Capitalise on high-altitude air operations

A big blunder in 1962 was not resorting to our superior air power, which we had then in terms of our Hunters and Canberras. The equation has no doubt changed, but India has to be prepared for high altitude operations against the Chinese all across the LAC. Infrastructure has to be built up to enhance our logistic wherewithal in the difficult terrain.

Countering the dragon: Air power sensibly employed in the mountains could turn the tide in favour of the initiator.

Group Captain Murli Menon (Retd)

Defence Analyst

In many ways, the ongoing standoff with the Chinese across the LAC reminds us of our bitter experiences of 1962. But there is no excuse to be surprised a second time by a recalcitrant adversary. The manner in which the Galwan debacle played out is uncannily similar to what the Chinese did to the Russians on the Manchurian Ussuri river in March 1969, including the targeting of the commanding officer.

That the Chinese should choose to indulge in such adventurism in the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and their own alleged role in creating it is surprising enough. And their ongoing aggressive forays in the South China Sea, Hongkong and Taiwan cannot be entirely coincidental. Clearly, there is a grand plan in the offing. A supposedly over keen Chinese Communist Party leader or a threatened President Xi Jinping attempting to counter internal ruffles within his establishment can only be other contributory factors.

But what India’s response needs to be is what should agitate all strategist minds now. Very clearly, the rules of engagement along the LAC need redefining. It is ridiculous to think of modern militaries fighting with stones and nailed batons. The basic principle in warfare is to pitch your strength against the enemy’s weakness.

In the Galwan valley, the terrain goes up to 15,000 ft AMSL (above mean sea level), with Leh and Thoise airfields being at around 11,000-10,000 ft AMSL and Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) at 16,614 feet. It is thus going to be a different kind of warfare altogether, something we ought to have equipped and trained for.

Now that both foreign ministers are talking of de-escalation, whilst we go along with any suitable proposals from the Chinese, we have to ratchet up our military’s tactical posturing in the area. That would mean the Army deploying troops to occupy advantageous high points and the IAF buttressing its air defence and offensive air support capabilities out of Leh, Thoise and DBO airfields.

A big blunder in 1962 was not resorting to our superior air power, which we had then in terms of our Hunters and Canberras. The equation has changed drastically no doubt, but India has to be prepared for a series of high-

altitude operations against the Chinese all across the LAC.

Meanwhile, infrastructure on the ground along the frontage of the LAC has to be expeditiously built up to enhance our logistic wherewithal in the difficult terrain. Though the Chinese may enjoy superiority in numbers, as far as the armies are concerned, we have to capitalise on our profound high-altitude air operations skills, honed since Siachen and Kargil, to smartly employ our air power to advantage against the Chinese.

As and when the likes of S-400 and THAD (terminal high altitude area defence) materialise, they have to be integrated into the air defence of the Leh area. Aircraft of the Mirage and SU30 class with their standoff and PGM (precision-guided munition) capabilities could be effectively employed to provide the force multiplier effect to our ground troops.

Also, our assets such as the new Apache/Chinook helicopters and the C-17/Hercules transporters would find valuable usage in this terrain. Trainer aircraft such as the Hawks and Pilatus would be good platforms to exploit too. The IAF already has high-altitude air ranges located at places such as Kartso, Kargil and Toshi Maidan, which need to be utilised for realistic operational training for weapon delivery and other aerial tactics. Our air power capabilities need to be deployed, albeit in a graded escalatory manner, to bring on unbearable pressure on the enemy.

Should suitable large targets, such as the formation HQ of the PLA or PLAAF, be available, the use of ground- or air-launched Brahmos missiles could also be considered.

One of the classic outcomes of the ‘Himalayan blunder’ was our government’s failure to declassify the Henderson Brooks report into the 1962 war. Had we done that in a timely fashion, many of the challenges of high-altitude warfare would have been addressed by now. But it is better late than never and capabilities have to be put in place forthwith.

Mountain warfare is not only critical for the Indian Army, but also for our air and sea elements. Some sea operations on the Pangong Tso lake could also be envisaged. Air defences need to cater to the Chinese SSM (surfeace-to-surface missile) threat too. High-altitude air warfare has its peculiarities owing to weapon delivery difficulties, aspects such as landslides and avalanches that could be intentionally triggered by air power and challenges in combat search and rescue.

Limitations in line-of-sight considerations for radar sensors and communications, terrain masking and its advantages are some other aspects to be considered. Passive air defence aspects, such as the availability of hardened shelters at Leh, DBO and Thoise, would also need to be addressed. Of course, any action along the LAC could have the possibility of Pakistan opening up a front in the West.

Battle staff management is another important aspect, where our experience in orchestrating the air war from Awantipur during Op Safed Sagar would come in handy. All in all, air power sensibly employed could turn the tide in favour of the initiator. Adaptation to base air defence, such as tactical usage of terrain to deploy mobile observer units, could compensate for ground radar limitations in the mountainous terrain. Recourse to shoulder fireds as opposed to impractical and unwieldy SAGWs (surface-to-air guided weapons) may need to be taken.

Clearly, all air capability for an air campaign in the mountains off Ladakh does not obtain as of now. So, the IAF will have to have a building-block approach to orchestrating any such campaign. But should we be able to pull it off, results in terms of overall campaign objectives would be out of proportion and in our favour.

It behoves the government to give a free reign to the three military chiefs to marshal a befitting tactical response to our land-grabbing neighbour.