Bruised Putin may still have his own way

Putin may have some more cards up his sleeve, including using his relationship with OPEC+, which has refused to raise its target to expand oil production higher than 400,000 barrels/month from April 1 onwards. Further, he will seek to consolidate an emergent Asia, with strong bilateral relationships and trade with 30-plus ‘abstaining’ members, most of whom are from Asia and Africa, and negotiate hard on gas with Europe.

Rampant: Permanence of the sanctions will spur Putin on for more muscle-flexing. AP

Vikram Singh

Former DGP, Uttar Pradesh

During the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the western media has amplified western hopes that US-EU sanctions will decimate Russia and break President Putin’s Hitlerian resolve to physically redraw borders in a hyper-connected modern world. However, almost two weeks after the invasion began, Russia continues to press forward city by city, having spread its ambitions to all ports on the Black Sea coast, undeterred, and possibly even more motivated, given the complete absence of any armed intervention by NATO.

American President Biden’s statement of non-intervention, coupled with NATO’s non-committal approach to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s desperate cry for a no-fly zone over Ukraine and the rushed US withdrawal from Afghanistan just six months ago — these were clear messages to Russian strategists that America will not intervene by land, sea or air, messages that would surely have been heard by Xi Jinping as well.

The chosen method of western intervention has been economic. With the crashed rouble and the stock market, restrictions on the use of at least half of foreign exchange reserves of $640 billion — those in gold, CNY (Chinese Yuan Renminbi) and SDRs (special drawing rights) remaining liquid — potentially limiting oil exports, transport and payments, and a highly inflationary 20 per cent interest rate, matters appear to be difficult for the Russian economy in the days ahead.

Yet, there are chinks in this approach. The US-EU hesitation in including Russia’s largest banks, Sberbank and Gazprombank, to the list of seven sanctioned banks is a gaping hole in the ‘stern’ measures adopted. Both are key facilitators of payments for Russia’s exports of 8 mbd (million barrels per day) oil and 15% of the EU’s imports of Russian gas, which is actually turning out to be a wedge between the US and the EU. The US seems to be drawing apart from EU by focusing only on oil, given American desperation for reviving JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and permitting at least 2.5 mbd of Iranian oil in global markets, a few months before its mid-term elections, already loaded against Biden, given his plummeting approval rating. The EU is focused only on gas and can ill-afford another hike in prices, given that the commodity costs twice more than the pre-pandemic level already. The flow of Russian natural gas to the EU continues and has even risen, even via pipelines passing through Ukraine.

Putin’s assessment of western reactions appears to have been based on real-time scenario-building. Russian troops were amassed over two months on Ukraine’s northern and eastern borders and the West only talked, unable to gauge Putin’s plans. This inaction encouraged him to declare Donetsk and Lugansk independent and build an almost contiguous land bridge north of the Crimean peninsula, lay siege to Mariupol and set his sights on Odessa, possibly intending to use the Russian Navy, all of which is steadily and conclusively pushing NATO’s expansionary ambitions back.

In another sign of western weakness, after just five days of the invasion, Zelenskyy was prompted to publicly sign an application to join the European Union only, but not for NATO — the West blinking first over Putin’s aggressive display of his intent to use the nuclear option. For NATO to initiate a hotline for a deconfliction zone with Russia, to obviate the negative effects of ordnance flying mistakenly into a NATO territory, was as good a certificate to Putin that Ukraine would not be ever taken in as a member. Therefore, 12 days after a blatant, publicly announced and war crime-ridden invasion, the western pushback is moderate to weak and not in the language any invader would understand.

A stronger immediate western reaction of including Ukraine in the EU and NATO would have surprised Putin. An even stronger statement would have been to actually send fighter jets with Ukrainian flags to strafe the several-mile-long sitting-duck convoy headed to Kyiv for so many days now. Putin’s slow movement into Kyiv appeared to military strategists as failure to advance faster on account of weak supply lines, insurgency and blown-up bridges. However, the relatively low use of the Russian Air Force, non-decimation of the Ukrainian Air Force and news of a regime change, with Viktor Yanukovych tipped to return as President, do indicate a possible Putin plan for post-invasion Ukraine. The plan clearly is to get Zelenskyy to surrender, the reward for which could be retention of the Ukrainian State and non-absorption in the Russian Federation, a move that would also pacify Ukrainian nationalists for the time being.

Putin seems set to succeed in his revivalism of Russian expansionism, albeit with the heavy price of sledge-hammer sanctions, which will not go away soon, whether he withdraws or not. In a way, permanence of the sanctions and the high probability of more western ostracism will spur Putin on for more territorial muscle-flexing.

Zelenskyy and the West allowing weapons into civilian hands all over the country and some countries encouraging nationals (read mercenaries) to travel to Ukraine to fight, are clear signs of the West having accepted Russian control as a fait accompli and is preparing for an insurgency. Once Russia enters Kyiv, finds and/or replaces Zelenskyy with friendly dissidents, western hegemony will have suffered a larger hit than the rushed withdrawal from Afghanistan last year.

Added to all this is the history of an expansionist China gobbling up Hong Kong, escalating threats to Taiwan, pushing into Bhutan in Doklam and fortifying a long border with India, and of Russia entering Georgia and Crimea, all opposed toothlessly by the west and the UN. The moment Putin manages a takeover of Kyiv, the world will wake up to a three-superpower world, with two of them propelling a resurgent Asia and the third declining fast. Ukraine may just turn out to be the first reversal of NATO’s expansionism, initiated after the humiliating dismemberment of USSR.

Putin may have some more cards up his sleeve, including using his relationship with OPEC+, which has refused to raise its target to expand production higher than 400,000 barrels/month from April 1 onwards. Further, he will seek to consolidate an emergent Asia, with strong bilateral relationships and trade with 30-plus ‘abstaining’ members, most of whom are from Asia and Africa; negotiate hard on gas with Europe; hold neon gas exports (Ukraine supplies 50 per cent of the world’s production) and palladium exports (Russia produces 43 per cent of the global supply) to stifle semi-conductor production; and mess up wheat markets, 25 per cent of which comes from Russia and Ukraine.

The lazy manner in which Putin’s army convoy is present around north of Kyiv is perhaps the most telling visual of this war, where all of Ukraine’s friends deserted it, leaving it only with words, promises and a budding insurgency.