military plan made in time of war.” He wanted the British military to be gradually moved into the Muslim regions, the most restive parts in northern India, “and put down the worst of the communal violence.”

No clarity: What was the need to speed up the Partition, which led to millions on both sides of border being killed or displaced? File photo

Vappala Balachandran

Former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat

Even 75 years after Independence, there is no clarity on why it was necessary to speed up the Partition by hurriedly announcing the Radcliffe Line, which resulted in the horrendous massacre on both sides of the India-Pakistan border.

In 2009, American Indologist-historian Stanley Wolpert blamed Lord Louis Mountbatten for this: “Britain’s shameful flight from its Indian Empire came only ten weeks after its last viceroy, Lord Louis (“Dickie”) Mountbatten, took it upon himself to cut ten months from the brief time allotted by the Labour government’s cabinet.” He charged him with “withdrawing its air and fleet cover, as well as the shield of British troops and arms, from South Asia’s 400 million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.”

VP Menon, the then Constitutional Adviser to Lord Mountbatten, said in 1957 that the government had expected some amount of violence and had hoped that the ‘Boundary Force’ of the “carefully picked men of mixed composition” under Major General Rees would be able to cope with the problem. The British government had also believed that the state governments concerned would be able to tackle the problem by themselves. All these hopes were in vain. They did not prepare for the worst mass fury.

A research paper (Cambridge University Press) published by Robin Jeffrey on November 28, 2008, which was based on several Partition documents, including 1,200 pages held by Sussex University belonging to the late Major-General TW ‘Pete’ Rees, had within it a letter from Mountbatten to Congress leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad saying that he would provide foolproof security in the event of the partition.

On May 14, 1947, the Viceroy assured Abul Kalam Azad that he would “give complete assurance at least on this one question.” He would see to it that there was no bloodshed and riot. “I am a soldier, not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue orders to see that there are no communal disturbances anywhere in the country.” He added that he would adopt the sternest measures to nip the trouble in the bud. “I shall not use even the armed police. I will order the Army to act, and I will use tanks and aeroplanes to suppress anybody who wants to make trouble.”

However, no such thing happened. Millions died. The British troops did not intervene. Even now, a feeling of guilt persists among some British researchers. A book, Partition (2017), by Lt Gen Barney White Spunner said that this failure in 1947 “would dictate the history of South Asia for the next seventy years, leading to three wars, countless acts of terrorism, polarisation around the Cold War powers and to two nations with millions living in poverty spending disproportionate amounts on their military.”

Research since March 2020 by the “WW2” group in Britain on WWII and post-War history has revealed that as many as six British brigades were present in India at the time of the Partition. This strength was not deployed to prevent or quell violence. However, the group was not sure whether these British units were withheld due to opposition from Indian political leaders, which had first surfaced in 1942.

This doubt arose while reading a book by Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (2014), that the Congress leadership was wary of the role of British-led Indian military after the 1942 “Quit India” movement when 57 army battalions were used to assist the police for internal security duties. This combined force had opened fire on civilians 300 times, killing at least 1,000 protesters.

Another important research paper traced by “WW2” was a long 2017 University of Vermont dissertation quoting several Indian authors on the imperial influence on the post-colonial Indian army. Most interesting was the revelation that Viceroy Lord Archibald Wavell, a British military veteran, and his military chief Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck were on the same page in resisting repeated Whitehall interference, which they considered detrimental to the peaceful transition of power. For example, Auchinleck had opposed the INA trials as it would be harmful to the multi-religious Indian army, but he was overruled.

In 1946, Wavell suggested to the Whitehall to aim the transfer of power by March 1948. “Wavell’s own appreciation of any planned British withdrawal was that it must be treated largely as if it were a military plan made in time of war.” Among other things, he wanted the British military to be gradually moved into the Muslim regions, the most restive parts in northern India, “and put down the worst of the communal violence.”

However, the Attlee government chose to ignore his recommendation, which would have appeared as “a military retreat”. It chose to replace him with Mountbatten in February 1947 for a political solution.

Wavell’s “dismissal” and appointment of Lord Mountbatten was criticised by the House of Commons. However, Attlee argued that “the departure of Wavell emphasised that the responsibility for India, and its security, was now in Indian hands, even if it was still constitutionally bound to the United Kingdom.” The Vermont paper also said that the June 2, 1947, agreement by the Congress and the Muslim League was “followed on June 4th by the sudden announcement by Mountbatten of August 15th of that year as the date when power would formally transition from Britain to the Dominions.”

Auchinleck opposed the division of the Indian army on communal lines so soon. When he met Mountbatten, he told him that an orderly division would take at least 10 years, but he was given just 77 days.

However, by that time, Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, Auchinleck’s “subordinate” in North Africa in the Second World War, had taken over as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. Montgomery felt that Auchinleck was “wrapped up entirely in the Indian army” and that he paid little heed to the welfare of British soldiers in India. He recommended to Attlee and Mountbatten to dismiss him.

Was this the reason for the six British brigades not being deployed? Even if they had been deployed, would they have prevented the massacre?

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